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ABSTRACT
We are in a state of overshoot; the human population today consumes
natural resources at a rate that exceeds what the planet can sustainably pro-
vide in the long term (Meadows et al., 2004). Two key causes of this over-
shoot are the overconsumption of natural resources, and the reluctance or
inability of society to remedy this overconsumption through the appropri-
ate use and deployment of technology and management practices. In this
light, the work contained in this dissertation is intended to explore poten-
tial solutions that operations management can provide to mitigate the im-
pact of these two causes of overshoot. Therefore, in the spirit of the Triple
Bottom Line (3BL) framework for sustainability, we evaluate environmen-
tal and social, along with the economic implications of strategic and opera-
tional decisions in the contexts of natural resource management and green
product development in this dissertation.
Freshwater is an invaluable resource to all life on earth. Groundwa-
ter reservoirs, an important source of freshwater, are drying up across the
United States and the globe, creating a severe mismatch in the supply and
demand of freshwater. Two new management paradigms have cropped up
in recent years to remedy this mismatch: water trading and privatization.
The first essay in this dissertation explores the impact of these paradigms
on groundwater management and the ensuing 3BL implications.
Voluntary green product development has emerged as a viable alterna-
tive to the traditional ’command and control’ approach for environmental
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regulation. The second essay in this chapter addresses a producer’s prob-
lem of labeling its product to communicate its environmental attributes that
are otherwise invisible to consumers. The key objectives of this essay are
to identify the efficacy of external ecolabeling agencies and the role of pro-
ducer credibility in stimulating green product development and its result-
ing benefits from a 3BL perspective.
The final essay in this dissertation explores the phenomenon of pre-
competitive collaboration between firms in the context of green product
development. In it, we identify the motivation for and the 3BL implications
of horizontal R&D collaboration between competing supply chains as well
as vertical collaboration within a supply chain through cost-sharing.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“There is no more strategic issue for a company, or any organization,
than its ultimate purpose. For those who think business exists to make a
profit, I suggest they think again. Business makes a profit to exist. Surely it
must exist for some higher, nobler purpose than that.”
- Ray C. Anderson
More firms are pursuing a sustainability agenda today than at any other
time in history, and they are doing so by going beyond their concern for
reputation management (Bonini, 2011). But what does sustainability really
mean? The most widely quoted definition of sustainability comes from
the Brundtland report of 1987, “development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs” (Brundtland et al., 1987). Three decades later, while there
has been some progress, including new technologies, institutions, and an
awareness of environmental issues, humanity has continued to increase its
ecological footprint that is now well in excess of the earth’s carrying capac-
ity (Meadows et al., 2004). John Holdren and Paul Ehrlich noted that the
impact of humans on the environment can be represented by a combina-
tion of population, resource use per person (which they call affluence), and
damage per unit of resource used (which they refer to as technology), i.e.,
the PAT formula as depicted in Figure 1 (Holdren and Ehrlich, 1974). As
populations continue to rise along with affluence afforded by a growing
industrial complex, we are in imminent danger of outstripping the planet
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of its ability to sustain us, and thus, the importance of sustainability has
never been greater than it is today.
Figure 1. Holdren and Ehrlich’s formula for environmental
impact
Consumers demand socially and environmentally benign products,
competitors carve out and take advantage of new market niches made pos-
sible by sustainable innovations, resource availability and prices remain
volatile, investors and special interest groups demand a holistic focus, and
regulators threaten to impose new and expensive regulation. All of the
above are valid and persuasive reasons for firms to take sustainability se-
riously. There is considerable evidence that firms are indeed beginning to
take sustainability seriously. For example, a global survey of over 1500 se-
nior executives found that 92% of respondents said their companies were
already doing something to address sustainability issues (Berns et al., 2009).
More than 80% of the Global Fortune 250 companies produced annual sus-
tainability reports to disclose their environmental performance and initia-
tives in 2008, and that number has since been growing (Kolk, 2008).
However, without well defined metrics and guidelines, sustainability
becomes an abstract concept with little practical relevance. One framework
that has emerged in recent years to measure and evaluate the impacts of
management policies on multiple stakeholders; people, planet, and profit,
is the Triple Bottom Line (3BL) (Elkington, 1998). Kleindorfer et al. (2005)
point out that Operations Management has a significant role in measur-
ing and reducing the impacts of firms on these stakeholders. Indeed, there
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is a growing literature in Operations Management that adopts a 3BL per-
spective which requires firms to expand their focus to consider social and
environmental consequences aside from the economic objective of profit.
Environmental performance measurement has been considered in a va-
riety of contexts including supplier selection (Handfield et al., 2002; Bai
and Sarkis, 2010), pollution removal and prevention (Islegen and Reichel-
stein, 2011; Kraft et al., 2013b,a), remanufacturing and waste minimization
(Souza, 2013; Ata et al., 2012; Galbreth et al., 2013), electric vehicle deploy-
ment (Avci et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014) etc. Social performance metrics have
also been studied, for instance, in the context of supplier selection (Pagell
et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2015), and social enterprise operations
(Sodhi and Tang, 2011; Balasubramanian and Drake, 2015).
It is in light of the relevance and importance of sustainability to busi-
nesses today that I present my dissertation titled “Three essays in sustain-
able operations management with implications for the Triple Bottom Line”.
The three essays in my dissertation are drawn from developments in the
fields of operations management, industrial organization, natural resource
economics, and marketing. While the modeling schemes and contexts of
application of these essays may vary, they are unified in their focus to ob-
tain managerial and policy prescriptions to instruct the development and
diffusion of sustainability in production and consumption.
The three essays in this thesis are characterized by two key features,
the first of which is a 3BL perspective. The 3BL concept is an accounting
framework for assessing the impacts of business practices using context-
specific measures of environmental impact, social equity, and similar con-
structs with the ultimate goal of balancing societal and environmental con-
cerns with economic objectives (Elkington, 1998). The 3BL concept addresses
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the impact of strategic and operational decisions on stakeholders not ex-
plicitly considered by standard management objectives. The three essays
in this thesis contribute to the literature in Operations Management and
related fields by extending the 3BL perspective beyond these contexts to
the areas of natural resource management, ecolabeling and environmental
quality competition, and collaboration within and across supply chains for
research and development in sustainability.
The second characteristic feature of this thesis is the search for manage-
rial and policy prescriptions to promote sustainability. The need for regula-
tion to protect society and the environment gets widespread but grudging
acceptance: widespread because everyone wants a livable planet, grudg-
ing because of the lingering belief that social and environmental regula-
tions erode competitiveness (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). The tradi-
tional view of sustainability in business practices assumes the existence of
a trade-off between social and environmental stewardship and economic
prosperity. Organizations often perceive the increased costs of production
and investments required to develop more sustainable products and pro-
cesses as a burden. This view pits benefits to society and the environment
against the prospect of economic gains. However, there is a growing con-
sensus among academics and practitioners that sustainable practices can
add economic value by cutting operating costs, increasing revenues and
market share, and by positioning a firm or organization to remain relevant
in a global arena where sustainability is projected to become the norm and
constraint to doing business (Vachon and Klassen, 2008; Anderson, 2009).
An extensive 2009 survey of corporate executives identified the following
reasons (in Figure 2) for pursuing a sustainability agenda.
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Figure 2. Source: Berns et al. (2009)
This leaves us with the following question: Can private enterprise be
sustainable without external intervention or regulation? When and how is
regulation or intervention by external agencies needed to ensure socially
and environmentally responsible business practices? These questions are
addressed in each of the three essays that follow this chapter.
The first of the three essays in this dissertation is contained in Chap-
ter 2, and tackles a natural resource management problem. The growing
scarcity of freshwater has led to a new management paradigm, two ingre-
dients of which are market-like institutions for the reallocation of water,
and the privatization of water management. The 3BL approach is particu-
larly relevant in this context due to the importance of water from a societal
and environmental perspective. Accordingly, the overarching purpose of
this chapter is to assess the implications of the aforementioned manage-
ment paradigms for society and the environment in the spirit of the 3BL
approach for sustainable management. The specific resource in considera-
tion is a renewable groundwater aquifer. We formulate a deterministic opti-
mal control model to study a welfare-maximizing community’s problem of
managing its groundwater aquifer, and determine optimal extraction and
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allocation policies in the presence of market-based water transfer oppor-
tunities. We also study the impact of privatizing the management of the
community’s groundwater on the optimal extraction and allocation poli-
cies, and contrast the results of welfare and profit-maximizing groundwa-
ter management along societal and environmental dimensions in the spirit
of the 3BL approach. To this end, we define context specific measures of
environmental and societal performance in this chapter.
We find that access to water reallocation opportunities will have a detri-
mental (beneficial) societal and environmental impact in exporting (import-
ing) communities. However, from a global perspective that captures im-
pacts across trading communities, we find that water reallocation can be
beneficial to society and the environment given certain hydrological char-
acteristics. In particular, we note that water trading between communities
with hydrologically similar endowments of groundwater can be beneficial
from a global 3BL perspective. In contrast, trade between communities
endowed with aquifers with vastly dissimilar hydrological characteristics
results in detrimental global social and environmental consequences. This
is particularly problematic because of the sizeable economic gains to be
realized from trading between such communities. We also find that priva-
tization of groundwater management will result in negative societal conse-
quences in the exporting community. However, privatization can be ben-
eficial to the environment. Moreover, privatization also results in positive
societal and environmental implications from a global perspective when
only the communities with specific hydrological characterestics are priva-
tized.
The second essay in Chapter 3 studies a problem of environmental
quality competition. Several studies in the literature have addressed green
product design and environmental quality competition (for example, see
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Chen (2001); Amacher et al. (2004)). A key characteristic of environmen-
tal product attributes is their unobservability, i.e., they cannot be searched
for or experienced by consumers, and therefore need to be communicated
through the use of credible ecolabels. Environmental claims can be made
unilaterally by the producer, or by acquiring voluntary ecolabels from ex-
ternal certification agencies that stipulate labeling fees and an environmen-
tal standard that the product must meet before it can use their label. Pro-
ducers consider acquiring external ecolabels because while their own en-
vironmental claims are discounted by consumers, external ecolabels enjoy
full credibility and thus boost demand for a product bearing them. The
primary contribution of this essay to the literature is to explore this as-
pect of green product development - ecolabeling by external certification
agencies. We develop a Stackelberg game with the external certification
agency in the role of a leader. By comparing the societal, environmental,
and economic performance resulting from an environmental-benefit maxi-
mizing NGO certification agency and a profit-maximizing private certifica-
tion agency, we identify conditions under which intervention by external
agencies may be beneficial.
From the societal perspective, depending on the parameters in ques-
tion, consumers may be better off with an NGO or private ecolabeling
scheme, or neither. However, despite creating an opportunity to boost de-
mand, external ecolabeling schemes hurt producer profits. From the en-
vironmental perspective, we find that while external ecolabeling schemes
improve environmental outcomes regardless of the source, NGO’s will im-
pose a higher environmental standard while private certifiers will charge
a positive labeling fee and impose lower environmental standards on pro-
ducers, consequently underproviding environmental benefits. Noting that
the environmental perspective is most salient given the intended purpose
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of ecolabeling schemes, we explore the role of NGOs in mitigating the un-
derprovision of environmental benefits by a private ecolabeling scheme by
anticipating their entry and announcing their own ecolabeling scheme in
advance. We find that while such intervention has no impact in a pro-
ducer monopoly, it improves environmental outcomes in the presence of
producer competition. This essay also addresses the impact of credibility of
environmental claims made by producers on green product development
and the efficacy of external ecolabeling schemes.
The third essay in Chapter 4 was motivated by observing an interest-
ing phenomenon: a growing number of organizations have begun to col-
laborate across previously inviolable boundaries to co-develop and share
sustainable innovations. While the impact of supply chain coordination
on sustainability has been studied (Klassen and Vachon, 2003; Swami and
Shah, 2012), collaboration across supply chains is relatively unexplored.
Examples of such collaborative alliances include the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition with its partners including competitors Nike and New Balance,
and WalMart and Target, among others, and the Climate Savers Comput-
ing Initiative with Google, Intel, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, Apple etc.
as its member organizations. This observation leads to the obvious ques-
tion: why do competing firms collaborate with each other? And what im-
pact does such collaboration have from a 3BL perspective? We address
these questions in this essay by analyzing a parsimonius model of pre-
competitive collaboration within and across competing supply chains.
We find that vertical collaboration through cost-sharing within a sup-
ply chain can increase the level of environmental investments and improve
social and environmental implications. The impacts of horizontal collabo-
ration however depend on the competitive intensity between the collab-
orating supply chains: at higher (lower) levels of competitive intensity,
8
horizontal collaboration leads to a lower (higher) investment in sustain-
ability and consequently, in negative (positive) implications for society and
the environment. However, regardless of competitive intensity, competing
OEM’s benefit from collaboration, which explains why we observe a grow-
ing number of such collaborative alliances.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation. It contains a summary of contri-
butions, a description of the limitations, as well as potential extensions to
our work here. Additional figures and tables as well as proofs are provided
in Appendices.
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CHAPTER 2
MUNICIPAL GROUNDWATERMANAGEMENT:
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF A
RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCE
2.1. Introduction
As the world’s supply of freshwater is burdened by the increasing de-
mands of a growing population, the insulation and subsistence of munici-
pal water systems on local sources of water may not be possible in the near
future. Indeed, the Natural Resources Defense Council (2010) projects that
by 2025, the world will experience over a 40% mismatch in the supply and
demand for clean water, and over 30% of states in the continental United
States are expected to experience severe water shortages by the middle of
the 21st century. The growing scarcity of freshwater has led to a changing
water management paradigm with an emphasis on finding or developing
new sources of water supply, addressing increasing and newly realized de-
mands, and incorporating societal and ecological considerations into water
management policies (Gleick, 2000). Groundwater in particular is an im-
portant source of freshwater across the globe. Indeed, it accounts for 33%
of the total freshwater used in the United States, and many communities,
including for example, San Antonio, Texas, and 38 of Virginia’s 95 coun-
ties, rely exclusively on groundwater for their needs (Kenny et al., 2009).
In light of these observations, we study two important issues focused on
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groundwater in this chapter, namely, water transfers as a means of reallo-
cating groundwater to address spatially differentiated demands, and pri-
vatization of groundwater-based municipal water supply systems within
the context of water transfers.
The majority of arguments opposing groundwater transfers and priva-
tization are made on the grounds of perceived deleterious impacts on the
local community and the environment. In general, management objectives
do not directly address the interests of these external stakeholders. Never-
theless, broader frameworks have evolved in recent years to measure and
evaluate the impacts of management policies on these external stakehold-
ers. The Triple Bottom Line (3BL) concept is one such framework for assess-
ing the impacts of business practices using context-specific measures of en-
vironmental impact, social equity, and similar constructs with the ultimate
goal of balancing societal and environmental concerns with economic objec-
tives (Elkington, 1998). The 3BL concept is particularly relevant in our con-
text of municipal water supply management. Accordingly, the overarching
purpose of this chapter is to assess the implications of the aforementioned
groundwater management paradigms for society and the environment in
the spirit of the 3BL approach for sustainable management.
Historically, especially in the Western United States before the 1970’s,
the institutions that evolved to manage water scarcity were committed to
increasing supply capacity with large amounts of capital invested in stor-
age and conveyance infrastructure. However, an increase in demand, costs
of capital, and water scarcity have shifted the focus to market-like insti-
tutions for the efficient reallocation of water (Vaux and Howitt, 1984). In-
formal markets for groundwater trading between agricultural users occur
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in developing regions of the world where the appropriate legal and ad-
ministrative institutions to enable transactions do not exist, such as in In-
dia (Saleth, 1998) and Pakistan (Meinzen-Dick, 1998). Formal and well-
developed water markets with significant volumes of trade exist in Chile,
South Africa, Australia, and the Western United States (Grafton et al., 2010).
Groundwater transfers may take the form of permanent sales of water
rights. For example, in Texas, the city of Amarillo purchased rights to
pump water and transfer it from under 72,000 acres of land in Roberts
County, and the city of San Antonio has a contract with Alcoa to pump
and transfer 55,000 acre-feet of groundwater from Lee and Milam counties
(Kaiser, 2005). Alternatively, groundwater can also be transferred through
leases in a water market, such as in the case of the Rio Grande market in
Texas (Yoskowitz, 1999) and the California Emergency Drought Water Bank
(Israel and Lund, 1995).
However, groundwater transfers such as these are sometimes contro-
versial for their impacts on the environment and for their implications for
affordability and accessibility to water within the exporting communities
(Bakker, 2007). Depletion of local sources as a result of groundwater ex-
ports have resulted in local ordinances being passed in the state of Califor-
nia and the American Southwest to restrict and control the terms of these
transactions (Hanak and Dyckman, 2002). There is also considerable oppo-
sition from environmentalist groups on the grounds of severe impacts on
the watersheds in and around the exporting community, as is the case for
example with Cadiz Inc.’s proposal to export groundwater from the Mo-
jave Desert to suburbs in Southern California (Hart, 2008). Hence, the first
objective of this study is to determine the groundwater management pol-
icy for a municipality with water reallocation opportunities and to evaluate
ensuing implications for society and the environment.
12
A second line of inquiry is to study the effect of privatization of
groundwater-based municipal water supply sytems. An increasing trend
of privatization of municipal water supply systems since the 1990’s has led
to water being dubbed the “oil of the 21st century” (Tully, 2000). Priva-
tization of municipal water systems can take many forms, from subcon-
tracts for facility and distribution infrastructure operations to monopoly
control, although we focus only on the latter in this chapter. Privatization
may also imply the ownership of water rights by private interests such as
farmer or landowner collectives. In some instances, private water rights
are held with the express intent of marketing them. Two examples are
Mesa Water (a landowner partnership in Roberts county, Texas) and Rio
Nuevo Ltd. (a private firm) that are seeking buyers for their groundwater
(Kaiser, 2005). Detractors cite overpricing, quantity rationing, and profi-
teering from exports as reasons to oppose privatization (Bakker, 2007). In-
deed, widespread protests have been witnessed in Bolivia, India, and the
Middle East in response to drastic rate hikes following privatization (Bar-
low and Clarke, 2005). However, proponents of privatization argue that
it leads to a more judicious use of scarce water resources. Moreover, they
claim that private ownership is more likely to foster rapid development
and investment in creating substitutes for naturally occuring freshwater
that will reduce the burden on groundwater sources (Hauter, 2012). There
is some evidence to support this claim, as a vast majority of desalination
projects around the globe are privately owned or operated and are expand-
ing rapidly with installed capacity increasing at a rate of 7% annually (Gle-
ick and Cooley, 2006). Hence, the second objective of this chapter is to de-
termine and contrast the impacts of privatization on groundwater manage-
ment and water reallocation policies and to explore ensuing implications
for society and the environment.
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The groundwater source we consider is a renewable and exhaustible
aquifer with endogenous costs of extraction. We study the groundwa-
ter management problem for a welfare-maximizing municipality using a
stylized dynamic optimization model. We consider two prominent mech-
anisms of water reallocation identified from an empirical analysis of water
market structures in the Western United States (Hansen et al., 2008). In
particular, we first model the export or import of water on a lease basis
at an exogenous price that is characteristic of, and which we refer to as,
a water market. Second, we model permanent sales of groundwater rights
through an endogenously determined price-quantity agreement between
two municipalities, which we refer to as a fixed quantity contract. In both
cases, we assume that a given municipality manages its own aquifer that
is hydrologically disconnected from other aquifers and the water market.
We also assume that the exogenous price in the case of a water market is
fixed and constant. We discuss the limitations of these assumptions and
the challenges posed by relaxing them in Conclusion. Following our analy-
sis of groundwater reallocation, we consider profit-maximization in lieu of
welfare-maximization as the management objective to study and contrast
the impact of privatization on groundwater management, groundwater re-
allocation, and investment in water production technologies. Throughout,
we define surrogate measures of local and global societal and environmen-
tal impacts to evaluate the performance of these groundwater management
paradigms from a 3BL perspective.
The key results and contributions of this chapter can be summarized as
follows:
(1) We characterize groundwater management policies in the con-
text of two prominent water reallocation mechanisms. We find
a threshold policy that depends on the water level in the aquifer
14
to be optimal for governing the municipality’s decision to export
or import water in a water market. From a 3BL perspective, we
find that exporting (importing) water leads to negative (positive)
impacts on society and the environment within that municipality
at steady-state. However, fixed quantity trading can lead to both
positive and negative implications from a global 3BL perspective.
We therefore identify the hydro-economic conditions under which
these implications occur, and find that typical trading scenarios be-
tween municipalities with vastly different endowments of ground-
water can be detrimental to the environment.
(2) We study the impact of privatization on groundwater manage-
ment policies and their 3BL implications. We find that a munic-
ipality importing water through a water market may switch in-
stead to exporting water following privatization. Moreover, as
partial confirmation of concerns voiced by its detractors, we find
that privatization results in negative implications for society at a
local level. However, under export bans, privatization of a munic-
ipality can have positive implications for the environment because
it mitigates the unintended overextraction of groundwater in the
transition to steady-state (which is akin to the green paradox). We
also find that fixed quantity trading is particularly beneficial from
a global 3BL perspective if only one of the municipalities is priva-
tized, but such trade leads instead to especially negative impacts
from a global 3BL perspective if both of the municipalities are pri-
vatized. Finally, contrary to popular claims, we show that priva-
tization does not encourage the development of water production
technologies.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We provide a brief re-
view of the relevant streams of literature in §2.2 to position and emphasize
the contribution of our work. We introduce the model setting and solve the
municipality’s dynamic optimization problem in a water market in §2.3.
Then in §2.4, we study privatization and its implications. We conclude
the chapter in §2.5. Problem formulations not included in the body of the
chapter are provided in Appendix A1, and technical proofs are provided in
Appendix A2.
2.2. Relation to Literature
Our model and its application context are related to four streams of lit-
erature, the first of which concerns the extraction of natural resources. The
modern theory of exhaustible resource extraction traces its roots to the the-
ory of the mine (Hotelling, 1931), but it has evolved to address renewable
resources and multiple spatially differentiated deposits and users, both for
the case of centralized management (Shimomura, 1983; Krulce et al., 1997)
and for the case of open access (Clark, 1990). Saleh et al. (2011) compare
centralized groundwater management policies with open access exploita-
tion, but they consider only a single source of groundwater. Other studies
in this stream consider the related problem of exhaustible resource man-
agement with the possibility of transitioning to the importation of exoge-
nously priced substitutes (Sethi and Sorger, 1990; Roumasset and Wada,
2012) or investing in susbtitute production capacity (Fuller and Vickson,
1987; Holland, 2003). We combine the features of multiple renewable re-
source deposits and demands in the context of decentralized management
with exclusive user rights, and augment this literature by considering sub-
stitution through groundwater reallocation (imports as well as exports) at
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exogenously fixed prices in a water market or by endogenously determined
prices through a fixed quantity contract.
The second stream focuses on privatization of water management.
Within this domain, Bruggink (1992) provides an excellent overview of
the arguments favoring privatization of groundwater. Dawande et al.
(2013) study the problem of allocating surface water through various mar-
ket mechanisms for a farming community to achieve an equitable distribu-
tion. In addition, a number of studies (for example, see Fractor (1988) and
Holland (2003)) address privatization of groundwater management with
varying modeling assumptions related to hydrology and demand func-
tions. However, with the exception of Holland (2003, 2006) who considers
investment in a capacity constrained substitute, none of these papers ad-
dress alternatives for local groundwater extraction in the form of produced
substitutes or reallocation mechanisms.
The third stream relates to studies of water reallocation. These focus
primarily on the economic efficiency of water transfers (for example, see
Vaux and Howitt (1984), Howe et al. (1986), and Calatrava and Garrido
(2005)). Weinberg et al. (1993) analytically estimate the impact of water
transfers on water quality. Saliba et al. (1987) discusses the impact of wa-
ter transfers on social equity and cultural implications for marginalized
communities. Howe and Goemans (2003) empirically estimate the socio-
economic repercussions of water transfers in two different regions of Col-
orado. They find that low transaction costs and more frequent intra-basin
transfers in economically diversified communities are likely to have pos-
itive societal and economic impacts, whereas large inter-basin transfers
in highly specialized (typically agricultural) communities can have severe
socio-economic consequences. However, these studies do not consider the
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municipality’s problem of water management given a specification of hy-
drological and economic conditions. Rather, they take demand and supply
functions of municipalities as given. Moreover, none of these studies ad-
dress groundwater management or privatization.
An important contribution of our work to the literature on exhaustible
resource extraction is the application of a 3BL perspective to evaluate dif-
ferent groundwater management paradigms. In this respect, the fourth
stream of literature to which our work is related falls within the area of
Operations Management, particularly the nascent domain of socially re-
sponsible operations, and addresses the impact of management policies on
stakeholders not explicitly considered by standard management objectives.
Kleindorfer et al. (2005) and Tang and Zhou (2012) provide two particularly
relevant reviews of 3BL and related frameworks within the context of Oper-
ations Management applications and models. In a similar vein, Wang et al.
(2015) consider the optimal allocation of farmland, a renewable but inex-
haustible resource, for the production of biofuel crops through subsidiza-
tion while taking into account environmental sustainability and the growth
of the biofuel industry. In addition, there is a substantial literature study-
ing the effectiveness of Environmental Management Systems (EMS), such
as the ISO 14000 family of certifications, and Total Quality Environmental
Management (TQEM), and their implications for profitability of the firm
(Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Delmas, 2001; Melnyk et al., 2003; Cor-
bett and Klassen, 2006). Our work differs from these studies in applying
the 3BL approach for socially responsible and environmentally sustainable
management outside the context of manufacturing and supply chains. In-
deed, the importance of sustainable and socially responsible management
practices is arguably greater in our context because they have a more di-
rect and measurable impact on the external stakeholders, i.e., society and
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the environment, relative to the traditional contexts of manufacturing and
supply chains that are the typical focus of this stream of literature.
2.3. A Model of Groundwater Management
We consider a groundwater reservoir with deterministic hydrodynam-
ics that we refer to as an aquifer. The defining feature of the aquifer in the
context of our model is its water level (i.e., the depth of the aquifer) de-
noted by xt at time t. The water level in the aquifer is governed by three
forces, the first of which is refill from rainfall and surface water runoff that
replenishes the aquifer. The second is the leakage from the boundaries of
the aquifer that tends to increase with the water level due to a greater sur-
face area and higher hydrostatic pressure on the boundaries of the aquifer.
The third is the quantity (i.e., volume) of water extracted from the aquifer at
time t, qt. To focus on the economics instead of the hydrodynamics, we do
not explicitly model refill and leakage; rather, we define recharge to repre-
sent the net volume of water entering the aquifer as a result of the refill and
leakage forces. Later, in the numerical analyses of §2.3.2 and §2.4.1, we will
adopt a specific functional form for recharge. For now, we assume that the
recharge G(xt) is such that G′(xt) < 0, G′′(xt) ≤ 0, and G(K) = 0, where
K denotes the maximum possible water level in the aquifer, which we refer
to as capacity. These assumptions on recharge are common in the literature
(see, for example, Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991)) and are typically used
to model porous, sandy, or coastal aquifers where losses from leakage tend
to be considerable (Roumasset and Wada, 2012). Given G(xt) and qt, the net
rate of change of the water level in the aquifer can be described in principle
by the differential equation dxtdt = ρ(G(xt) − qt), where ρ > 0 is a factor
that converts water volume to water level (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980). For
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analytical convenience, we set ρ = 1 because such a parameterization does
not qualitatively affect our analysis.
The water level in the aquifer also affects the costs of extraction. We
assume that the unit cost of extraction increases as the water level in the
aquifer falls because the required pumping lift increases and deeper wells
must be dug. In particular, consistent with the literature, we use a con-
vex decreasing unit extraction cost function c(xt), c′(xt) < 0, c′′(xt) >
0, and c(K) = 0 (see, for example, Krulce et al. (1997)). Further, we as-
sume that the unit cost of extraction at time t is independent of the quantity
extracted at that time qt, as is the case when the quantity extracted is rela-
tively small in comparison with the volume of the aquifer. We assume that
conveyance infrastructure for transferring water between municipalities is
already in place, i.e., we do not explicitly consider transportation costs in
our model. Such a cost can be captured trivially and does not change our
results qualitatively.
In our modeling framework, we define a municipality to be the basic
unit of groundwater management by stipulating that a given municipal-
ity controls a single aquifer to serve a single community. A municipality
may refer to a town or to a collective of farmers or landowners. Water
extracted from the aquifer is either sold for consumption within the mu-
nicipality or exported outside the municipality through a water market or
a fixed quantity contract. We note here that the water market is hydrolog-
ically disconnected from the municipality, such that the export or import
of groundwater through the market has no direct impact on the municipal-
ity’s aquifer except through a change in its optimal extraction decisions.
Empirical examination of the elasticity of municipal demand for water
has found that it is decreasing in the quantity of water sold for consump-
tion (Espey et al., 1997; Harou et al., 2009). Accordingly, we define a linear
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demand function p(lt) = a− blt, where a, b > 0, to characterize the price
of a quantity lt of water sold for consumption within a municipality at time
t. The parameter a embodies factors including population, income, and the
relative proportions of residential, agricultural, and industrial demands; b
represents the aggregate price-sensitivity of demand. This demand func-
tion, which represents disparate individual demands that are aggregated
across residential, industrial, and agricultural uses within a municipality,
is consistent with related literature. In particular, the linear specification
has been used in the empirical literature to estimate the demand for water
(Espey et al., 1997; Hanemann, 1998), in analytical models of groundwater
management (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Feinerman and Knapp, 1983), and
in analytical and empirical models analyzing water transfers (Vaux and
Howitt, 1984; Dinar and Letey, 1991; Weinberg et al., 1993).
We assume that the objective of the municipality is to maximize its total
welfare, i.e., the economic surplus for its community, where economic sur-
plus is the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Consumer surplus is
defined as the difference between the consumers’ maximum willingness to
pay and the equilibrium price paid (i.e., the area under the demand curve
up to the equilibrium quantity supplied). Producer surplus is the economic
profit accruing to the producer (i.e., the revenue net of total costs). An ex-
ample of such a welfare-maximizing municipality in the context of water
supply management is the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) of South-
ern California (O’Connor, 1998). Later in §2.4, we model profit-maximizing
water supply management to study the impact of privatization.
Given this modeling framework, we first study a single municipality’s
participation in a water market defined by a constant exogenous price s in
§2.3.1. Following this, we study the equilibrium between two municipal-
ities interacting through a fixed quantity contract for trading water rights
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at an endogenously determined price in §2.3.2. Mathematical notations are
summarized in Table 1.
Variable/Parameter Description
t Time ( 0 ≤ t < ∞)
xt Water level at time t ≥ 0; 0 ≤ xt ≤ K
c(xt) Unit cost of water extraction at water level xt
lt Total quantity of water sold locally at time t; lt ≥ 0
et Total quantity of water exported at time t; et ≥ 0
it Total quantity of water imported at time t; it ≥ 0
qt Total quantity of water extracted at time t; qt = lt − it + et
p(lt) Price of water sold within the municipality; p(lt) = a− blt
s Price in the water market
G(xt) Groundwater recharge at water level xt; G(xt) ≥ 0
δ Discount rate; 0 < δ ≤ 1
K Capacity of the aquifer; K = G−1(0)
Table 1. Modeling notation
2.3.1. Water Markets. We begin by considering the problem faced by
a municipality with the option to participate in a water market. As one
example of a water market, the California Emergency Drought Water Bank
of 1991 paid a fixed price of $125/acre-foot of water to all sellers (Israel and
Lund, 1995). The municipality must determine how much groundwater
to sell for consumption within the municipality lt, as well as how much
water to export et or import it on the water market for all t. Water is sold
within the municipality at a price p(lt) = a− blt and in the water market
at a constant exogenous price s, as in Dinar and Letey (1991), Weinberg
et al. (1993), and Calatrava and Garrido (2005). The total quantity of water
extracted from the aquifer at time t is the sum of the water that is sold
for local consumption net of the water imported for that purpose, and the
water exported on the water market: qt = lt − it + et. The municipality’s
problem can be formulated as follows:
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maximize
lt,et,it
ˆ ∞
0
e−δt

ˆ lt
0
(a− bu)du + s(et − it)− c(xt)(lt − it + et)
 dt,
(2.3.1)
Subject to
dxt
dt
= G(xt)− (lt − it + et),
lt, et, it, xt ≥ 0.
In (2.3.1), the welfare from consumption of water within the municipality
at time t is captured by the term
´ lt
0 (a− bu)du− c(xt)(lt − it)− sit, and the
profit from exporting through the water market at time t is captured by
(s − c(xt))et. The total welfare and revenue from local consumption and
exports are obtained by integrating over an infinite horizon and applying
a discount rate δ > 0 to future streams. The first constraint represents the
hydrodynamics of the aquifer, where the change in water level at time t is
given by the recharge G(xt) less the total quantity of water extracted from
the aquifer. The second constraint stipulates that the water level in the
aquifer as well as the quantities of water consumed locally, exported, and
imported must be non-negative at all times t.
The municipality’s problem (2.3.1) is a deterministic optimal control
problem over an infinite horizon. This problem can be solved using stan-
dard techniques by applying the maximum principle to provide the neces-
sary conditions for optimality. These conditions are also sufficient due to
the concavity of the integrand and linearity of the equation of motion in
the decision variables in this problem (Mangasarian, 1966). Accordingly,
the current value Hamiltonian Hc.v (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991) for this
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problem is
Hc.v = alt − b2 l
2
t + s(et − it)− c(xt)(lt − it + et) + λt(G(xt)− (lt − it + et)).
(2.3.2)
Note that the current value Hamiltonian eliminates the discounting term
e−δt from the integrand in (2.3.1), thus making the problem autonomous
or time-independent. The resulting optimality conditions for (2.3.1) can be
derived from (2.3.2) as follows:
∂Hc.v
∂lt
= a− blt − c(xt)− λt ≤ 0 and lt(a− blt − c(xt)− λt) = 0,(2.3.3)
∂Hc.v
∂et
= s− c(xt)− λt ≤ 0 and et(s− c(xt)− λt) = 0,(2.3.4)
∂Hc.v
∂it
= −s + c(xt) + λt ≤ 0 and it(c(xt) + λt − s) = 0,(2.3.5)
dλt
dt
− δλt = −∂H
c.v
∂xt
= c′(xt)(lt − it + et)− G′(xt)λt,(2.3.6)
dxt
dt
= G(xt)− (lt − it + et),(2.3.7)
lt, et, it, xt, λt ≥ 0.(2.3.8)
Therefore, the optimal solution to the municipality’s problem as defined by
(2.3.3)-(2.3.8) comprises a set of differential equations that uniquely charac-
terizes the evolution of the water level in the aquifer dxtdt , the rate of water
sold for consumption within the municipality dltdt , and the rate of water ei-
ther exported detdt out of or imported
dit
dt into the municipality. At steady-state
t ≥ T, the evolution of the water level and quantity extracted must cease,
i.e., dxtdt =
dqt
dt = 0. Thus, the hydrodynamic constraint (2.3.7) implies that
the total quantity of water extracted from the aquifer qt = lt− it + et exactly
equals the recharge G(xt) at steady-state. To avoid ambiguity, we denote
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the variables at steady-state with the subscript “ss”. For example, xss rep-
resents the water level of the aquifer at steady-state. Further, to distinguish
it from the steady-state, we refer to t < T, which is such that dxtdt ,
dqt
dt 6= 0,
as the transitional phase.
Given (2.3.3)-(2.3.8), we provide the general solution to the munic-
ipality’s problem in Proposition 2.1, but we first characterize the solu-
tion to a special case in which a water market does not exist, i.e., when
et = it = 0 for all t by definition. We refer to this as the benchmark solu-
tion and index the variables for this special case with the superscript “o”.
Ultimately, we will use the benchmark solution to describe and contrast
the effects of the water market on the municipality’s optimal groundwater
management policy.
LEMMA 2.1. Suppose et = it = 0 for all t in (2.3.1). Then the following are
true:
(a) lot > 0 implies that λ
o
t = a− blot − c(xt) ≥ 0.
(b) If lot > 0, then the optimal rate of consumption and the corresponding evolu-
tion of the water level are uniquely described by the initial water level x0 and the
following system of differential equations:
dlot
dt
=
G′(xt)− δ
b
[a− blot − κ(xt)],
dxt
dt
= G(xt)− lot ,
where κ(x) := c(x) + c
′(x)G(x)
G′(x)−δ .
(c) At steady-state, xoss = G−1(
a−κ(xoss)
b ) and l
o
ss =
a−κ(xoss)
b .
In Lemma 2.1(b), we refer to the consumption quantity lot despite the
lack of explicit analytical solutions to the system of differential equations.
In fact, we observe that because this system of differential equations is au-
tonomous, the benchmark consumption quantity lot is time-independent
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and depends only on the water level xt. Hence, we express the benchmark
consumption quantity as lo(xt). Correspondingly, given Lemma 2.1(a), we
also express λot as λ
o(xt). We also find (as shown in the proof of Lemma 2.1)
that the benchmark consumption quantity is increasing in the water level
of the aquifer, i.e., dl
o(x)
dx > 0. Given l
o(xt), we define the corresponding
benchmark price of water sold for consumption within the municipality as
so(xt) := p(lo(xt)) = a− blo(xt). Accordingly, we see from Lemma 2.1(a)
that in order for any water to be sold for consumption within the munici-
pality, the benchmark price so(xt) must exceed the unit extraction cost c(xt)
by the mark-up amount λo(xt), i.e., so(xt) = c(xt) + λo(xt). Moreover,
note from Lemma 2.1(c) that at steady-state, so(xoss) = κ(xoss), and thus,
λoss := λo(xoss) = κ(xoss)− c(xoss) = c
′(xoss)G(xoss)
G′(xoss)−δ . Finally, from the assumptions
on c(x) and G(x), note that λoss increases as xoss decreases. Thus, we refer
to λoss as the steady-state scarcity value of groundwater when there is no
access to a water market because, everything else being equal in the bench-
mark solution, a lower steady-state water level in the aquifer implies a
higher unit mark-up λoss, and correspondingly, a higher benchmark price of
water sold for consumption within the municipality so(xoss) = c(xoss) + λoss.
In a similar vein, we refer to κ(x), which is a decreasing function of x, as the
effective cost of extraction (alternatively, the efficient price of water sold lo-
cally) at steady-state, and consequently, κ−1(s) is interpreted as the steady-
state water level corresponding to an effective cost of water s.
To proceed to the solution to the municipality’s problem with access to
a water market where et, it ≥ 0, we stipulate the following assumptions
to eliminate trivial cases: (i) s < a, which ensures that the market price
is not so high that it would be optimal to export all the water extracted
from the aquifer and sell none of it for local consumption within the mu-
nicipality, (ii) etit = 0 for all t, which ensures that the same unit of water is
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not exported and imported simultaneously on the water market1, and (iii)
l∗t (xt) > 0 for all t, which ensures that the optimal quantity of water sold
for consumption within the municipality is always positive.
PROPOSITION 2.1. The solution to the municipality’s problem (2.3.1) is as
follows.
(a) For any time t < T (transitional phase),
Condition l∗t e∗t (xt) i∗t (xt)
xt ≥ κ−1(s) a−sb xt − κ−1(s) + G(xt)− a−sb 0
xt < κ−1(s) a−sb 0 κ
−1(s)− xt − G(xt) + a−sb
(b) For any time t ≥ T (steady-state),
Condition l∗ss e∗ss i∗ss x∗ss
s ≥ so(xoss) a−sb G(κ−1(s))− a−sb 0 κ−1(s)
s < so(xoss)
a−s
b 0
a−s
b − G(κ−1(s)) κ−1(s)
According to Proposition 2.1, the optimal quantity of water sold for
consumption within the municipality, l∗t =
a−s
b is stationary and depends
only on the water market price s, i.e., it is independent of the water level
in the aquifer. This is in contrast to the case when the municipality has no
access to a water market (see Lemma 2.1) and is indicative of the opportu-
nity to export or import water to close the gap between optimal ground-
water extraction on the one hand and the optimal consumption quantity
within the municipality on the other hand. In that spirit, note that the mu-
nicipality’s optimal extraction quantity at any time t is a function only of
the water level in the aquifer xt and the price in the water market s, and
is independent of whether the municipality exports or imports water. In
particular, q∗t (xt) = xt − κ−1(s) + G(xt) during the transitional phase, and
1 This condition would always hold at the optimum, for example, if transportation costs
were considered explicitly in our model.
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q∗ss = G(κ−1(s)) at steady-state, regardless of whether the municipality ex-
ports or imports water to complement or supplement its local consump-
tion.
Moreover, we see from Proposition 2.1(a) that the solution to the munic-
ipality’s problem during the transitional phase is characterized by a thresh-
old policy, where the threshold is defined by the steady-state water level
of the aquifer κ−1(s). If the current water level exceeds this threshold,
i.e., if xt ≥ κ−1(s), then it is optimal to export as much water as possible to
deplete the aquifer until it reaches the steady-state water level x∗ss = κ−1(s);
otherwise, if xt < κ−1(s), then it is optimal to import water instead until the
aquifer recovers to the steady-state water level x∗ss = κ−1(s). This policy
therefore is an example of bang-bang control (Chiang, 1992), which applies
here because of the linearity of et and it in the current-value Hamiltonian
expression (2.3.2).
As per Proposition 2.1(b), the steady-state solution depends only on
how the water market price s compares to the export/import thresh-
old price defined by the steady-state price of water sold for consump-
tion within the municipality when there is no access to a water market,
so(xoss). Thus, similar to the benchmark solution in Lemma 2.1, we define
λ∗ss := s− c(x∗ss) = c
′(x∗ss)G(x∗ss)
G′(x∗ss)−δ as the steady-state scarcity value of ground-
water when there is access to a water market. Given this definition, note
that as a result of the exhaustibility of the municipality’s aquifer, the profit
margin from exporting water must exceed the scarcity value of groundwa-
ter when there is no access to a water market, i.e., s − c(x∗ss) = λ∗ss > λoss
since e∗ss > 0 implies x∗ss = κ−1(s) < xoss. Similarly, the incremental cost of
importing water relative to extracting it from the aquifer must be smaller
than the scarcity value of groundwater when there is no access to a water
market, i.e., s− c(x∗ss) = λ∗ss < λoss since i∗ss > 0 implies x∗ss = κ−1(s) > xoss.
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Therefore, we observe that as the market price of water increases (de-
creases), ceteris paribus, exporting (importing) water becomes more attrac-
tive to the municipality.
In the spirit of the 3BL, we now turn our attention to the societal and
environmental implications of participating in a water market. We mea-
sure the societal impact of a municipal water supply management policy by
the quantity of water sold for consumption within the municipality, i.e., the
availability and affordability of water for local consumption. Due to down-
ward sloping demand for water within the municipality p(lt) = a− blt, an
increase in the quantity of water sold for consumption within the munic-
ipality lt also implies a decrease in the price of water sold for consump-
tion within the municipality, and therefore we say that a higher lt corre-
sponds to a more positive societal impact. From the environmental per-
spective, lower water levels in the aquifer are associated with deleterious
consequences such as land subsidence, erosion, and loss of habitat for flora
and fauna (Gleick, 2000). Therefore, we capture the environmental impact
of a management policy by the resulting water level in the aquifer, where
higher water levels imply a more positive environmental impact.2 Thus,
to evaluate the impact of participating in a water market, we compare
the steady-state values of l∗ss and x∗ss with their respective analogs loss and
xoss from Lemma 2.1. From Proposition 2.1, we thus observe that export-
ing water on a water market has negative societal and environmental im-
pacts relative to the case when there is no access to a water market, be-
cause e∗ss > 0 implies that s ≥ so(xoss) = κ(xoss), which in turn implies that
2 Note that the societal and environmental measures adopted here fit within the scope
of our model. Although additional measures, such as, for example, equity or change in
availability of water for consumption among different uses and users within the munici-
pality might also be of related interest, such measures are beyond the scope of our model
specification.
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l∗ss = a−sb ≤ a−s
o(xoss)
b = l
o
ss and x∗ss = κ−1(s) ≤ xoss. Conversely, the impact
of importing water on a water market is positive for society and the envi-
ronment, because i∗ss > 0 implies that s < so(xoss) = κ(xoss), which in turn
implies that l∗ss = a−sb >
a−so(xoss)
b = l
o
ss and x∗ss = κ−1(s) > xoss. However,
note from Proposition 2.1(a) that a municipality that imports (exports) at
steady-state will export (import) water in the transition to steady-state if
xt > κ−1(s) (xt < κ−1(s)), thus first resulting in negative (positive) impli-
cations for the environment during the transitional phase. Therefore, as far
as the environment is concerned, the overall implications of importing wa-
ter will depend not only on the water level in the aquifer at steady-state but
also on the severity of the consequences of the rate of depletion of water in
the aquifer during the transitional phase.
2.3.2. Fixed Quantity Contracts. We now consider water transfers be-
tween two municipalities through a fixed quantity contract. Fixed quan-
tity contracts are typically used for permanent transfers of water rights at
a mutually agreeable price (Hansen et al., 2008). For example, the Santa
Margarita Water District recently agreed to buy from Cadiz Inc. one-tenth
of the annual quantity of water extracted from aquifers under the Mojave
Desert for an indefinite period of time (Hart, 2008). Groundwater rights
transfers also have been negotiated by Amarillo and San Antonio in Texas
(Kaiser, 2005) and by Phoenix and Tucson in Arizona (Saliba et al., 1987).
In this subsection, we assume that each municipality has access to its
own aquifer such that the aquifers in either municipality are hydrologi-
cally distinct and disconnected. Each municipality must determine how
much water to extract from its aquifer and how much water to export to,
or import from, the other municipality. Proposition 2.1 implies that long
term trading equilibria between two municipalities are feasible only when
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both the exporter and the importer are at their respective steady-states.
Therefore, we focus our attention on steady-state interactions. For ana-
lytical convenience, we assume that the local demand functions within the
two municipalities are identical and are given by p(lt) = a − blt. How-
ever, we assume that the two aquifers have different recharge or extraction
cost characteristics or both, i.e., we assume that either Gj(x) 6= Gk(x) or
cj(x) 6= ck(x) or both for municipalities j and k. Hence, each municipality
has its own export/import threshold price soj (x
o
jss) or s
o
k(x
o
kss), above (be-
low) which either municipality is willing to export (import) water to the
other municipality. Given these different export/import threshold prices,
we see from Proposition 2.1(b) that the role of exporter and importer will
be endogenously determined such that the municipality with the lower ex-
port/import threshold price will export water to the municipality with the
higher export/import threshold price.
Fixed quantity trading between the two municipalities allows us to
measure not just the local but also the global societal and environmental
impacts of groundwater reallocation. We capture the global societal impact
of trade by comparing the total quantity of water sold in the two munici-
palities with and without groundwater transfers. Similarly, we capture the
global environmental impact of trade by comparing the sum of the water lev-
els of the two aquifers with and without groundwater transfers. While it
can be argued that a social planner is only concerned with impacts within
his municipality, it is in the spirit of the 3BL framework that we consider the
effects on all stakeholders, which includes communities and environments
connected by groundwater transfers.
In the following proposition, we obtain the Nash equilibrium trading
price in the fixed quantity contract denoted by s˜, and we perform a sensi-
tivity analysis of the equilbrium with respect to the demand parameters a
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and b. The total quantity of water sold for consumption in both munici-
palities is denoted by l˜ss = l˜jss + l˜kss, where l˜jss and l˜kss denote the quantity
of water sold for consumption following trade in municipalities j and k re-
spectively. Similarly, the sum of water levels in both aquifers is denoted by
x˜ss = x˜jss + x˜kss, where x˜jss and x˜kss denote the water levels in the aquifers
following trade in municipalities j and k respectively.
PROPOSITION 2.2. (a) The equilibrium trading price at steady-state, s˜,
uniquely solves
a = s +
b
2
[
Gj(κ−1j (s)) + Gk(κ
−1
k (s))
]
where s˜ ∈ (soj (xojss) ∧ sok(xokss), soj (xojss) ∨ sok(xokss)). Moreover, soj (xojss) < s˜ <
sok(x
o
kss) implies that municipality j exports to municipality k; s
o
k(x
o
kss) < s˜ <
soj (x
o
jss) implies that municipality j imports from municipality k.
(b) The effect of the demand parameters on the equilibrium trading price s˜ are as
follows: ∂s˜∂a > 0,
∂s˜
∂b < 0.
(c) The effect of the demand parameters on the total quantity of water sold in both
municipalities l˜ss and the total water level in both aquifers x˜ss are as follows: ∂l˜ss∂a >
0, ∂l˜ss∂b < 0; and
∂x˜ss
∂a < 0,
∂x˜ss
∂b > 0.
In essence, the exporter and importer agree on an equilibrium trad-
ing price between their respective threshold prices that solves the equa-
tion in Proposition 2.2(a). Note that this notion of equilibrium is consis-
tent with the endogenous price models in Vaux and Howitt (1984) and
Weinberg et al. (1993). Having obtained the trading price s˜, the quantity
of water traded can be determined by the respective optimal export and
import quantities (which are identical at the equilibrium price as shown
in the proof of Proposition 2.2(a)). From Proposition 2.2(b), we observe
that an increase in a through the population, or a decrease in b as a re-
sult of change in income within each municipality results in an increase
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in the trading price. The effect of the demand parameters on the trading
price is explained by an increase in the value of selling water for consump-
tion within each municipality, such that the exporter is more reluctant to
export water and the importer is more willing to import water, resulting
in a higher equilibrium trading price. To explain the results in Proposi-
tion 2.2(c), we see from Proposition 2.1(b) that the water levels in the two
aquifers fall and the total quantity of water extracted from the two aquifers
rises when the price of importing or exporting water increases.
Given Proposition 2.2, the societal and environmental implications of
fixed quantity trading between two municipalities can be evaluated at both
local and global levels. At the local level, the results from §3.1 still hold, i.e.,
both societal and environmental impacts of trading are negative (positive)
in the exporter’s (importer’s) municipality at their respective steady-states.
However, the global impacts of fixed quantity trading depend on the rel-
ative characteristics of the two aquifers. Therefore, we next probe deeper
by performing a numerical analysis to determine the implications of differ-
ences between the aquifer recharge characteristics of the two municipalities
on the global impacts of fixed quantity trading. In the analysis that follows,
both the extraction volume qt and the volume sold for consumption within
the municipality lt are measured in units of 250,000 cubic meters, and the
water level xt is measured in meters; we fix Gj(x) = 60 − 0.0002x2 and
cj(x) = ck(x) = 300, 000 − 500x0.75, while varying Gk(x) = α − βxγ for
α ∈ [45, 75], β ∈ [0.0001, 0.0005], γ ∈ {1.7, 2.0, 2.3}; and we set the de-
mand parameters to a = 1, 000, 000 and b = 12, 500.
Our specification and parameterization of the recharge function G(xt)
is drawn from Pongkijvorasin et al. (2010), which is one hydro-economic
study in the related literature that empirically estimates the recharge char-
acteristics of an aquifer that fits our modeling framework. Specifically, they
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use the functional form G(x) = α − βxγ to estimate the recharge charac-
teristics of the coastal Kiholo aquifer in Hawaii. Following their lead, we
adopt this functional form where α represents constant refills from rain-
fall and runoff, β represents the leakage coefficient and γ represents the
leakage rate. Fitting this curve to their data, Pongkijvorasin et al. (2010)
empirically estimate the recharge parameters for the Kiholo aquifer to be
α = 60, β = 0.019, and γ = 2. These specific parameter values thus im-
ply a capacity of K = G−1(0) = 56m for the Kiholo aquifer. We note,
however, that although this imputed water level may be representative of
coastal aquifers, it is atypical of non-coastal aquifers. For example, fol-
lowing decades of extraction, the water level of the Mahomet aquifer in
Illinois remains at 525m (Burch, 2008) and the water level of the Edwards
aquifer in Texas sits between 180m and 260m at different parts of the state
(Slade et al., 1986). Moreover, we also note that the estimate for the leak-
age coefficient (β = 0.019) for the Kiholo aquifer would be atypically high
for noncoastal aquifers because noncoastal aquifers are buffered from any
leakage into the sea (Burnett et al., 2003). Therefore, to recalibrate and
to generalize their parameterizations for our numerical analysis, we set
α = 60, β = 0.0002, and γ = 2 for municipality j to fix the capacity for that
municipality’s aquifer at Kj = 548m, but we vary α, β, and γ as specified
above for municipality k (which imply capacities ranging from Kk = 142m
to 2857m) to provide a broad comparative range of differences between the
two municipalities’ aquifer characteristics.
Consistent with these parameterizations, to further facilitate the anal-
ysis of the impact of differences in aquifer characteristics between the
two municipalities, we set the demand function and extraction cost func-
tion for both municipalities j and k as p(l) = 1, 000, 000 − 12, 500l and
34
c(x) = 300, 000− 500x0.75 , respectively. Note that while our demand func-
tion is also identical in form to Pongkijvorasin et al. (2010), our cost function
differs from theirs because they use a linearly decreasing cost function for
tractability despite making the assumption of a strictly convex cost func-
tion in their theoretical model. Nevertheless, to validate our specifications
for price and cost, we note first that the corresponding benchmark steady-
state water level for municipality j (xojss = 171m) implies a price and cost
of water that is consistent with public utility rate and cost structures across
the United States, and second that the corresponding price elasticity at that
benchmark steady-state lies within the range of empirically estimated elas-
ticities for water (Espey et al., 1997). We illustrate the results of our analysis
in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3. Global societal and environmental implications
of aquifer recharge characteristics
In Figure 3, the symbols “+” and “−” indicate positive and nega-
tive global impacts, with the first and second position indicating societal
and environmental impacts respectively. Moreover, “E” and “I” indicate
whether municipality k is the exporter or importer respectively. Figure 3(b)
represents the scenario where both aquifers have the same leakage rate γ,
whereas Figure 3(a) (Figure 3(c)) represents the scenario where the aquifer
in municipality k has a lower (higher) leakage rate than its counterpart in
municipality j.
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Notice in Figure 3(b) that as α increases for a fixed β, municipality k
goes from being the importer to the exporter of water. This can be ex-
plained by the observation that, everything else being equal, a higher α
implies a lower export/import threshold price at steady-state sok(x
o
kss). Cor-
respondingly, in moving from the left to the right in Figure 3(b), the rela-
tive export/import threshold prices for the two municipalities change from
sok(x
o
kss) > s
o
j (x
o
jss), in which case municipality k imports from municipality
j, to sok(x
o
kss) < s
o
j (x
o
jss), in which case municipality k exports to municipal-
ity j. Here, we also point out that for the range of parameters used in our
analysis, the leakage coefficient β has little impact on the threshold price
and thus plays a relatively insignificant role in determining the direction
and consequences of trade as compared to the refill parameter α.
Notice also from Figure 3(b) that regions of similar global impacts (as
indicated by the same sign of global societal and environmental impacts)
are rotationally symmetric about the point at which both aquifers have
identical characteristics (α = 60, β = 0.0002). This is a consequence of
the switching of trading roles and relative magnitudes of the parameters
α and β between the two municipalities about this point. For example, in
the northeast corner of Figure 3(b), municipality k exports water when its
aquifer receives higher refills but also has a higher leakage coefficient than
its counterpart in municipality j, while in the southwest corner, municipal-
ity j exports water when its aquifer receives higher refills but has a higher
leakage coefficient than its counterpart in municipality k. Naturally, this
export-import symmetry results in symmetric trading consequences for so-
ciety and the environment at the global level. The effect of the leakage
rate γ is similar to, but stronger than, the effect of the leakage coefficient β.
Therefore, in going from Figure 3(a) to (c), we find negligible change in the
export/import threshold; but, in comparing Figures 3(a) and 3(c), we find
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apparent symmetry of the different regions of global consequences about
Figure 3(b).
From this numerical analysis, we observe that trade between two mu-
nicipalities is most beneficial from a global 3BL perspective when the
aquifer in the exporting municipality receives higher refills but is also
leakier than its counterpart in the importing municipality. Moreover, we
observe that trading results in negative consequences for the environment
at a global level when the aquifers in the two municipalities vary consid-
erably in terms of their capacities. To see this, notice for example, that the
difference between the aquifer capacity of municipality j (Kj = 547m) and
the aquifer capacity of municipality k (Kk = G−1k (0) = (
α
β )
1/γ) increases as
we move toward the southeast or the northwest corner of Figure 3(b). The
same applies as we move toward the southeast corner of Figure 3(a) or the
northwest corner of Figure 3(c). These negative consequences for the en-
vironment are noteworthy because fixed quantity trading typically occurs
between municipalities with vastly different endowments of groundwater.
In light of these observations from Figure 3, we next evaluate the so-
cietal and environmental implications of fixed quantity trading relative to
those associated with the centralized management of the two municipal-
ities, where we define the central planner’s objective to be to maximize
the total welfare across both municipalities. A detailed formulation of the
central planner’s problem is provided in Appendix A1. We continue to
denote the local variables (i.e., the characteristics of each municipality and
its aquifer) in the central planner’s problem with the subscripts j and k,
but to contrast the variables associated with the centralized problem with
those associated with the decentralized setting, we index the variables in
the central planner’s problem with the superscript “cp”. Thus, for example,
we define the total water level in the two municipalities in the centralized
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setting as xcpss = x
cp
jss + x
cp
kss, where x
cp
jss and x
cp
kss represent the water levels
at steady-state in municipalities j and k respectively. We compare the so-
lution to the central planner’s problem with that of Proposition 2.2 in the
following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2.3. The centralized management of the two municipalities
results in the same equilibrium outcome as that produced by the fixed quantity
trading: xcpjss = x˜jss, x
cp
kss = x˜kss, l
cp
jss = l˜jss, and l
cp
kss = l˜kss.
Proposition 2.3 essentially shows that fixed quantity trading between
two municipalities is efficient in the sense that it achieves the same equi-
librium outcomes as those that result from centralized management. In-
tuitively, this is because a municipality engaging in fixed quantity trading
effectively internalizes the same steady-state scarcity value of groundwater
into its threshold price as the central planner uses to determine the optimal
reallocation from one municipality to the other. Therefore, the fixed quan-
tity trading mechanism described in Proposition 2.2(a) finds an efficient
allocation of groundwater extraction from the two aquifers to maximize
welfare in the two municipalities. This is precisely what centralized man-
agement seeks to achieve, hence, both fixed quantity trading and central-
ized management produce identical societal and environmental impacts at
both local and global levels.
2.4. Privatization
In this section, we study the impact of privatization by comparing
the optimal groundwater management and water trading policies of §2.3,
along with their implications for society and the environment, to their
respective analogs that would result if a municipality operated with the
objective of profit-maximization in lieu of welfare-maximization. We use
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these comparisons to assess the extent to which privatization would re-
sult in quantity rationing within the municipality, overexploitation of its
aquifer, or profiteering from exports. Moreover, we verify if indeed priva-
tization spurs investment in technologies that reduce reliance on ground-
water.
2.4.1. The Impact of Privatization on Groundwater Management and
Trading Policies. We begin by studying the impact of privatization on the
results of Proposition 2.1, the context for which is defined by access to a
water market characterized by an exogenous price s. Privatization may
refer to the control of a community’s water supply system by a private
water supplier (for example, Aquarion and American Water), or possession
of water rights by private entities such as farmer or landowner collectives
(for example, Mesa Water in Roberts County, Texas).
For clarity and distinction, we denote the variables in the privatization
model with a “bar”; for example, l¯t denotes the quantity of water sold for
consumption within a privatized municipality. The municipality’s problem
under privatization is analogous to (2.3.1), except that the revenue term
(a− bl¯t)l¯t replaces the welfare term
´ lt
0 (a− bu)du in the objective. Hence,
the privatized municipality’s problem when there is access to a water mar-
ket is as follows:
maximize
l¯t, e¯t, i¯t
ˆ ∞
0
e−δt
[
(a− bl¯t)l¯t + s(e¯t − i¯t)− c(xt)(l¯t − i¯t + e¯t)
]
dt,(2.4.1)
Subject to
dxt
dt
= G(xt)− (l¯t − i¯t + e¯t),
l¯t, e¯t, i¯t, xt ≥ 0.
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The total revenue in (2.4.1) comprises the revenues from selling water for
consumption within the municipality, (a − bl¯t)l¯t, plus the revenues from
exporting through the water market, se¯t. The corresponding costs are
c(x¯t)(l¯t − i¯t + e¯t) from extraction plus si¯t from importing. Given (2.4.1), the
implications of privatization for a municipality that has access to a water
market are as follows:
PROPOSITION 2.4. (a) The steady-state export/import threshold price for a
privatized municipality s¯o(x¯oss) is lower than that of its non-privatized counterpart
so(xoss); s¯o(x¯oss) = a− 2bl¯oss < a− bloss = so(xoss).
(b) Privatization has the following effects on the optimal policies when there is
access to a water market: i¯∗t (xt) ≤ i∗t (xt), e¯∗t (xt) ≥ e∗t (xt), and l¯∗t = a−s2b <
a−s
b = l
∗
t for all t > 0.
(c) Additionally, at steady-state, x¯∗ss = x∗ss = κ−1(s) and q¯∗ss = q∗ss = G(κ−1(s))
for all t > T.
Notice from Proposition 2.4(a) that at steady-state, a privatized munici-
pality’s export/import threshold price s¯o(x¯oss) = a− 2bl¯oss, which represents
the marginal revenue on water sold for consumption within the municipal-
ity when there is no access to a water market, is strictly less than a non-
privatized municipality’s export/import threshold price so(xoss) = a− bloss,
which, recall, represents the price of water sold for consumption within the
municipality when there is no access to a water market. This difference in
the export/import threshold prices means that a privatized municipality is
more (less) likely to export (import) water for a given market price s. As a
result, there exists a range of market prices that is such that at steady-state,
a non-privatized municipality will import water, but its privatized coun-
terpart will instead export water for the same given s. Moreover, as Propo-
sition 2.4(b) indicates, the amount of water that a privatized municipality
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exports (imports) when it exports (imports) for a given s will be more (less)
than the amount of water that a non-privatized municipality exports (im-
ports) when it exports (imports) for the same s. These differences between
the optimal water market policies of a privatized versus a non-privatized
municipality are illustrated below in Figure 4, which we generate using the
same functions and parameters that we applied to characterize the aquifer
in municipality j for the numerical analysis in §2.3.2. In Figure 4, the two
curves represent the quantities of water exported (negative) or imported
(positive) at steady-state by a privatized and non-privatized municipality
for a price s in the water market.
Figure 4. Optimal water market policies for a privatized
and non-privatized municipality
Another implication of the difference between s¯o(x¯oss) and so(xoss) is as
follows. A privatized municipality could export water at water market
prices that are below the price at which water would be sold for consump-
tion within the municipality if there were no access to a water market,
namely for values of s that are such that s¯o(x¯oss) < s < s¯o(x¯oss)+ bl¯oss = p(l¯oss).
However, a non-privatized municipality would not export water under
analogous conditions. This controversial outcome of privatization has been
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cited as a major cause for concern (Barlow and Clarke, 2005). Analogously,
a privatized municipality will not import at some water market prices
that are below the price at which water would be sold for consumption
within the municipality if there were no access to a water market, whereas
a non-privatized municipality would always import water under such con-
ditions.
The propensity of a privatized municipality to export more, but import
less, relative to a non-privatized municipality has important implications
for society. In particular, as Proposition 2.4(b) establishes, privatization has
a negative impact on society in the sense that it results in a decrease in
the affordability and availability of water sold for consumption within the
municipality, i.e., l¯∗t < l∗t for all t. However, as Proposition 2.4(c) further
establishes, privatization has no net impact on the environment at steady-
state in the sense that the total quantity of water extracted at steady-state
as well as the resulting steady-state water level of the aquifer are the same
regardless of whether or not the municipality is privatized. The difference
between the privatized and non-privatized municipalities lies in their re-
spective optimal uses (local consumption vs. exports) for the water ex-
tracted. Thus, we see that only the concerns over the local societal impacts
of privatization of municipal groundwater systems are justified.
Next, we similarly address the impact of privatization on the results
of Proposition 2.2, the context for which is defined by fixed quantity trad-
ing of groundwater between two municipalities at an endogenously deter-
mined price. Toward that end, we append our notation from §2.3.2 with the
two letter subscript jk, where j, k ∈ {p, w} now denotes whether or not a
given municipality is privatized, with p and w representing privatized and
non-privatized municipalities, respectively. For example, s˜wp denotes the
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equilibrium trading price between a non-privatized and a privatized mu-
nicipality. Given this convention, note that Proposition 2.2 corresponds to
the “WW” case.
PROPOSITION 2.5. (a) Given two municipalities j and k that trade through a
fixed quantity contract, where j, k ∈ {p, w}, the equilibrium trading prices are
ordered as follows: s˜ww > s˜wp > s˜pp. Correspondingly, the total quantity of water
sold in the two municipalities and the sum of water levels in the two aquifers at
equilibrium are ordered as follows: l˜ww > l˜wp > l˜pp and x˜pp > x˜wp > x˜ww.
(b) The relative effect of a change in demand parameters on the trading prices be-
tween two privatized municipalities versus two non-privatized municipalities are
as follows: ∂s˜ww∂a >
∂ ˜spp
∂a and
∣∣∣ ∂ ˜sww∂b ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣ ∂ ˜spp∂b ∣∣∣.
From Proposition 2.5(a), we see that the equilibrium trading price is
highest when neither municipality is privatized and lowest when they both
are privatized. Moreover, these trading prices follow the same ordering as
the total quantity of water sold in the two municipalities. This can be ex-
plained by observing that a non-privatized municipality is willing to sell
a greater quantity of water locally as compared to its privatized counter-
part, which in turn results in a relatively higher trading price in the fixed
quantity contract. The implication of an increase in the trading price on the
total quantity of water sold and the water levels across both municipalities
thus follows by analogy with Proposition 2.2. Proposition 2.5(b) further
states that a change in demand parameters has a greater effect on the trad-
ing price between two non-privatized municipalities. This is because the
local demand for water in a non-privatized municipality is more sensitive
to changes in the demand parameters, where an increase (decrease) in the
market size (a) (price sensitivity (b)) has a positive effect. This can be veri-
fied from a direct comparison between the optimal quantities of water sold
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within a non-privatized municipality and its privatized counterpart from
Proposition 2.4. The effect of a change in demand parameters on the total
quantity of water sold and the total water levels follows from Proposition
2.5(a). One implication of this result is that an increase in demand due
to demographic or economic changes has a relatively smaller effect on the
parameters of trade when municipal water systems are privatized.
The local impacts of privatization on society relative to the case when
neither municipality is privatized are negative in both the exporting and
importing municipalities. This follows from Proposition 2.5(a), since pri-
vatization in one or both municipalities results in a lower equilibrium trad-
ing price, and correspondingly, a lower quantity of water sold in the two
municipalities relative to the case when neither municipality is privatized.
This in turn implies a higher water level in both municipalities, hence the
environmental impact of privatization in the context of fixed quantity trad-
ing is positive.
As in §2.3.2, the global impacts of privatization on society and the envi-
ronment depend on the characteristics of the aquifers in the two municipal-
ities. Thus, to facilitate the analysis of the global impacts of privatization in
the context of fixed quantity trading, we perform a similar numerical anal-
ysis using the same functional specifications and parameterizations from
§2.3.2, and we illustrate the results in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Global societal and environmental implications
of privatization
Analogous to Figure 3, the impacts illustrated in Figure 5 are measured
against the case in which the two municipalities do not have access to water
reallocation opportunities. The implications of privatization for the global
impacts of fixed quantity trading relative to these benchmark policies thus
can be determined by observing the differences between Figures 3 and 5.
In particular, relative to Figure 3 (WW case), Figures 5(a)-(c) illustrate the
effect of privatizing municipality k only (WP case) and Figures 5(d)-(f) il-
lustrate the effect of privatizing both municipalities j and k (PP case). We
do not consider the case where only municipality j is privatized (PW case)
as it is qualitatively similar to the WP case.
In comparison with Figure 3, Figures 5(a)-(c) indicate that the privati-
zation of municipality k results in a trading equilibrium in which the pri-
vatized municipality is always the exporter and the non-privatized mu-
nicipality is always the importer. Indeed, from Figure 5(b), we observe
that the privatized municipality exports water to the non-privatized mu-
nicipality even when both of their aquifers have identical characteristics
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(α = 60, β = 0.0002). This is in contrast to Figure 3(b), which indicates that
there is no trade between two non-privatized municipalities when their
two aquifers are identical. Both of the above observations can be explained
by the quantitative differences in the export/import threshold prices em-
ployed by a privatized and non-privatized municipality from Proposition
2.4, where municipality k has a lower threshold price for a given set of
aquifer characteristics when it is privatized, s¯ok(x¯
o
kss) < s
o
k(x
o
kss). Notice that
as a result of the export of water from municipality k to municipality j, the
region of positive global societal and environmental impacts expands in
Figures 5(b) and (c), but contracts in Figure 5(a) relative to their counter-
parts in Figure 3, indicating that privatization in the municipality with a
leakier (higher γ) aquifer has positive consequences for society and the en-
vironment on a global level. This can be explained as follows: As a result of
the lower export/import threshold price associated with privatization, the
increase in water consumption within the importing municipality j more
than compensates for the decrease in water consumption within the ex-
porting municipality k, thus leading to positive global impacts from trade
for society. But, because of the steeper recharge function associated with a
comparatively higher γ, trading leads to positive global impacts for the en-
vironment only when it provides a mechanism to extract additional water
from the leakier aquifer in exchange for extracting less water from the less
leaky aquifer.
Privatizing both municipalities does not qualitatively change our ob-
servations from §2.3.2. However, both β and γ play greater roles in deter-
mining the direction of trade between the two municipalities when they are
privatized, as can be seen by observing the flatter export-import boundary
curve in the PP case in Figures 5(d)-(f) relative to the WW case in Figure 3.
This can be explained by noting that the roles of β and γ are more salient for
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higher water levels as is the case for PP relative to WW. Moreover, we see
that the regions of negative global impacts on society and the environment
expand in Figures 5(d)-(f) (PP case) relative to Figure 3 (WW case). This
results from the concavity of the recharge functions, such that at higher
water levels as in the PP case, the negative societal and environmental im-
pacts within the exporting municipality k more than offset the positive so-
cietal and environmental impacts within the importing municipality j. In
summary, we observe from these numerical studies that trade between two
municipalities participating in a fixed quantity contract is particularly ben-
eficial from a global 3BL perspective when only the municipality with an
aquifer that is leakier is privatized; but trade leads instead to especially neg-
ative impacts from a global 3BL perspective when both of the municipalities
are privatized.
2.4.2. The Green Paradox. We have observed thus far that access to a
water market can produce a positive impact on the local environment if a
municipality exploits that access to import water to supplement its ground-
water extraction; however it can also produce a negative environmental
impact if the municipality exploits that access instead to export ground-
water extracted from its aquifer. Moreover, we observed from Proposition
2.1 that regardless of its eventual role as an exporter or importer at steady-
state, a non-privatized municipality will initially implement a bang-bang
control policy to export a positive quantity e∗t (xt) > 0 of water during the
transitional phase if the water market price s and current water level in
the aquifer xt are such that xt ≥ κ−1(s). Thus, including the quantity of
groundwater extracted for local consumption, a municipality with access
to a water market (even a municipality that eventually imports water at
steady-state) will extract a greater quantity of groundwater from its aquifer
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during the transitional phase relative to the case in which there is no access
to a water market. We refer to this increase in the non-privatized munici-
pality’s extraction rate that is attributable to the presence of a water market,
∆q∗t (xt) := q∗t (xt)− qo(xt) ≥ 0, as the extraction differential and we note that,
by analogy, a similar extraction differential applies to a privatized munici-
pality (∆q¯∗t (xt)) as well. This increase in groundwater extraction rates due
to the municipality’s ability to export groundwater during the transitional
phase can result in severe environmental impacts such as land subsidence
and desertification from rapid water level depletion (Konikow and Kendy,
2005). In response to such deleterious environmental consequences, several
communities throughout the United States have enacted strict regulations
banning the export of groundwater. For example, eight counties in Califor-
nia have imposed partial or complete bans on groundwater exports (We-
ber, 1994), and similar regulations have been enacted in the Groundwater
Conservation Districts in Texas (Kaiser, 2005).
Consequently, in this subsection, we introduce the notion of export
bans into our groundwater management model, and we study the impact
of privatization accordingly. In the context of our model, banning a mu-
nicipality from exporting water when it would otherwise export water on
a water market means considering the case when xt ≥ κ−1(s), as well as
setting et = 0 for all t in (2.3.1) and e¯t = 0 for all t in (2.4.1). Applying these
constraints to our model thus implies the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2.6. If exports are banned such that et = e¯t = 0 for all t, then
the extraction differential is non-negative for both privatized and non-privatized
municipalities but it is greater in magnitude for the non-privatized municipality,
i.e., ∆q∗t (xt) ≥ ∆q¯∗t (xt) ≥ 0 for all t.
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Notice therefore, that despite the ban on exports, the mere presence of a
water market results in a positive extraction differential for a municipality,
regardless of whether or not the municipality is privatized. To help explain
this, note that access to a water market, even if only available to import
water, effectively imposes a ceiling on the price of water sold within a mu-
nicipality. This in turn results in a larger quantity of water being extracted
for local consumption within a municipality relative to the case when there
is no access to a water market. All told, however, as noted in Proposition
2.4, a privatized municipality sells less water for local consumption than
its non-privatized counterpart, thus implying a smaller extraction differ-
ential, and consequently, less damage to the local environment during the
transitional phase.
The positive extraction differential in the presence of a water market
when only imports are allowed can be considered an example of the ‘green
paradox’, which is a term coined by Sinn (2008) to describe a similar phe-
nomenon in the context of non-renewable fossil fuels, i.e., the hastening of
fossil fuel extraction when greener environmental policies are anticipated.
In the context of our model, the availability of groundwater substitutes
through water imports can be interpreted as the greening of environmen-
tal policy. This paradox has important implications because it means, first,
that importing water can produce negative environmental effects during
the transitional phase despite its relative societal and environmental bene-
fits at steady-state, and second, that privatization mitigates rather than am-
plifies these negative effects. Given that related literature suggests that the
overall environmental consequences of groundwater extraction is a func-
tion not only of the total quantity of water extracted, but also of the rate at
which it is extracted (Zektser et al., 2005), transitional phase implications
like those suggested by Proposition 2.6 are important to include in any
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comprehensive evaluation and comparison of the environmental impacts
of a groundwater management policy in a privatized and non-privatized
municipality.
2.4.3. Investment in Water Production. Thus far, our exploration of
the impacts of privatization of municipal groundwater management has in-
dicated that criticisms directed at its negative consequences for society can
indeed be justified. However, it has also indicated that the environmental
consequences of privatization can be positive if groundwater exports are
banned. In this subsection, we attempt to verify another important claim
favoring the privatization of water management, namely that privatization
would lead to a more rapid development of technologies to reduce reliance
on exhaustible groundwater.
Although reallocation of groundwater through a water market or a
fixed quantity contract has become a popular means of resolving the im-
balance between the demand and supply of groundwater, there has been
an emergence of newer technologies for the reclamation and production of
water, such as, for example, waste water recycling and desalination. De-
spite high initial set-up costs, such technologies are appealing because they
offer control over the timing and scale of water supply. Accordingly, in this
subsection, we introduce the option of investing in water production and
study its impact on groundwater management policies. We assume that
the unit cost of water production is constant and we denote it by cw, where
cw > 0. In addition, we assume that the capacity W for producing water is
costly. Specifically, we follow the lead of Holland (2003) and assume that
the fixed cost F(W) of setting up a water production plant is increasing and
convex in capacity, i.e., F′(W) > 0 and F′′(W) > 0.
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Given this construct, we study the optimal policies in a water market
for the privatized and non-privatized variants of the municipality’s prob-
lem. The privatized municipality’s problem is stated as follows:
maximize
l¯t, e¯t, i¯t, w¯t, W¯, τ¯
ˆ ∞
0
e−δt
[
al¯t − bl¯2t + s(e¯t − i¯t)− c(xt)(l¯t − i¯t + e¯t − w¯t)
(2.4.2)
− cww¯t
]
dt− e−δτ¯F(W¯),
Subject to
dx¯t
dt
= G(xt)− (l¯t − i¯t + e¯t − w¯t),
w¯t = 0 for t < τ¯,
w¯t ≤ W¯ for t ≥ τ¯,
l¯t, e¯t, i¯t, w¯t, W¯, τ¯, xt ≥ 0,
where the new variables w¯t, W¯, and τ¯ represent the quantity of water pro-
duced at t, the capacity of water production, and the timing of the capacity
investment respectively. The objective in (2.4.2) comprises two parts, the
first of which is the discounted sum of profits over the infinite planning
horizon, and the second of which represents the discounted cost of a one-
time investment in production capacity. The constraints w¯t = 0 for t < τ¯
and w¯t ≤ W¯ for t ≥ τ¯ stipulate that the quantity of water produced at
any time be constrained by the production capacity at that time. Given the
above problem specification, the total quantity of water extracted from the
aquifer is defined as q¯t = l¯t − i¯t + e¯t − w¯t. The non-privatized variant of
(2.4.2) is analogous. For convenience, we drop the time subscript in the
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remainder of this section. In the following proposition, we state the key
implications of privatization for investment in water production.
PROPOSITION 2.7. (a) When there is no water market, the privatized munic-
ipality invests in lower production capacity than its non-privatized counterpart;
W¯o < Wo.
(b) When there is access to a water market, the privatized municipality invests at
the same time and in the same production capacity as its non-privatized counter-
part; τ¯∗ = τ∗ and W¯∗ = W∗.
From Proposition 2.7 we observe that privatization leads to investment
in a (weakly) lower capacity of water production regardless of access to a
water market. To understand this result, recall that in the absence of a wa-
ter market, the export/import threshold price for a privatized municipality
is lower than the corresponding export/import threshold price for a non-
privatized municipality, i.e., s¯o(x¯oss) < so(xoss). This implies that the non-
privatized municipality is more inclined to substitute water production for
groundwater extraction, hence it invests in larger production capacity. Fur-
ther, capacity investment occurs when the value of groundwater reaches
an investment threshold (namely, the effective cost of investment cw +
δF(w)
w
as described in the proof of Proposition 2.7). Observe that while this in-
vestment threshold is higher for a non-privatized municipality (because
F(W) is convex and W¯o < Wo), the threshold price is also correspondingly
higher. Therefore, the relationship between the timing of investments by
a privatized and non-privatized municipality depends on the difference in
the optimal investment levels and the convexity of the set-up cost function.
When there is access to a water market, the threshold price of groundwa-
ter is defined by the water market price s, which results in a municipality
investing in the same capacity regardless of whether or not it is privatized.
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Moreover, this implies that both a privatized and a non-privatized munici-
pality will either invest in a positive capacity immediately or not invest in
any capacity at all.
The implications of water production along both societal and environ-
mental dimensions at a local level are positive at steady-state, but greater
for the non-privatized municipality. This follows from Proposition 2.7(a)
since the non-privatized municipality substitutes groundwater extraction
with water production to a greater extent than its privatized counterpart
in the absence of a water market. This difference disappears when there is
access to a water market as stated in Proposition 2.7(b).
2.5. Conclusion
As the first line of inquiry in this chapter, we considered the problem of
municipal groundwater management in the context of water reallocation
between municipalities through a water market or a fixed quantity con-
tract. In the case of a water market, a municipality can export or import wa-
ter at a constant exogenous price. In this context, we find that the decision
to export or import water is guided by a threshold policy in the water level
of the municipality’s aquifer. At steady-state, the export/import threshold
is defined by the price of water sold for local consumption in the absence of
a water market, where it is optimal to export (import) water if the price in
the water market exceeds (is exceeded by) this threshold. The water mar-
ket essentially determines the economic value and quantity of water con-
sumed within the municipality, and it has a beneficial (detrimental) impact
on the municipality’s local water consumption if the value of water within
the municipality in the absence of a water market exceeds (is exceeded by)
the exogenous market price. This also implies that the economic value of
water is equalized across municipalities connected by a water market such
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that groundwater is distributed equitably regardless of initial endowments,
with each municipality having to face the full opportunity cost of ground-
water use as dictated by the market price. Accordingly, groundwater is
only transferred from municipalities with under-stressed aquifers to those
with over-stressed aquifers (that is, from municipalities with current wa-
ter levels above the steady-state at the market price to municipalities with
current water levels below the steady-state at the market price). As a re-
sult, importing (exporting) water through a water market leads to benefi-
cial (detrimental) local impacts to both society and the environment. How-
ever, we find that a municipality that imports water at steady-state may
export large quantities of water en-route to that steady-state, thus resulting
in severe environmental impacts during the transitional phase.
In the context of fixed quantity trading between two municipalities,
we have shown not only that a simultaneous-move Nash game results in
the same efficient allocation of water that would result from the central-
ized management of the two municipalities, but also that fixed quantity
trading is always economically beneficial to both municipalities when they
have different export/import thresholds at steady-state. Moreover, any
growth in demand through an increase in population or income, or through
a change in demographic makeup (such as residential vs. industrial vs.
agricultural uses) of one or both municipalities will result in more aggre-
gate groundwater extraction and consumption, with consumption increas-
ing more in the faster growing municipality. This observation validates
the trend observed in the majority of groundwater trades in the Western
United States, where small rural communities often sell groundwater ex-
traction rights to expanding cities where the economic values and needs
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for water are higher. Additionally, we find that fixed quantity trading per-
forms poorly from a global 3BL perspective when the aquifers in both mu-
nicipalities vary considerably in their endowments of groundwater, espe-
cially with respect to the impact on the environment. This is particularly
noteworthy because it is such trading agreements that occur most often as
a result of the potential for significant economic benefits. Therefore, it is
imperative that an evaluation of the benefits of fixed quantity trading must
include a comprehensive analysis of societal and environmental impacts
across the two municipalities.
All told, then, water markets and fixed quantity trading are examples of
mechanisms that essentially reallocate groundwater from regions defined
by lower water values to those defined by higher water values such that
positive economic impacts are generated for the municipalities involved.
In addition, fixed quantity trading in particular also can generate both pos-
itive societal and positive environmental outcomes, thus yielding a win-
win-win scenario from a global 3BL perspective. However, that triple-win
invariably comes at the expense of societal or environmental harm at a local
level, particularly in exporting municipalities. Thus, it runs the risk of gen-
erating ill will or even contempt. This could be the case, for example, if the
sustenance of indigenous communities or the environmental maintenance
of water system health is a high priority for community stakeholders. In-
deed, this helps explain in part why Utah Tribal Leaders filed a lawsuit
against the state’s agreement to export groundwater from the Snake Val-
ley to Nevada (UTL, 2011). Thus, from a policy perspective, if municipal-
ities with lower water values nevertheless have important socio-cultural
or environmental motivations, then the negatively impacted municipal-
ities should be adequately compensated, else appropriate restrictions to
groundwater transfers should be enforced to ensure aquifer protection.
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As a second line of inquiry in this chapter, we studied the impact of pri-
vatization on municipal groundwater management in the aforementioned
contexts. We find that a privatized municipality employs a similar thresh-
old policy to govern exporting or importing decisions in a water market.
However, the steady-state export/import threshold price in this case is the
marginal revenue on water sold within the municipality in the benchmark
problem characterized by the absence of water reallocation opportunities,
and as such, it is smaller in magnitude than the corresponding steady-state
export/import threshold price for a non-privatized municipality. This dif-
ference implies that a privatized municipality will extract the same quan-
tity of water as its non-privatized counterpart but allocate less for con-
sumption within the municipality, implying negative societal impacts from
privatization at a local level. This also implies that a municipality that was
an importer of water prior to privatization may export water following pri-
vatization. However, the privatization of a municipality could mitigate
the green paradox in under-stressed aquifers if groundwater exports are
banned, thus resulting in relatively less damage to the environment. In
the context of fixed quantity trading, from a global 3BL perspective, trade
is most beneficial when only a single municipality, particularly one that
is more likely to export water as a result of either lower local demand or
a leakier aquifer, is privatized. In contrast, fixed quantity trading is most
detrimental for the global 3BL when both participating municipalities are
privatized.
Thus, from a policy perspective, when groundwater is not vital for local
needs, such as, for example, in thinly populated regions where low value
agriculture is the main source of demand for groundwater, exports can be
beneficial for the global 3BL. This helps explain why instances of private
interests such as Mesa Water in Texas obtaining groundwater rights with
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the intention of selling them to growing cities such as Amarillo and San
Antonio should be encouraged (Kaiser, 2005). As discussed above, such
private to public transfers are particularly beneficial on a global level to
both society and the environment because they transfer the greatest quan-
tity of water to higher valued uses without increasing the aggregate rate of
exploitation of the two aquifers. Therefore, careful and restricted privati-
zation where the aquifer is leakier or where groundwater is less vital for
local needs can outperform welfare-maximizing management in the pres-
ence of groundwater reallocation opportunities. In a similar vein, although
privatized municipalities will lag behind their non-privatized counterparts
in investing in water production technologies in the absence of groundwa-
ter reallocation opportunities, this difference disappears with access to a
water market. Therefore, policy makers seeking to incentivize investment
by privatized municipalities can consider water markets as a mechanism
to do so. Nevertheless, the likelihood of investment depends on the rela-
tive magnitude of the market price with respect to the fixed and variable
costs of the technology, and therefore, if market prices are sufficiently low
relative to the costs of the technology, water markets may dis-incentivize
investments in water production technologies altogether.
In closing, we acknowledge some limitations of our model. In partic-
ular, our analysis hinges on two key modeling primitives. Firstly, we stip-
ulate that the exogenous price in a water market is fixed and constant. If
this stipulation were relaxed to consider varying market prices, then a mu-
nicipality would potentially switch dynamically back and forth between
exporting and importing water depending on how the water level in the
municipality’s aquifer compared with the steady-state water level as de-
termined by the current market price, similar to the threshold policies im-
plied by Proposition 2.1(a). We note however, that varying market prices
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will not yield a steady-state solution as described in Proposition 2.1(b). Sec-
ondly, we stipulate that the municipality’s aquifer is hydrologically discon-
nected from other aquifers and the water market. If this stipulation were
relaxed, we would have a dynamic non-cooperative extraction and reallo-
cation game between municipalities connected through a single groundwa-
ter source, wherein the extraction and reallocation decisions of a given mu-
nicipality would still be governed by a threshold policy similar to that de-
scribed in Proposition 2.1. However, the threshold prices and water levels
within a given municipality would depend on the actions of the other mu-
nicipalities connected to the same source of groundwater. Thus, we point
to considerations such as these as potentially viable extensions to our work
here. Other potential extensions include optimal allocation of groundwater
among different types of users with differentiated demands such as resi-
dential, commercial, and agricultural sectors, the consideration of ground-
water banking wherein municipalities can import water for the purpose
of artificially increasing aquifer recharge, and the conjunctive management
of surface water and groundwater. Finally, in addition to the reallocation
mechanisms considered here, other contract structures can be used to de-
termine the reallocation of water between two municipalities. Knapp et al.
(2003) provide an overview of some of these contract structures that are in
use today.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF ECOLABELS: THE ROLE OF
ECOLABELING AGENCIES AND CREDIBILITY
3.1. Introduction
Green product development has emerged as a significant challenge to
industry as a result of consumer demand, competition, and regulatory re-
quirements. Consumer preference for green products has been identified
through an increased willingness to pay for products perceived to be pro-
duced in an environmentally friendly manner (Moon et al., 2002). Increased
consumer awareness of the environmental consequences of the industrial
complex has pushed firms to engage in environmental quality competi-
tion to differentiate themselves from each other and attract consumers,
not unlike traditional quality competition. Examples of green products in-
clude Starkists’ Dolphin-safe tuna, Method’s eco-friendly cleaning prod-
ucts, Starbucks’ post-consumer recycled coffee cups and sleeves etc. How-
ever, a key differentiating feature of environmental product attributes that
separates them from conventional dimensions of quality such as perfor-
mance or durability is their unobservability to consumers. In particular,
unlike conventional quality attributes that can be observed or experienced,
it is difficult for consumers to identify the environmental quality of a prod-
uct (Baksi and Bose, 2007). Consequently, ecolabels have emerged as a tool
through which firms can communicate the environmental attributes of their
products to consumers.
59
To fulfill the need for credible communication of environmental at-
tributes embodied in products and production processes associated with
them, firms may choose to affix their own self-labels on their products. As
per the International Standards Organization (ISO), such self-declarations
are classified as Type 2 ecolabels and do not require external validation.
However, due to the lack of independent verification and the premise that
firms may reveal only positive while leaving out negative environmental
information, self-labels typically suffer from a lack of credibility with con-
sumers. This results in undervaluation and decreased consumer willing-
ness to pay for self-labeled products (Leire and Thidell, 2005; Horne, 2009).
Moreover, the confusion resulting from the proliferation of self-labels has
been found to depend on the credibility or environmental reputation of the
firm making these claims (Teisl, 2003; Carmona, 2011). For example, stan-
dards on down procurement adopted by competing apparel manufacturers
Patagonia and The North Face are perceived differently by consumers ow-
ing to the differences in their respective environmental track records; Patag-
onia is seen as a frontrunner of environmental stewardship and hence their
claim is viewed more favorably by consumers. As our first contribution in
this chapter, we identify the role of credibility in guiding the choice of envi-
ronmental attribute levels in green products, and consequently, we explore
the social, environmental, and economic implications of credibility.
As a recourse to this lack of credibility, firms can avail of external eco-
labels for their products as provided and validated by a range of certifying
organizations (Ben Youssef and Abderrazak, 2009). Such externally val-
idated environmental standards are trusted by consumers and hence do
not suffer from consumer undervaluation, resulting in improved credibil-
ity and consumer willingness to pay (Castka and Corbett, 2014). A certi-
fying organization chooses an environmental standard and may charge a
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fixed labeling fee to certify the product. Firms who wish to certify their
products using these ecolabels must ensure their products meet the certi-
fier imposed environmental standard and pay the labeling fees to carry the
ecolabel. Therefore, while voluntary external certification solves the cred-
ibility problem by enhancing consumer perception and willingness to pay
for a green product, it imposes an exogenous environmental standard that
may differ from the firm’s desired level of environmental improvement,
besides also collecting labeling fees.
External certification schemes differ in their objectives; governmental
and NGO schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council seek to max-
imize environmental benefits, while private schemes such as Ecologo are
administered by profit-maximizers. Due to their differing objectives, the
environmental standards chosen by these external certifying organizations
for their ecolabeling schemes differ in stringency, and consequently, in their
efficacy. The second contribution of this chapter is to identify the value of
external ecolabeling schemes and contrast NGO and private ecolabeling
schemes with respect to their impact on firms, consumers, and the environ-
ment.
While the literature on ecolabeling has primarily focused on whether it
can improve environmental outcomes (Mason, 2006; Ibanez and Grolleau,
2008), our scope and focus in this study is more holistic in that we also con-
sider the social and economic implications of ecolabeling schemes. To do
so, we utilize the Triple Bottom Line (3BL) concept which is a framework
for assessing the impacts of business practices using context-specific mea-
sures of environmental impact, social equity, and similar constructs with
the ultimate goal of balancing societal and environmental concerns with eco-
nomic objectives (Elkington, 1998). We define and evaluate surrogate mea-
sures of environmental, social, and economic impacts to achieve a balanced
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scorecard perspective of external ecolabeling schemes and the impact of
firm credibility.
To address these questions, we first analyze a model with a single mo-
nopolistic producer both in the presence and absence of independent ex-
ternal (NGO or private) ecolabeling schemes, where the external certifying
agent, when present, is a leader in a Stackelberg game. Next, to identify
the impact of credibility on self-labeling competition and ensuing conse-
quences, we study a model of duopolistic competition between two firms
with asymmetric credibilities, with the firms simultaneously choosing en-
vironmental qualities in the first stage followed by price competition in the
second stage. Firm credibilities are known by producers as well as con-
sumers and ecolabeling agencies, i.e., there is no information asymmetry
in our model. We then study the duopoly model with access to a single ex-
ternal certification scheme in a four-stage game, with the certifying agent
in the role of a Stackelberg leader, followed by simultaneous ecolabel se-
lection, environmental quality setting, and price setting by the competing
firms in the following stages. Here, we contrast the NGO and private exter-
nal ecolabeling schemes with respect to their impacts on firms, consumers,
and the environment. Finally, we explore the ability of an NGO to miti-
gate the underprovision of environmental benefits by a private ecolabeling
scheme. We study NGO intervention in a five-stage game with the NGO
in the role of a Stackelberg leader. The key results and contributions of this
chapter can be summarized as follows:
(1) As a monopolistic firm becomes more credible, its environmental
quality choice and resultant 3BL implications are all impacted pos-
itively. However, in the presence of competition, a firm’s environ-
mental quality choice does not follow from its credibility vis-a-vis
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its competitor. In particular, in the absence of an external ecola-
bel, a more credible firm will offer a product with higher environ-
mental quality than its competitor. In contrast, the less credible
firm adopts the external ecolabel, and its product bears a higher
environmental quality than that of its more credible competitor
when an external ecolabeling scheme from either an NGO or pri-
vate agency is available. However, in the presence of both an NGO
and private ecolabel, both firms will adopt an external ecolabel,
and the more credible firm will revert to offering a product with
higher environmental quality than its competitor.
(2) External ecolabeling schemes result in increased environmental
qualities of products and result in better environmental outcomes.
However, they are detrimental to the producing firms and may
even hurt consumers in the presence of producer competition. In-
terestingly, this occurs when the credibility of the industry as a
whole is low, a situation in which the greatest need for external
ecolabeling programs may be perceived. While they are preferred
by the industry relative to their NGO counterpart, private ecola-
beling schemes underprovide environmental benefits as they set
lower environmental standards relative to an NGO.
(3) An NGO cannot mitigate the underprovision of environmental
benefits by a private ecolabeling scheme by preemption in a pro-
ducer monopoly. In the presence of producer competition how-
ever, NGO’s can mitigate the underprovision of environmental
benefits by preempting a private ecolabel and steering the pri-
vate ecolabel’s environmental standard upwards, which also im-
proves consumer surplus. This occurs even if the NGO’s ecolabel
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is not chosen in equilibrium. However, a single NGO ecolabeling
scheme is most beneficial from an environmental perspective.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. A brief review of the literature
and our contributions are summarized in §3.2. We study two forces driving
green product development in this chapter: demand-pull from consumers,
and competition from producers. To focus on the role of consumer demand
in stimulating green product development and the concurrent role of ex-
ternal certification, we begin our analysis with the case of a single-product
monopolist in §3.3. Next, we jointly address the two forces by analyzing
a model of duopolistic producer competition in §3.4. An analysis of NGO
preemption of private ecolabeling schemes is contained in §3.5. Conclud-
ing remarks to this chapter are provided in §3.6. Appendix B1 contains
additional figures and tables referenced herein and proofs are provided in
Appendix B2.
3.2. Literature Review
Consumer preference for environmental attributes is well documented
in the literature (Khanna, 2001; Tully and Winer, 2014). Models of product-
line design first introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and extended by
Moorthy and Png (1992); Desai et al. (2001); Kim and Chhajed (2002) have
been applied to study environmental product design choices and product-
line strategies (Chen, 2001; Amacher et al., 2004). This is the first stream
of literature our work is related to. The insights from traditional quality
competition are applicable to the context of environmental quality com-
petition as a result of the vertical nature of preference for the attributes
in question, traditional and environmental quality, respectively. However,
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while Chen (2001) considers government regulation and mandatory min-
imum environmental quality standards, these studies do not address vol-
untary external certification or the specific characteristics of environmental
attributes arising from their unobservability to consumers.
A second stream of literature addresses the role of voluntary certifi-
cation schemes, particularly in the context of environmental preservation.
Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed (2008) and Craig et al. (2011) study a model
of voluntary certification with partial information wherein consumers hold
simple beliefs regarding the environmental qualities of certified and non-
certified products. In a similar setting with partial information and sim-
ple beliefs, Bottega et al. (2009) and Bottega and De Freitas (2009) contrast
minimum standards imposed by a regulator with public and private label-
ing and also consider the use of green advertisement to enhance consumer
preference for ecolabels. In a model with perfect competition, Fischer and
Lyon (2014) compare NGO and industry standards for ecolabels in a setting
with full information and find that the coexistence of multiple standards is
likely to diminish environmental benefits. Unlike our work, they do not
consider self-labeling by producers and consequently, do not consider the
notion of credibility. Further, these papers focus on environmental out-
comes alone, while we extend our scope to consider social and economic
implications of ecolabeling as well.
A few studies introduce the notion of consumer trust and credibil-
ity when environmental quality is otherwise imperceptible to consumers,
which is the third stream of literature our work is related to. Castka and
Corbett (2014) conduct an empirical study of the ecolabeling marketplace
and identify factors such as governance, stringency, and reputation that
lead to more widespread ecolabel adoption. There are few analytical stud-
ies within this stream. Craig et al. (2011) consider a single ecolabel, with
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consumers perceiving the unlabeled product as possessing a fraction of
the environmental quality possessed by a labeled product. Brécard (2014)
studies the effect of misperception of ecolabels on social surplus and the
provision of environmental benefits. Harbaugh et al. (2011) consider the
impact of uncertainty in exogenous quality standards (to firms and con-
sumers) of external labels and uncertainty in exogenous product qualities
(to consumers) in the presence of multiple ecolabels. In contrast, our work
considers endogenously chosen producer self-labels that are known to, but
discounted by consumers as a result of a lack of credibility, as well as en-
dogenously determined environmental standards chosen by external eco-
labelers.
An important contribution of our work is to extend the scope of the
analysis of the impacts of ecolabeling beyond the environment. Several
studies in the ecolabeling literature (see, for example, (Amacher et al., 2004;
Bottega and De Freitas, 2009; Craig et al., 2011; Fischer and Lyon, 2014))
focus on its environmental implications. We consider in this study envi-
ronmental, as well as the social and economic consequences of ecolabel-
ing. In this respect, our work is related to a fourth stream of literature
on Triple Bottom Line implications of operational and strategic decisions.
Kleindorfer et al. (2005) and Tang and Zhou (2012) provide two particu-
larly relevant reviews of 3BL and related frameworks within the context
of Operations Management applications and models. As two examples,
Guo et al. (2015) consider responsible sourcing in supply chains when con-
sumers are socially conscious, and Xu et al. (2015) study policies that can
effectively combat sourcing from suppliers utilizing child labor in develop-
ing economies. As developed in the context of groundwater management
in Chapter 2, we define metrics for environmental, social, and economic
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implications and contrast them for different ecolabeling scenarios. More-
over, we also describe the impact of firm credibility on the 3BL implications
of green product development and ecolabeling.
3.3. Base Model
We first develop a model of ecolabeling for a single-product monopo-
list to focus on the role of consumer demand-pull in driving green product
development and ecolabeling. The role of ecolabeling in monopolistic mar-
kets is of interest given the absence of competitive forces to spur the pro-
vision of environmental attributes. In the absence of external certification,
the monopolist must first choose an environmental quality gm ∈ [0, 1] for
his product and subsequently set the corresponding price pm. Note the use
of the subscript m to denote a monopoly. Examples of such environmental
attributes include the quantity of pasture in cattle feed, the removal of syn-
thetic fertilizer and genetically modified ingredients from the production of
food products, hazardous chemicals from cleaning products etc. Designing
a product with environmental quality level gm incurs a quadratic fixed cost
of g2m as in the quality and environmental product design literature (Moor-
thy and Png, 1992; Chen, 2001; Amacher et al., 2004). The variable costs of
production are assumed to be independent of environmental quality and
normalized to zero. Consumers are assumed to prefer products with higher
environmental qualities to those with lower ones (see, for example, Chen
(2001); Amacher et al. (2004); Bottega and De Freitas (2009)). Other product
attributes such as convential quality are normalized to zero and hence do
not enter the decision-making framework. The empirical literature on con-
sumer adoption of ecolabeled products indicates that consumers respond
to their awareness of the environmental track-record of a firm in evaluat-
ing their willingness to pay for a product bearing an environmental claim
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by that firm (Carmona, 2011; Castka and Corbett, 2014). Accordingly, we
assume that a monopolist’s self-label is discounted by consumers, with an
environmental quality claim of gm being perceived as µgm, where credibil-
ity µ ∈ [0, 1]. We note that the lack of full credibility of a self-label in our
model does not imply the potential for firms to make fraudulent claims, a
possibility we do not consider in this chapter1. Rather, as Horne (2009) sug-
gests, it reflects on the nascency of the ecolabeling marketplace resulting in
a lack of awareness, non-uniformity in the definitions of green marketing
claims, and skepticism from consumers. Taken altogether, the monopolist
faces a demand function qm = 1− pm + βµgm , where β ∈ [0, 1] is the sen-
sitivity of demand to the perceived environmental quality of the product.
This specification of β implies that consumers are more sensitive to price
than they are to perceived environmental quality, which reflects empirical
findings in the literature (see, for example, D’Souza et al. (2006)). This lin-
ear form of demand has precedence in the literature on product design and
development (Tsay and Agrawal, 2000; Savaskan et al., 2004; Gurnani and
Erkoc, 2008).
Given that a key contribution of this work is to identify the social,
environmental, and economic implications of ecolabeling, we now de-
fine measures for each of these categories of impacts. Social implica-
tions are measured by consumer surplus accruing from all products sold
CS = ∑i
´ pci
p∗i
qi(g∗i , pi)dpi, where p
c
i is the choke price, or the price at which
quantity of product sold goes to zero. Note that i = m in a producer mo-
nopoly. Consumer surplus measures the difference between the maximum
1 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issues Green Guides that outline general principles
that green marketing claims must adhere to. While not enforcible, the FTC can investigate
an organization believed to be violating the outlined principles. This mitigates the likeli-
hood of rampant ecolabel fraud (FTC, 2012).
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willingness to pay and the actual price paid by consumers. Environmen-
tal benefits are measured by the total diffusion of environmental quality in
the market across all products sold, i.e., E = ∑i q∗i g
∗
i . Finally, we measure
economic implications through the total profits accruing to the producer(s)
Π = ∑Π∗i , i.e., the producer surplus.
We now study a monopolist’s problem in the absence of external eco-
labeling schemes. In the absence of an external ecolabeling scheme, the
monopolist chooses his optimal environmental quality in the first stage,
followed by price-setting in the second stage to maximize his profits Πm =
pmqm − g2m. In the absence of external ecolabeling schemes (i.e., when only
self-labeling is possible), we denote the equilibrium outcomes with the su-
perscript S. Solving backwards, we obtain the equilibrium choices of envi-
ronmental quality and price that are described in Lemma 3.1 below.
LEMMA 3.1. The monopolist chooses environmental quality gSm =
βµ
4−β2µ2 ,
charges price pSm =
2
4−β2µ2 , and obtains profits of Π
S
m =
1
4−β2µ2 . The environmen-
tal quality, price, and profits are all increasing in credibility µ.
From Lemma 3.1, we see that an increase in the monopolist’s credibility
increases his product’s environmental quality, price, and associated profits
in the absence of external ecolabeling schemes. This follows as a result of
consumers increasing their perception of environmental quality and will-
ingness to pay as the credibility of the firm’s environmental claim goes up.
Naturally, we now consider the impact of ecolabeling schemes launched by
external certification agencies. Regardless of their objective, i.e., environ-
mental benefit-maximization for an NGO (G) or profit-maximization for a
private agency (P), the external certification agent specifies a fixed labeling
fee τCm ≥ 0 and an environmental standard gCm ∈ [0, 1] that must be met for
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a product to bear its ecolabel, where C ∈ {G, P}. We refer to this combina-
tion of labeling fee and environmental standard as an external ecolabeling
scheme. Private certification agencies seek to maximize profits from label-
ing fees τPm (we assume that a labeling agency’s cost of certification is zero,
hence profits equal revenues).
For the monopolist, acquiring the credible external ecolabel is benefi-
cial as it eliminates consumer discounting due to the lack of a credible en-
vironmental claim, i.e., consumers perceive the environmental quality of a
product bearing an external ecolabel of environmental standard gCm as gCm
itself, whereas they perceive the environmental quality of a product bear-
ing a self-label of environmental quality gSm as µgSm. However, to use the
ecolabel, the monopolist’s product must meet the ecolabeling scheme’s en-
vironmental standard, and the monopolist must additionally bear the im-
posed labeling fees. The game with external ecolabeling schemes proceeds
in four stages. In the first stage, the external certification agency announces
its ecolabeling scheme (τCm , gCm). The monopolist chooses whether or not
to adopt the ecolabeling scheme in the second stage. In the third stage, the
monopolist chooses the environmental quality of his product; if he chose to
adopt the external ecolabeling scheme in the previous stage, he meets the
imposed environmental standard gCm, else he self-labels and determines his
optimal environmental quality gSm. He sets prices in the fourth stage. Note
the use of the superscript C ∈ {G, P} to denote the presence of an external
ecolabeling scheme. The equilibrium of this four-stage game is described
in Proposition 3.1 below.
PROPOSITION 3.1. The environmental standard stipulated by the NGO eco-
labeling scheme is higher than the environmental standard stipulated by the private
ecolabeling scheme, which in turn exceeds the self-labeling environmental quality
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chosen by the monopolist: gGm =
4β−β3µ2+2
√
β2(1−µ2)(4−β2µ2)
(4−β2)(4−β2µ2) > g
P
m =
β
4−β2 >
gSm =
βµ
4−β2µ2 . Further, no labeling fees are charged under the NGO ecolabeling
scheme, τGm = 0, while the private scheme charges τPm =
β2(1−µ2)
(4−β2)(4−β2µ2) .
To induce adoption, the external ecolabeling scheme must make a
tradeoff between a high environmental standard and a low labeling fee.
Since the diffusion of environmental quality is increasing in the environ-
mental quality of the product (this can be verified by substituting the op-
timal price such that E(gm) =
gm
2 (1 + βκgm), where κ = µ if self-labeled
and κ = 1 if externally labeled), the NGO chooses to set the highest pos-
sible environmental standard that induces adoption from the monopolist
(which implies that τGm = 0) while the private firm chooses the highest
possible fee that can induce adoption from the monopolist. This results in
the NGO choosing a higher environmental standard than its counterpart.
Proposition 3.1 also notes that regardless of the source, the environmental
standard imposed by an external ecolabeling scheme is higher than the en-
vironmental quality chosen by the monopolist when self-labeling his prod-
uct. Thus, external ecolabeling schemes improve the environmental quality
of the monopolist’s product.
We now turn our attention to the social, environmental, and economic
implications of ecolabeling. The following proposition contrasts the 3BL
implications of the different ecolabeling schemes and the effect of credibil-
ity on these implications in a monopoly.
PROPOSITION 3.2. a) Consumer surplus and environmental benefits are or-
dered such that CSGm > CSPm > CSSm and EGm > EPm > ESm. Monopolist’s surplus
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(profits) are independent of the type of label used, i.e., ΠGm = ΠPm = ΠSm.
b) The impact of credibility on the 3BL implications of ecolabeling for a mo-
nopolist are such that ∂CS
S
m
∂µ ,
∂ESm
∂µ ,
∂ΠSm
∂µ ,
∂ΠPm
∂µ ,
∂ΠGm
∂µ > 0,
∂CSGm
∂µ ,
∂EGm
∂µ < 0, and
∂CSPm
∂µ ,
∂EPm
∂µ = 0.
As noted in Proposition 3.1, the NGO scheme sets the highest environ-
mental standard, which consequently results in the best outcomes from a
3BL perspective. It is noteworthy that regardless of the objective of the
ecolabeler, consumer surplus and environmental benefits improve with ex-
ternal certification, i.e., ecolabeling improves not only the environmental
quality designed into a product but also the 3BL outcomes in a monopoly.
Proposition 3.2(b) notes that while the social and environmental impacts of
the private ecolabeling scheme are independent of the monopolists’ cred-
ibility (since the private scheme chooses a standard gPm =
β
4−β2 that is in-
dependent of µ, and indeed, a level that a monopolist with full credibility
µ = 1 would choose himself), the impact on the social and environmen-
tal consequences of the NGO ecolabeling scheme are negative. This occurs
since an increase in credibility results in an increase in the monopolist’s
self-labeling profits, consequently increasing his reservation profits. Thus,
the ecolabeling schemes must respond by imposing a lower environmental
standard or charging a lower labeling fee. Since the NGO ecolabel already
charges τGm = 0, it must respond by lowering its environmental standard,
and consequently, the social and environmental benefits of NGO ecolabel-
ing decline. In contrast, the private firm keeps its environmental standard
intact while lowering its labeling fee, thus hurting its own profits but not
impacting the social or environmental consequences of ecolabeling.
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3.4. Producer Competition
To identify the role of competition in combination with consumer-
demand pull in determining ecolabeling outcomes, we now study a model
with competing firms (producers). The two firms H and L in our model
are asymmetric in their credibilities, with environmental self-declarations
from firm H being discounted by µH and those from firm L discounted by
µL, such that 1 > µH > µL > 0, i.e., firm H is more credible in the eyes of
the consumer. Thus, a self-label claiming an environmental quality gi from
firm i ∈ {H, L} is perceived by consumers as possessing environmental
quality µigi.
Extending the demand spefications of Banker et al. (1998) and Matsub-
ayashi (2007) to the case of environmental quality competition, we model
demand as a linear function of environmental qualities and prices, where
qH = 12 − (pH − pL)+ β(µH gH − µLgL) and qL = 12 − (pL− pH)+ β(µLgL−
µH gH), where β ∈ [0, 1] is the demand sensitivity to relative perceived en-
vironmental quality µigi − µ−ig−i, where i ∈ {H, L}. Note that this de-
mand specification is such that the two firms sell products that are other-
wise identical in every respect, and moreover, qH + qL = 1, i.e., this is a
market share model2. The firms are assumed to be identical on the supply
side, i.e., designing an environmental quality of gi costs both firms g2i in
fixed costs.
We now describe the setting of the self-labeling game between two
duopolists in the absence of an external ecolabeling scheme. A two-stage
2 This assumption can be relaxed by assuming less than perfect substitutatibility be-
tween the two products. For example, we can do so by incorporating a term φ ∈ [0, 1]
as a measure of substitutability between the two products resulting in a demand spec-
ification qi = 12 − (pi − φp−i) + β(µigi − φµ−ig−i), where i ∈ {H, L}, such that
qH + qL = 1− (1− φ)(pH + pL + β(µH gH + µLgL)).
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structure is widely used in the literature on quality competition as it is re-
alistic (designing quality is a long-term activity while price-setting is rela-
tively short-term) and also because it permits a pure-strategy equilibrium
of the game. The competing firms simultaneously determine and announce
thier environmental qualities (self-labels) in the first stage, followed by a
simultaneous announcement of prices in the second stage after which de-
mand for their respective products is determined. We define ν as the ratio
between the credibilities of firm L and firm H, i.e., ν = µLµH ∈ [0, 1].
We solve the game backwards by first resolving the game of price com-
petition in the second stage following the announcement of environmental
qualities by the firms in the first stage. The firms determine their opti-
mal prices given the response of the other firm and the choices of envi-
ronmental qualities in the previous stage by maximizing their profit func-
tions Πi = qi pi − g2i . Solving for the two optimal pricing functions si-
multaneously results in the price equilibrium pSH(g
S
H, g
S
L) =
1
6 (2βµH g
S
H −
2βµHνgSL + 3), p
S
L(g
S
H, g
S
L) =
1
6 (−2βµH gSH + 2βµHνgSL + 3). Given the price
functions pSH(g
S
H, g
S
L) and p
S
L(g
S
H, g
S
L) from the second stage, we can solve
for the resulting optimal environmental qualities in the first stage. The re-
sulting equilibrium outcome is described in Lemma 3.2.
LEMMA 3.2. The environmental qualities chosen in a self-labeling equilibrium
are gSH =
βµH(9−2β2µ2Hν2)
2(27−3β2µ2H(ν2+1))
and gSL =
βµHν(9−2β2µ2H)
2(27−3β2µ2H(ν2+1))
, where gSH > g
S
L. The
prices chosen in equilibrium are pSH =
2β2µ2Hν
2−9
2(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
and pSL =
2β2µ2H−9
2(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
,
where pSH > p
S
L. The resulting profits are Π
S
H =
(9−β2µ2H)(9−2β2µ2Hν2)
2
36(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 and ΠSL =
(9−2β2µ2H)
2
(9−β2µ2Hν2)
36(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 , where ΠSH > Π
S
L.
We note from the equilibrium outcomes of the self-labeling game that
the more credible firm H will design a higher environmental quality, charge
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a higher price, and obtain higher profits. This implies that in the absence
of independent, external ecolabels, environmental quality choices follow
from the ordering of firm credibilities. We now turn to a discussion of the
3BL implications of imperfect credibility and credibility asymmetry in the
absence of independent, external ecolabels. The following proposition de-
scribes the 3BL implications of self-labeling competition between the two
firms and the effect of credibility on these implications.
PROPOSITION 3.3. a) In a self-labeling equilibrium, the consumer surplus is
CSS =
2β4µ4H(ν4+1)−18β2µ2H(ν2+1)+81
4(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 , total diffusion of environmental quality is
ES =
βµH
(
4β4µ4Hν
4−36β2µ2Hν2+ν(9−2β2µ2H)
2
+81
)
12(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 , and total producer surplus is ΠS =
1458−4β6µ6Hν2(ν2+1)+36β4µ4H(ν2+1)
2−405β2µ2H(ν2+1)
36(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 .
b) For a fixed ν, the impacts of a change in µH are as follows: ∂CS
S
∂µH
, ∂E
S
∂µH
> 0 and
∂ΠS
∂µH
< 0. For a fixed ν, the impacts of a change in ν are as follows: ∂E
S
∂ν > 0, and
∂CSS
∂ν ,
∂ΠS
∂ν < 0.
Note that given our parametrizations, ceteris paribus, an increase in µH
to µH(1+ δ) results in a like increase in µL to µL(1+ δ). Thus, we interpret
µH as industry credibility and ν as the ratio of credibilities of firm L and
H. We observe from Proposition 3.3(b) that an increase in either µH or ν
hurts industry profits. Specifically, an increase in µH causes a decrease in
firm L’s profits as the credibility gap between the two firms widens, which
exceeds the resulting increase in firm H’s profits. Conversely, an increase
in the credibility ratio ν causes a decrease in firm H’s profits due to the
narrowing credibility gap resulting in increased competition between the
two firms, which exceeds the resulting increase in firm L’s profits. A similar
explanation accounts for an increase (decrease) in consumer surplus with
µH (ν): an increase in µH raises the environmental quality of both firms’
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products resulting in higher consumer surplus. An increase in ν results
in firm H (L) lowering (raising) the environmental quality of its product.
Thus, firm H (L) charges a lower (higher) price for its product, such that
the increase in the price of firm L’s product has a greater impact than that
caused by the decrease in the price of firm H’s product, thus negatively
affecting consumers. However, an increase in either µH or ν results in an
increase in total environmental benefits. Therefore, we note that, aside from
the unequivocal benefit to the environment at the industry’s expense, an
increase in industry credibility for a fixed credibility ratio, or an increase
in the credibility ratio for a fixed industry credibility may have positive or
negative consequences for society under self-labeling competition.
We next turn our attention to external ecolabeling schemes in the
duopoly model. We now allow for the presence of one external ecolabel-
ing scheme (administered either by an environmental benefit-maximizing
NGO or a profit-maximizing private firm), with the competing producers
having the option of either choosing the external ecolabel and meeting the
associated standard and incurring a labeling fee while enjoying full credi-
bility (no consumer discounting), or using their own self-label with credi-
bility µi < 1. The game proceeds in four stages. In the first stage, the ecola-
beling agency announces its environmental standard gCc and fixed labeling
fee τCc , where C ∈ {G, P} depending on the objective of the agency and
the subscript c denotes producer competition. Following the announce-
ment, the two firms simultaneously choose whether to adopt the external
ecolabel (C) or self-label (S) in the second stage. If a firm chooses to self-
label, it determines its environmental quality in the third stage after having
observed its competitor’s label choice (S or C) in the second stage and the
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ecolabeling agency’s announcement in the first stage. We separate the eco-
label adoption decision in the second stage and environmental quality set-
ting in the third stage since it is realistic3 and also permits a pure-strategy
equilibrium of the game. In the fourth stage, price competition follows la-
beling and environmental quality choices. The matrix of the ensuing game
between the two firms is described in Table 2 below.
Firm H/ Firm L Self-label Externally certify
Self-label SS SC
Externally certify CS CC
Table 2. Matrix form of ecolabeling game with external cer-
tification
The second stage equilibrium (choice of self-labeling S or adopting the
external standard C) between the two firms is described in the following
lemma.
LEMMA 3.3. Let τ1(gCc ) and τ2(gCc ) denote thresholds for the labeling fee. The
equilibria are CC iff τCc ≤ τ1(gCc ), SC iff τCc ∈ [τ1(gCc ), τ2(gCc )], and SS iff τCc ≥
τ2(gCc ). Further, iff gCc ≥ gˆ, there exist two more ordered thresholds τ3(gCc ) ≤
τ4(gCc ) within the range [τ1(gCc ), τ2(gCc )] such that CS is an equilibrium iff τCc ∈
[τ3(gCc ), τ4(gCc )].
The equilibria described in Lemma 3.3 are illustrated in Figure 6 below4.
3 For example, farms must go through a three year transition period following the adop-
tion decision before they can sell produce labeled organic (Coleman, 2012). 4 We only
consider the case when τ1(gCc ) ≤ τ2(gCc ), which we show to be true everywhere except
when µL → 1 from a numerical analysis illustrated in Figure 14 in Appendix B1. The case
when τ1(gCc ) > τ2(gCc ) does not admit heterogenous equilibria (SC or CS) and results in a
trivial equilibrium outcome to the four-stage game.
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Figure 6. Equilibrium in the second-stage for a given τCc as
a function of gCc
When the two firms are differentiated only by their credibilities (ν < 1),
we see from Lemma 3.3 that all four equilibria described in Table 2 are fea-
sible given the labeling fee τCc and external standard gCc . Firm L with lower
credibility has more to gain from adopting the external ecolabel (as a re-
sult of its lower self-labeling profits relative to firm H due to greater con-
sumer discounting, and consequently, a lower reservation profit) and hence
chooses action C over a wider range of labeling fees, i.e., τCc ≤ τ2(gCc ). Firm
H with higher credibility only chooses to adopt the external ecolabel C over
a smaller range of labeling fees, τCc ∈ [0, τ1(gCc )]∪ [τ3(gCc ), τ4(gCc )] as it has
less to gain from doing so (a higher reservation profit as a result of lower
consumer discounting). Therefore, as τCc increases for a given gCc , we first
see both firms choosing C because the labeling fees are low enough to jus-
tify adoption of the external ecolabel. Thereafter, firm L continues to adopt
the external ecolabel C while firm H self-labels S. As the labeling fees rise
past τCc = τ2(gCc ), both firms choose to self-label S as the external ecolabel
becomes too costly for either firm. Notice further, that the equilibrium is
unique everywhere except for τCc ∈ [τ3(gCc ), τ4(gCc )] where both SC or CS
equilibria may occur. This is explained by noting that at least one firm has
a dominant strategy everywhere except for τCc ∈ [τ3(gCc ), τ4(gCc )]. In par-
ticular, firm L will adopt the external ecolabel C regardless of what its com-
petitor does for τCc ≤ τ3(gCc ), and firm H will self-label S regardless of what
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its competitor does for τCc ≥ τ4(gCc ). However, for τCc ∈ [τ3(gCc ), τ4(gCc )],
neither firm has a dominant strategy, and the ensuing equilibrium (SC or
CS) depends on what each firm’s competitor chooses. Adopting the exter-
nal ecolabel is only beneficial for a firm when its competitor does not also
adopt it, i.e., differentiation drives external ecolabel adoption in this range
of labeling fees. We note here that not all of the equilibrium regions de-
picted in Figure 6 may exist for any given gCc ; for example, if gCc is too high,
then τ1(gCc ) < 0 so that the CC equilibrium disappears.
In the following proposition, we describe the equilibrium choices of
gCc and τCc by the external ecolabeling agencies and the ensuing equilibrium
between the competing firms.
PROPOSITION 3.4. a) Let gCAc and gCBc denote conditionally optimal envi-
ronmental standards stipulated by an ecolabeling scheme C ∈ {G, P}. Similarly,
let τCAc and τCBc denote conditionally optimal labeling fees charged by an ecola-
beling scheme C ∈ {G, P}. Further, let, ∆E = E|(gGAc , τGAc ) − E|(gGBc , τGBc ) and
∆ΠPri = ΠPri|(gPAc , τPAc )−ΠPri|(gPBc , τPBc ), where ΠPri denotes the private labeler’s
profits. Then, the equilibrium outcome of the game is described in the following ta-
ble:
NGO scheme Private scheme
∆E ≥ 0 ∆E < 0 ∆ΠPri ≥ 0 ∆ΠPri < 0
Labeling fees 0 0 τPAc τPBc
Environmental standard gGAc gGBc gPAc gPBc
Labeling equilibrium GG SG PP SP
b) Regardless of an NGO or private ecolabel, g∗L = g
C
c ≥ g∗H > gSH > gSL, i.e.,
when an external ecolabel is available, firm L provides a higher environmental
quality than its competitor and both firms’ environmental qualities are higher than
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those chosen in the absence of an external ecolabel.
c) In a CC equilibrium, gGc = gGAc > gPAc = gPc , and in an SC equilibrium,
gGc = gGBc > gPBc = gPc .
As noted in Proposition 3.4(a), regardless of the source of the ecola-
beling scheme, firm L always chooses to adopt the external ecolabel in
equilibrium, while firm H adopts the external ecolabel if and only if ∆E =
E|(gGAc , τGAc ) − E|(gGBc , τGBc ) = E|(gGAc , 0) − E|(gGBc , 0) ≥ 0 (and in the case of the
private ecolabeler, if and only if ∆ΠPri = ΠPri|(gPAc , τPAc ) −ΠPri|(gPBc , τPBc ) ≥
0). A numerical exploration of the switching point in firm H’s ecolabel
adoption decision reveals that for a given ν, this occurs when the credibil-
ity of firm H lies below some threshold value, such that an SC equilibrium
ensues only when firm H’s credibility is sufficiently high (this numerical
study is described in Figure 12 in Appendix B1). This results from the larger
reservation profits for firm H due to its higher credibility, making firm H
more reluctant to adopt the external ecolabel when its credibility is higher
than a threshold. In addition, Proposition 3.4(b) notes that in the presence
of an external ecolabel, firm L, who in the absence of an external ecolabel
would choose a lower environmental quality relative to its competitor, will
now choose a higher environmental quality than its competitor. This im-
plies that environmental quality choices do not follow from the ordering
of firm credibilities in the presence of a single external ecolabel. Moreover,
Proposition 3.4(b) states that the environmental qualities chosen in equilib-
rium in the presence of an external ecolabel are higher than the environ-
mental qualities that would have been chosen in its absence. That is, the
presence of an external ecolabel drives up environmental qualities of both
products. In addition, we observe from Proposition 3.4(c) that conditional
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on a given equilibrium between the competing firms, the NGO ecolabel-
ing scheme will stipulate a higher environmental standard than its private
counterpart. A more general result on the ordering of environmental stan-
dards in an NGO and private ecolabeling scheme is obtained through a
numerical exploration and illustrated in Figure 7, revealing that the NGO
will stipulate a higher environmental standard than its private counterpart,
who in turn will stipulate a higher environmental standard than the envi-
ronmental qualities chosen in the absence of external ecolabeling schemes.
We obtain this figure by plotting the self-labeling environmental qualities
and environmental standards obtained in Lemma 3.2 and Proposition 3.4
respectively, conditional on the sign of ∆E and ∆ΠPri. In Figure 7, we set
the parameters β = 0.75 and ν = 0.5, but we note that the ordering of en-
vironmental standards and qualities does not change upon varying β and
ν in increments of 0.2 over the range β ∈ (0, 1] and ν ∈ [0, 1).
Figure 7. Environmental standards and qualities as a func-
tion of µH for β = 0.75, ν = 0.5
We next direct our attention to the 3BL implications of the introduction
of an external ecolabel. Owing to the intractability of the expressions for
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3BL metrics, we perform a numerical analysis while varying the param-
eters µH ∈ [0, 1] and ν ∈ [0, 1]. We graphically describe in Figure 8 the
resulting comparisons of the 3BL implications for the cases when no ex-
ternal ecolabels are available, an NGO external ecolabel is available, and
a private external ecolabel is available (computed from the definitions of
the 3BL metrics and the equilibrium outcomes described in Lemma 3.2 and
Proposition 3.4). We note here that while the results described in Figure 8
are for the case of β = 0.75, the structure of Figure 8 remains qualitatively
unchanged while β is varied in increments of 0.2 in the range β ∈ (0, 1].
Figure 8. First-Best Consumer Surplus and Industry Sur-
plus as a function of µH and ν for β = 0.75.
Figure 8 contrasts the 3BL impacts across the three scenarios: no exter-
nal ecolabel, external NGO ecolabel, and external private ecolabel. Note
that in Figure 8, S implies first-best implications result from self-labeling
in the absence of external ecolabeling schemes, and C ∈ {G, P} implies
first-best implications result from the corresponding external ecolabeling
scheme. We observe that while industry profits are higher in the absence of
an external ecolabel, which occurs as a result of decreased differentiation as
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well as the imposed environmental standard and labeling fees in the pres-
ence of external ecolabeling schemes, consumer surplus can be maximized
by either one of these three scenarios depending on the credibilities of the
two firms. In particular, as µH increases from left to right, the first-best con-
sumer surplus results first from the absence of an external ecolabel, then
from the private ecolabel, then from the absence of an external ecolabel
again, and finally from the NGO ecolabel, respectively. Note that external
ecolabeling schemes result in first-best consumer surplus when industry
credibility µH is high, a scenario wherein external ecolabeling schemes are
less likely to be available or perceived as necessary. As the credibility ra-
tio ν increases, the regions where external ecolabeling schemes result in
first-best consumer surplus diminish in size. Therefore, external ecolabel-
ing schemes may be more valuable to consumers when industry credibility
is high but the credibilities of the two producers are significantly different.
We note that by virtue of the NGO’s objective of environmental benefit-
maximization, first-best environmental impacts are achieved by the NGO
ecolabeling scheme. Moreover, as in the monopoly case, we also find that
the private ecolabeling scheme results in superior environmental outcomes
relative to the absence of an external ecolabel. We note here that the sensi-
tivity of demand to perceived environmental qualities, β, plays a relatively
minor role in determining the ordering of 3BL implications in these three
scenarios. Thus, external ecolabeling schemes improve environmental out-
comes but also hurt industry profits, whereas they can leave consumers
better or worse off depending on the credibilities of the two firms.
3.5. NGO Preemption of a Private Ecolabel
We noted in §3.4 that while a private ecolabel is preferred by the indus-
try over an NGO ecolabel, it still underprovides environmental benefits by
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stipulating a lower environmental standard than the NGO. There is some
conceptual discussion around the role of governmental and allied agencies
in preempting or regulating ecolabeling in the fields of environmental and
marketing law (for example, see Grabosky (1994)). We therefore explore in
this section whether the NGO can remedy this underprovision of environ-
mental benefits by a private ecolabel by anticipating its entry and choosing
to preempt it.
To address this question, we analyze a Stackelberg game between the
NGO and private labelers that are competing to address a firm’s need for
certification. We begin with an analysis of a producer monopoly as in §3.3.
The NGO moves first by announcing an environmental standard gG2m and
labeling fee τG2m to maximize environmental benefits. In response to this
announcement from the NGO, the private ecolabeler announces his envi-
ronmental standard gP2m and labeling fee τP2m to maximize his profits from
labeling fees, where the superscript 2 indicates the presence of two exter-
nal ecolabels. Next, the monopolist chooses between the two ecolabels or
his own self-label, followed by implementing the environmental standard
if adopting an external ecolabel or by choosing and implementing the self-
labeling environmental quality instead, followed by determining a price
for the product.
Resolving the game backwards, we first determine the monopolist’s
price function as pm(g, τ) = 12 (βκg + 1), where κ = 1 if the monopo-
list adopts an external ecolabel g = gC2m , and κ = µ if he self-labels in-
stead g = gS2m . Note that the price function is independent of the fixed
labeling fees charged. The monopolist’s optimal choice of environmen-
tal quality when self-labeling is gS2m = gSm =
βµ
4−β2µ2 , and the resulting
profits are ΠS2m = ΠSm =
1
4−β2µ2 as described in Lemma 3.1. Given the
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announcement from the NGO, the private ecolabeler maximizes his prof-
its by choosing gP2m (gG2m , τG2m , µ) and τP2m (gG2m , τG2m , µ). To make a positive
profit, the private ecolabeler must stipulate his scheme such that the mo-
nopolist will choose it over the self-labeling option and the NGO scheme,
and hence the following constraint applies to the private ecolabeler’s prob-
lem: ΠP2m ≥ Max[ΠG2m ,ΠSm] = Max[ΠG2m , 14−β2µ2 ]. The NGO being aware
of the private labeler’s response functions, chooses gG2m and τG2m to maxi-
mize environmental benefits. The equilibrium of this Stackelberg game is
described in Proposition 3.5.
PROPOSITION 3.5. a) In equilibrium, the monopolist chooses the private eco-
label which stipulates gP2m =
β
4−β2 = g
P
m, and
τP2m = Min[
β2(1−µ2)
(4−β2)(4−β2µ2) ,
β2(1−4τG2m )+16τG2m +(β2−4)
2
(gG2m )2−2(4−β2)βgG2m
4(4−β2) ] ≤ τPm.
As a result, the monopolist earns profits Π2m =
1
4
(
β2
4−β2 − 4τP2m + 1
)
≥ Πm. The
NGO does not have any impact on environmental benefits and hence chooses an
environmental standard gG2m ≥ 0 and labeling fee τG2m ≥ 0.
b) With two ecolabels, the 3BL implications are such that CS2m = CSPm, E2m = EPm,
and Π2m ≥ ΠPm.
Proposition 3.5(a) states that the private ecolabel is chosen in equilib-
rim. Despite NGO preemption, the private scheme stipulates an environ-
mental standard of β4−β2 that is independent of the monopolist’s credibility
or the NGO’s announcement. Thus, an NGO cannot improve environmen-
tal outcomes by preempting a private ecolabel in a producer monopoly.
Indeed, the only change relative to the single private label case in §3.3
is a fall in the private labeler’s profits resulting from lower labeling fees
τP2m ≤ τPm so that the private label can outcompete the NGO’s announce-
ment, which results in an increase in the monopolist’s profits Π2m ≥ Πm.
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However, if the private labeler’s entry were assumed to be costly, in par-
ticular, if its fixed costs of entry exceeded τP2m (gG2m ), the reduction in the
labeler’s profits from NGO intervention which occurs in equilibrium for
gG2m ∈ [ β
3µ2−2
√
β2(µ2−1)(β2µ2−4)−4β
(4−β2)(4−β2µ2) ,
β3µ2+2
√
β2(µ2−1)(β2µ2−4)−4β
(4−β2)(4−β2µ2) ] can dissuade
the private labeler’s entry. In particular, if the NGO stipulates gG2m =
β
4−β2
and τG2m = 0, this drives the private labeler’s fees and profits to zero. We
also observe from Proposition 3.5(b) that while the social and environmen-
tal consequences of NGO preemption do not change in a producer mo-
nopoly as they depend only on the environmental standard and are inde-
pendent of the labeling fees, the monopolist’s profits go up as a result of
the private ecolabeling scheme lowering its labeling fee to outcompete the
NGO ecolabel. Thus, we observe from Proposition 3.5 that in a monopoly,
the NGO cannot impact environmental or social outcomes but it can drive
up the monopolist’s profits from adopting the private ecolabel.
We next explore the NGO’s preemptive role in a duopoly. The game
proceeds as in the monopoly case with the NGO’s announcement com-
ing first, followed by the private labeler’s announcement, after which
the two producers simultaneously make ecolabel adoption, environmental
quality, and pricing choices. Due to analytical intractability, we perform
a full factorial numerical experiment to determine the equilibrium out-
comes in a producer duopoly for the parameters µH ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8},
ν ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8}, and β ∈ {0.5, 0.75}. The solution is obtained
by backward induction as in the monopoly case. A representative snap-
shot of the equilibrium outcomes of this numerical analysis for ν = 0.5 is
provided in Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix B1.
From these tables, we observe that both firms’ products are externally
ecolabeled in equilibrium. Further, we see that differentiation in ecolabel-
ing occurs when β = 0.5 but not when β = 0.75, i.e., when the sensitivity of
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demand to the difference in perceived environmental qualities of the two
products is sufficiently low. As β increases, the profits of firm L who adopts
the private ecolabel P (with a lower environmental standard than the NGO
ecolabel G) are increasingly hurt as a result of differentiation, and therefore,
it chooses to adopt the same ecolabel as its competitor. Since adopting the
same ecolabel confers no demand benefits to either firm, both firms move
downwards to adopt the private ecolabel with a lower environmental stan-
dard as it is less costly to achieve. We also observe that in the case of both
NGO and private ecolabels coexisting, the more credible firm H adopts a
higher environmental standard than its less credible competitor, i.e., as in
the self-labeling case, environmental quality choices follow from the order-
ing of firm credibilities. Also note from Table 5 (in Appendix B1) that while
the presence of a single external ecolabeling scheme drives the environ-
mental qualities provided by both firms upwards relative to the absence of
an external ecolabeling scheme, adding a second ecolabeling scheme does
not drive the environmental qualities of both firms upward relative to the
presence of a single external ecolabeling scheme.
With respect to 3BL implications in the presence of two external eco-
labels, we observe from Table 4 that all entries in row 10 of Table 4 are
positive. This means that the NGO can improve environmental outcomes
by preempting the private ecolabel in a duopoly even when its own ecola-
bel is not chosen in equilibrium. This occurs as the NGO’s announcement
pushes the private label to increase its environmental standard and reduce
labeling fees. Note that consumer surplus also improves with NGO pre-
emption relative to the case of only a single external ecolabel being present.
On the other hand, industry profits decrease (increase for β = 0.5 but de-
crease for β = 0.75) relative to a the scenario wherein only a single private
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(NGO) ecolabeling scheme was available to the producers. It is interest-
ing to note that NGO preemption of a private ecolabel does not improve
environmental benefits relative to the scenario wherein only a single NGO
ecolabel is present. We also observe that the environmental qualities chosen
by the two firms are higher when a PP equilibrium ensues (when β = 0.75)
relative to when a GP equilibrium ensues (when β = 0.5).
3.6. Conclusion
The two key questions addressed in this chapter are the role of ex-
ternal ecolabeling schemes and firm credibility in determining environ-
mental, social, and economic outcomes from green product development.
Green product development has gained momentum as a result of increased
consumer awareness and impetus from competition. To distinguish the
role of consumer demand for green products from the role of competitive
forces, we first studied a monopolistic model wherein a single firm pro-
duces a single product with environmentally beneficial attributes. In the
absence of external ecolabeling schemes, a monopolistic producer must
self-label his product to declare its environmental attributes to his con-
sumers. We observe that an increase in the credibility of the monopolist’s
self-labeling claims enhances the environmental quality of his product, and
consequently, improves environmental, social, and economic outcomes.
External ecolabeling schemes offer the monopolist the opportunity to
enhance credibility for a fixed certification fee, under the condition that his
product meets the environmental standard stipulated by the external eco-
labeling scheme. In comparing two possible external ecolabeling schemes
from an environmental benefit-maximizing NGO and a profit-maximizing
88
private firm, we find that the NGO ecolabel achieves the highest environ-
mental benefits and consumer surplus by stipulating a higher environmen-
tal standard than its private counterpart and imposing no labeling fees on
the monopolist. However, we also note that regardless of the source of
the external ecolabeling scheme, adopting an external ecolabel results in
greater environmental benefits and consumer surplus without impacting
the profits of the monopolist. Thus, in a monopoly, external ecolabeling
schemes offer an unequivocal benefit from a 3BL perspective.
We next study the impact of competitive forces on the efficacy of ex-
ternal ecolabeling schemes. Firm credibility in a duopoly of producers is
captured by two notions: 1) industry credibility, and 2) a ratio between the
credibilities of the firms with lower and higher credibility, respectively. In
a duopoly of producers, we find that in the absence of an external ecola-
bel, environmental qualities go up as industry credibility rises for a fixed
credibility ratio, and thus, so do the environmental benefits and consumer
surplus. However, the industry as a whole becomes less profitable, as the
increased differentiation caused by the rising credibility gap affects the less
credible firm severely. An increase in the credibility ratio for a fixed indus-
try credibility narrows the credibility gap between the two firms, thus in-
tensifying competition between them. While this improves environmental
benefits, it has a negative effect on industry profits, and interestingly, also
on consumer surplus. We also observe that in the absence of an external
ecolabeling scheme, the more credible firm provides a higher environmen-
tal quality than its competitor, i.e., environmental quality follows from the
ordering of firm credibilities when firms are self-labeling.
When the duopolists have access to a single external ecolabeling
scheme, environmental qualities, and consequently, environmental bene-
fits will rise. However, a numerical exploration of the 3BL implications
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of a single ecolabeling scheme reveals that industry profits fall relative to
the scenario where neither firm had access to an external ecolabel. This
occurs as a result of the homogenezation effect of external ecolabels; only
two types of equilibria occur in the presence of an external ecolabel, either
both firms adopt it, or the less credible firm adopts it while its competitor
self-labels. In either case, the environmental qualities are higher than in the
absence of an external ecolabel, and are also closer together, reducing dif-
ferentiation despite both firms bearing higher fixed costs of environmental
quality. In addition, consumers may not necessarily benefit from the pres-
ence of external ecolabeling schemes. We find, in fact, that consumers ben-
efit from external ecolabeling schemes when industry credibility is already
very high, i.e., when it appears that external certification is less likely to
be valuable. In comparing the two external ecolabeling schemes, we ob-
serve, as in the monopoly case, that an NGO ecolabeling scheme stipulates
a higher environmental standard than its private counterpart and charges
no labeling fees. Moreover, both ecolabeling schemes impose higher envi-
ronmental standards than the environmental qualities chosen by the firms
in the absence of the external ecolabels. In addition, when a single exter-
nal ecolabeling scheme is available, the less credible firm provides a higher
environmental quality than its competitor. This implies that in the pres-
ence of a single external ecolabeling scheme, environmental quality does
not follow from the ordering of firm credibilities.
Observing that while the private ecolabel improves environmental ben-
efits relative to the absence of an external ecolabel, it still underprovides
them relative to an NGO ecolabeling scheme, we explore the possibility
of an NGO anticipating the entry of a private ecolabeling scheme by mak-
ing a preemptive announcement of its own ecolabeling scheme with the
intent to boost environmental benefits. In a producer monopoly, we find
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that NGO preemption cannot prevent the private ecolabel from being cho-
sen, nor can it impact the environmental benefits or consumer surplus from
ecolabeling. NGO preemption can however reallocate profits from the pri-
vate ecolabeler to the monopolist, and in doing so, can dissuade the private
ecolabeler from entering the market should entry be costly. An alternative
approach to improve environmental outcomes in the presence of a private
ecolabel can be regulatory intervention by a government agency in the form
of a mandatory minimum environmental quality standard.
In contrast, NGO preemption can have a positive impact on environ-
mental benefits in a duopoly. A numerical study for a fixed set of param-
eters reveals that the equilibria that arise are such that both firms choose
to adopt an external ecolabel; either they both adopt the private ecola-
bel, or the less credible firm adopts the private ecolabel while the more
credible firm adopts the NGO ecolabel. Thus, within the scope of this nu-
merical study, the private ecolabel is chosen in equilibrium by at least one
firm. Despite the NGO ecolabel not always being chosen in equilibrium,
we find that NGO preemption results in improved environmental bene-
fits as it steers the environmental standard stipulated by the private ecola-
beling scheme upward. However, despite the presence of two ecolabeling
schemes, environmental benefits are lower relative to the scenario wherein
the firms had access to only a single NGO scheme. Consumer surplus also
goes up with NGO preemption, while industry profits are typically lower
due to the higher average environmental standards imposed by the two
ecolabeling schemes. We also note that since the environmental standard
stipulated by an NGO ecolabeling scheme continues to be higher than that
of its private counterpart, the more credible firm will provide a higher en-
vironmental quality when both ecolabeling schemes coexist. That is, in the
presence of both ecolabeling schemes, environmental qualities follow from
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the ordering of firm credibilities, as in the scenario wherein no external
ecolabeling schemes were available, but unlike the scenario wherein only a
single external ecolabeling scheme was available.
External ecolabeling schemes are intended to stimulate the production
and consumption of environmentally friendly products and services by in-
creasing consumer awareness and trust for green products, consequently
stimulating the demand for and supply of these products, thus mitigat-
ing the environmental impacts of production and consumption (Galar-
raga Gallastegui, 2002). The results of our study show that regardless of
their source, external ecolabeling schemes can help preserve the environ-
ment. However, their impact on consumers may be negative, particularly
when industry credibility is low such that the greatest need for ecolabeling
is foreseen. Further, they do not necessarily boost industry profits by al-
lowing them to target and meet consumer needs, rather, they tend to limit
differentiation while simultaneously imposing costly environmental stan-
dards and labeling fees on the participating firms. The precise nature of
their impact depends on industry structure; ecolabeling is unequivocally
beneficial from a 3BL perspective in a producer monopoly, but not when
the market is competitive. Furthermore, we find that not all ecolabeling
schemes are made equal; NGO schemes are more stringent and thus pro-
vide better environmental outcomes than private ecolabeling schemes but
may or may not benefit consumers depending on the industry structure
and the credibilities of the producers. A preemptive NGO can remedy the
underprovision of environmental quality by a private ecolabeling scheme
in the presence of two competing producers even if its own scheme is not
adopted. In a monopoly however, the recourse to mitigate the underprovi-
sion of environmental quality by a private ecolabeling scheme must come
from either a regulatory minimum environmental quality standard or an
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increase in the monopolist’s credibility through investments in corporate
social responsibility or other forms of positive advertisement.
Credibility is the second notion we explore in this study. Our results re-
veal that monopolists can benefit from improving their credibility through
investment or advertisement regardless of whether external ecolabeling
schemes are available, while in the case of producer competition, the in-
dustry as a whole may not benefit from improving their credibility in the
presence of external ecolabeling schemes. Moreover, an increase in firm
credibilities can hurt consumers and the environment in the presence of
an NGO ecolabeling scheme. Indeed, we find that the ordering of envi-
ronmental qualities does not necessarily follow from the ordering of firm
credibilities; a less credible firm will provide higher environmental quality
when a single external ecolabeling scheme is available.
In closing, we acknowledge some limitations of our model and sug-
gest potential extensions to our study. The demand form stipulated in a
duopoly is such that the overall size of the market is fixed. Thus, any mar-
ket share gains to one firm come from an equivalent loss in its competitor’s
market share. This stipulation further assumes that the two firms produce
otherwise identical and perfectly substitutable products. Relaxing this stip-
ulation by allowing for imperfect substitutability can provide insights into
the role of competitive intensity on the impacts of ecolabeling. A prelim-
inary numerical analysis described in Figure 13 in Appendix B1 suggests
that the structure of the equilibria between competing firms in the pres-
ence of external ecolabeling schemes is preserved even while allowing for
imperfect substitutability. We also restrict our attention to a single-product
monopolist in this study. Allowing the monopolist to produce more than
one product can facilitate a clearer comparison with the duopoly setting
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and provide greater insight into the role of market structure in determin-
ing the impact of ecolabeling schemes on green product development. One
final extension we propose is to consider credibility enhancement by firms
through investments in corporate social responsibility efforts and green ad-
vertisement and to identify when such a strategy might prove beneficial to
the firms, consumers, and the environment, as well as its effects on the ef-
ficacy of external ecolabeling schemes.
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CHAPTER 4
IS COMPETITION OR COLLABORATION THE KEY
TO DRIVING SUSTAINABILITY IN SUPPLY
CHAINS?
4.1. Introduction
Green product development is increasingly being undertaken by firms
voluntarily and is quickly replacing the traditional ‘command and control’
approach to environmental regulation (Bottega and De Freitas, 2009). This
has primarily resulted from the rise in consumer awareness of the environ-
mental impacts of consumption, with a sizeable proportion of consumers
now willing to pay significant premiums for sustainably produced prod-
ucts (Moon et al., 2002). Competitive forces and the threat of regulation
have also contributed to the growing incidence of green product develop-
ment. Firms have responded by offering sustainable products, for exam-
ple, Starkists’ Dolphin-safe tuna, Method’s eco-friendly cleaning products,
Starbucks’ post-consumer recycled coffee cups and sleeves, among others.
However, sustainability is not created on an island. Firms are begin-
ning to recognize that focusing on sustainability requires them to coordi-
nate the implementation of greening strategies within their supply chains.
When Walmart launched their first sustainable product – recycled paper
towels in 1989, they met with immediate backlash from consumers and
watchdog groups who found that only the tube was recycled, but that the
towels themselves were made from 100% non-recycled paper. This event,
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among other such public outings of green-washing claims made firms real-
ize the importance of transparency and visibility within their supply chains
for sustainability to become a viable and winning strategy (Plambeck and
Denend, 2008). Today, Walmart is driving sustainability in their product
offerings and overall energy and waste reduction targets, with the primary
focus on a sustainability index that covers over 200 product categories and
1000 suppliers that will be used to rate, score and bring suppliers up to ac-
ceptable environmental performance standards (Gunther, 2013b). This in-
dex is also supported by Patagonia, a firm renowned for its environmental
credentials. Patagonia has a long history of coordinating its supply chain
to achieve superior environmental performance (Stevenson, 2012). Simi-
larly, the beverage giant SABMiller urged its barley suppliers to implement
water conservation measures to support its goal of water-use efficiency.
Data from this successful initiative is now being shared with other suppli-
ers (Gunther, 2013a). These examples, among others, including efforts by
Nike, Intel, and Coca Cola suggest that firms are increasingly learning to
cooperate with other members in their supply chains when they undertake
greening initiatives. This is not surprising, as much has been written in the
literature about coordination within vertical supply chains for quality im-
provement initiatives, and as growing research suggests, the links between
quality and sustainability are strong (see, for example, Corbett and Klassen
(2006)). Therefore, an important question is to understand the value of and
motivation for collaboration within supply chains from the perspective of
sustainability.
Lately, a new paradigm has emerged within the context of sustain-
ability: collaboration between competing firms, or horizontal collabora-
tion (as opposed to the previously described vertical collaboration). The
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Sustainable Apparel Coalition is a group of over 100 members from in-
dustry, academia and NGO’s. It was convened in 2011 by Patagonia and
Walmart to share research and practical tools on sustainability implementa-
tion and to develop a common index for measuring appropriate action. To-
day, several firms (many of whom compete with each other) such as Target,
Walmart, Kohl’s, H&M, Inditex, Puma, New Balance, Nike and others are
members of this working group (Gunther, 2012). The Climate Saver’s Com-
puting Initiative was founded in 2007 by Google and Intel and later joined
by Microsoft, HP and WWF to involve technology firms in setting joint
emissions reduction targets and efficiency goals. Today, this coalition has
grown into a non-profit group with 70-90% of the IT industry as its mem-
bers (Clay, 2011b). Other examples include Toyota and Ford’s joint venture
to develop a hybrid system for SUV’s, and The Sustainability Consortium
which includes competitors like Unilever and P&G. These observations are
particularly interesting because sustainability has historically been seen as
a business opportunity and a source of competitive advantage for firms
(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Yet, as these examples show, competing
firms share research, innovations, and sourcing information. For example,
Nike shared its materials sustainability index with the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition, and has more recently developed an open source application
known as ‘Making’ for use by designers outside the firm that incorporates
this index (Rhodes, 2013). This leads to the natural question: Why do firms
collaborate with their competitors in the context of sustainability? And un-
der what circumstances can such collaboration be valuable? Experts and
firms participating in industry consortia believe that sustainability must be
a pre-competitive issue, meaning that industry needs to first come together
to determine appropriate metrics and targets, shared goals and know-how,
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to truly take sustainability mainstream (Clay, 2011a). The benefits of pre-
competitive collaboration cited by firms participating in such alliances in-
clude stimulation of consumer demand, a reduction in risk of investments,
and cost savings through scale economies in green technologies. However,
the question remains: Does unfettered competition or implicit collusion
(through horizontal collaboration) better spur sustainability?
Policy makers have also played a major role in promoting sustain-
ability. Regulatory approaches such as mandated technologies for auto-
mobile and power plant emissions reduction, emissions standards for au-
tomakers, recycled product procurement mandates and waste take-back
requirements for the electronic consumer goods industry have been widely
adopted in the United States and elsewhere. In other cases, incentive-based
approaches have been used to stimulate the desired behavior, such as cash
subsidies for investments in pollution control technologies, and consumer
subsidies such as the plug-in car and van grants in the UK (NCEE, 2004).
Policy makers have also played a role in stimulating innovation and R&D
through the use of incentives. There typically exists a significant gap be-
tween private and social incentives for pursuing R&D, a major cause of
which has been noted to be spillover effects to rival firms, i.e., the abil-
ity of rival firms to appropriate gains from R&D investments (Bernstein
and Nadiri, 1988). With collaboration, however, it would seem that these
spillover effects can be appropriated by firms by making the most effi-
cient use of their joint resources. Does under-investment in R&D occur
even when competing firms collaborate? We address this question and
propose as an extension to our work in this chapter, to determine the role
of a policy maker in incentivizing (disincentivizing) sustainability-related
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R&D collaborations through the use of subsidies (or tariffs) for collabora-
tive alliances to achieve the environmentally and socially optimal level of
investment in sustainability.
In summary, we answer two questions in this chapter: 1) In the context
of sustainability-related R&D, when and why do firms (OEM’s) collabo-
rate vertically with their supply chain partners (suppliers) and horizon-
tally with their competitors? And 2) what are the impacts of vertical and
horizontal collaboration on consumers and the environment? Our focus
on societal and environmental implications of collaboration stem from a
Triple Bottom Line (3BL) perspective; the 3BL is a concept used to account
for the impact of business practices on stakeholders not typically consid-
ered by economic objectives by using context-specific measures of environ-
mental impact, social equity, and similar constructs with the ultimate goal
of balancing societal and environmental concerns with economic objectives
(Elkington, 1998). We find that vertical collaboration through cost-sharing
between the OEM and supplier within a monopolistic supply chain can re-
sult in higher levels of sustainability-related investment and consequently,
in improved social and environmental outcomes. However, at the optimal
level of cost-sharing, the supply chain benefits while the social and envi-
ronmental implications of vertical collaboration are negative. In a com-
petitive setting (with perfect competition such that the two dyads produce
perfectly substitutable products), we find that horizontal collaboration be-
tween OEM’s reduces the level of investment in sustainability-related R&D,
and consequently, results in negative social and environmental implica-
tions. Such collaborative alliances, while most beneficial to smaller OEM’s,
are nevertheless profitable relative to non-collaborative competition to all
OEM’s regardless of size. We also find that regardless of whether or not
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they collaborate with their competitors, larger OEM’s make greater invest-
ments in sustainability. We also perform a numerical analysis to obtain
insights on the role of competitive intensity between supply chains in mo-
tivating collaborative alliances and their impacts from a 3BL perspective.
We find that OEM’s benefits from collaboration regardless of the intensity
of competition or their respective sizes. However, when similarly sized
supply chains that produce complementary products and services (low de-
gree of substitutability) collaborate, investments in sustainability-related
R&D may increase, and consequently, the social and environmental impli-
cations of such collaborative alliances can be positive.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. A brief review of the rele-
vant streams of literature is summarized in §4.2. We first describe the basic
setting of our model and study vertical collaboration through cost-sharing
within a supply chain in a monopolistic setting in §4.3.1. Thereafter, we
study horizontal collaboration between competing supply chains in §4.3.2.
In §4.4, we perform a numerical study to understand the impact of com-
petitive intensity between the two supply chains on the motivations for
and implications of horizontal collaboration. Concluding remarks to this
chapter are provided in §4.5.
4.2. Literature Review
Our work in this chapter is related to four main streams of literature.
Firstly, we draw on the literature on supply chain coordination. One main
focus of this stream is to design contracts and other mechanisms between
retailers and manufacturers to achieve first-best outcomes as in a verti-
cally integrated supply chain. As examples, Cachon and Lariviere (2005)
study revenue-sharing mechanisms, while Bernstein et al. (2006) focus on
two-part tariffs to coordinate a supply chain. Majumder and Srinivasan
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(2008) and Agrawal et al. (2013) study coordination in upstream supplier
networks. A comprehensive review of the supply chain coordination litera-
ture can be found in (Cachon, 2003). Within the context of sustainability, the
coordination literature focuses on remanufacturing, with tasks such as col-
lection effort, design effort etc., allocated among different members of the
supply chain (Savaskan et al., 2004; Savaskan and Van Wassenhove, 2006).
Ghosh and Shah (2012) and Swami and Shah (2012) study the impact of
supply chain coordination on sustainability-related investments in a mo-
nopoly. Ghosh and Shah (2015) also study cost-sharing contracts within
supply chains in the context of green product development. Our con-
tribution to this stream is to focus on collaboration within supply chains
through cost-sharing while simultaneously considering horizontal collabo-
ration with competing supply chains in the context of sustainability-related
R&D investments.
The second stream from the intersection of microeconomics and op-
erations management studies collaboration in R&D investments between
competing firms. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) study the impact
of collaboration on the level of cost-reducing R&D investments made by
firms engaging in Cournot competition. Sinha and Cusumano (1991) study
a model of joint research ventures between asymmetric firms engaged in
Cournot competition when the research outcome is uncertain. Other stud-
ies extend the work on cooperative R&D to include a wider range of game
settings and cooperative scenarios (Kamien et al., 1992; Amir et al., 2003).
An exception within this research stream is Atallah (2002) who studies both
horizontal collaboration as well as vertical coordination with respect to
cost-reducing R&D investments between dyads engaged in Cournot com-
petition. Our focus, in contrast, is on demand-enhancing R&D investments
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made by OEM’s engaged in Bertrand competition in the presence of verti-
cal and horizontal collaboration.
We also draw on the literature on green product development and so-
cial responsibility in supply chains. Consumer preference for social and en-
vironmental attributes is well documented in the literature (Khanna, 2001;
Tully and Winer, 2014). Chen (2001) studies a model of consumer-driven
green product development and evaluates the performance of regulatory
mechanisms. A few studies consider the role of external agencies in regu-
lating the provision of environmental quality in a competitive setting (Bot-
tega and De Freitas, 2009; Fischer and Lyon, 2014). Some studies also con-
sider the use of contractual mechanisms to source sustainably from sup-
pliers. Xu et al. (2015) consider mechanisms to avoid procurement from
suppliers utilizing child labor. Kraft and Raz (2014) study the role of suppli-
ers and regulators in inducing manufacturers to eliminate toxic substances
from production. We focus instead on voluntary collaboration within and
between supply chains to stimulate market-driven green product develop-
ment.
The 3BL perspective adopted in this chapter draws on the literature
in sustainable and socially responsible operations management that ad-
dresses the impact of management policies on stakeholders not explicitly
considered by standard management objectives. Kleindorfer et al. (2005)
and Tang and Zhou (2012) provide two extensive reviews of the 3BL and
related frameworks within the context of Operations Management appli-
cations and models. In addition, there is a substantial literature study-
ing the effectiveness of Environmental Management Systems (EMS) such
as the ISO 14000 family of certifications, and Total Quality Environmen-
tal Management (TQEM) and their implications for profitability of the firm
(Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Corbett and Klassen, 2006; Melnyk et al.,
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2003; Delmas, 2001). In particular, Vachon and Klassen (2008) empirically
estimate the impact of vertical collaboration in the context of sustainability-
related R&D on firm performance and find that profitable firms tend to be
greener and coordinate investments with supply chain partners. In this
chapter, we determine the value of vertical and horizontal collaboration
from the firms’ perspective, as well as that of society and the environment,
from a parsimonius analytical model.
4.3. Model
4.3.1. Monopoly. The primary unit of analysis in our model is an OEM
– Supplier dyad. We begin with an analysis of a monopolistic dyad (supply
chain) to study the impact of vertical collaboration within the supply chain
on sustainability-related R&D. We stipulate a demand function that is lin-
ear in price and environmental attributes q(p, g) = (1 − p + αg), where
p and g are the final price and level of greenness designed into the product
by the supplier, respectively, and α ∈ [0, 1] is the sensitivity of demand to
environmental attributes in the product. The restriction on α assumes that
demand is more sensitive to price than it is to environmental attributes of
the product, which reflects empirical findings in the literature (see, for ex-
ample, D’Souza et al. (2006)). Similar assumptions on modeling consumer
demand in the context of conventional quality-type attributes have been
made in the literature (Tsay and Agrawal, 2000; Savaskan et al., 2004; Gur-
nani and Erkoc, 2008).
Sustainability in the context of the examples alluded to in the introduc-
tion is largely driven by consumer facing organizations such as OEM’s and
powerful retailers. For example, Walmart is actively seeking to green its
products and processes and recognizes that the real opportunity to make
these changes lies not within the organization itself, but along its supply
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chain (Plambeck and Denend, 2008). The OEM’s effort serves to identify
the appropriate opportunities and methods for sustainability-related in-
vestment on behalf of the supplier. For example, Patagonia and Nike de-
termine the least environmentally damaging fabrics for use in their cloth-
ing and footwear lines respectively (Mazzoni, 2014). Industry roundtables
convened by OEM’s like the Sustainable Apparel Coalition come together
to determine best practices and identify ‘low hanging fruit’ that can be cap-
tured by making sustainability-related R&D investments. Therefore, we
assume that the OEM determines the level of sustainability-related R&D
investments g ≥ 0 in the supply chain.
Typically, the costs of such investments are borne entirely by the sup-
pliers. For instance, WalMart announced a sustainability index based on
which it would score and screen suppliers who must undertake the invest-
ments themselves to retain WalMart’s business (Bustillo, 2009). However,
as suppliers find it increasingly expensive to adopt socially and environ-
mentally superior processes, it is becoming common for OEM’s to share
the costs of making these investments with their suppliers. As an exam-
ple, Unilever partners with NGO’s such as Solidaridad and The Rainforest
Alliance to provide financial support and training in sustainable agricul-
tural practices to its tea suppliers (Albert, 2010). Similarly, Levi Strauss
has partnered with the World Bank to help its garment suppliers become
more eco-friendly and conscious of labor conditions through financial sup-
port and rewards for compliance (Donnan, 2014). Therefore, we assume
that the costs of sustainability-related investments may be shared between
the OEM’s and suppliers. In particular, the fixed costs of pursuing and
implementing sustainability-related R&D are δg2, where δ ≥ 0, and a frac-
tion θ ∈ (0, 1] of these costs are borne by the OEM, with the remainder
borne by the supplier. There are no variable costs in our model. Later in
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this section, we consider and contrast the implications of not sharing in-
vestment costs within the supply chain, i.e., when θ = 0. The quadratic
specification of fixed costs of R&D effort are in line with the quality im-
provement, green product development, and R&D literature and represent
diminishing returns to investment (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Li
and Rajagopalan, 1998; Chen, 2001). We refer to this sharing of R&D costs
as vertical R&D collaboration within a supply chain. Mathematical nota-
tions used in §4.3 are summarized in Table 3.
Variable/Parameter Description
p Total price to consumer p ≥ 0
w Wholesale price charged by supplier w ≥ 0
m Retail margin set by OEM m ≥ 0
g Level of sustainability-related investment g ≥ 0
α Demand sensitivity to investment α ∈ [0, 1]
φ Competitive intensity φ ∈ [0, 1]
ki Initial market share of dyad i ∈ {A, B}, ki + k−i = 1
δ Fixed cost coefficient δ ≥ 0
θ Degree of cost-sharing within dyad θ ∈ [0, 1]
λ Degree of R&D spillovers λ ∈ [0, 1]
Table 3. Modeling notation
To focus our attention on the impact of vertical R&D collaboration
within a supply chain, we first study as a benchmark, the case of a monop-
oly wherein the OEM and supplier share R&D investment costs. We con-
sider a Stackelberg game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, as is typi-
cally the case in our context. The sequence of the game is as follows : 1) the
OEM determines the optimal R&D level g, 2) The supplier responds with
a wholesale price w, 3) The OEM determines its margin m. Non-negativity
of decision variables and individual rationality of the two players apply
as constraints to the OEM’s and supplier’s profit-maximization problem
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which is given as:
maximizem, gΠOEMM = (1− w−m + αg)m− θδg2
Subject to
ΠSM ≥ 0,
m, g ≥ 0.
maximizewΠSM = (1− w−m + αg)w− (1− θ)δg2
Subject to
ΠOEMM ≥ 0,
w ≥ 0.
The equilibrium outcome of this game (described by the subscript M
representing a monopoly) can be obtained by backward induction and
is described in Lemma 4.1. We state the following assumption on θ,
ΩM = 16δθ − α2 > 0, which ensures that a non-trivial, interior equilib-
rium is obtained. The interpretation is that the degree of cost-sharing must
be sufficiently large for the OEM’s objective to be concave in the level of
investment. From the supplier’s individual rationality constraint, we fur-
ther obtain the condition θ >
√
α4+128α2δ−α2
64δ = ωM to ensure that the degree
of cost-sharing is large enough to guarantee the supplier makes a positive
profit. Therefore, θ > Max[ α
2
16δ , ωM] must be satisfied throughout §4.3.1
for the monopoly case.
LEMMA 4.1. The equilibrium decisions in a monopolistic dyad are w∗M =
8δθ
ΩM
, m∗M =
4δθ
ΩM
, and g∗M =
α
ΩM
such that ∂w
∗
M
∂θ ,
∂m∗M
∂θ ,
∂g∗M
∂θ < 0. Moreover, the
OEM and supplier profits are ΠOEM∗M =
δθ
ΩM
, with ∂Π
OEM∗
M
∂θ < 0 , and Π
S∗
M =
δ(32δθ2−α2(1−θ))
Ω2M
, with ∂Π
S∗
M
∂θ > 0 iff θ <
2
5 − α
2
80δ .
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We observe from Lemma 4.1 that an increase in the degree of cost-
sharing in fact lowers sustainability-related investment by a monopolistic
dyad. This is explained by noting that it is the OEM that chooses the level
of investment, and as θ increases, so do the fraction of R&D costs internal-
ized by the OEM. Consequently, the OEM chooses a lower level of R&D
as θ rises. Note also that while the OEM’s profits are decreasing in the de-
gree of cost-sharing, the supplier’s profits are increasing (decreasing) for
degrees of cost-sharing below (above) a threshold. This is explained as fol-
lows: for low degrees of cost-sharing, as θ increases, the supplier’s share
of R&D costs become smaller. However, as θ rises beyond a threshold, the
fall in investment lowers demand to the extent that the associated loss in
revenues outpaces the fall in the supplier’s costs from cost-sharing with the
OEM. The condition θ > ωM ensures that the degree of cost-sharing is large
enough to guarantee the supplier makes a positive profit.
We next turn our attention to the 3BL implications of vertical col-
laboration in a supply chain through cost-sharing. To measure the 3BL
implications, we define the following metrics for environmental, social,
and economic impacts: environmental impact is captured by the follow-
ing expression E = ∑i q∗i g
∗
i that measures total diffusion of environmen-
tal quality in the market; social impacts are captured via the notion of
consumer surplus: i.e., CS = ∑i
´ pci
p∗i
qi(g∗i , pi)dpi, where pi = wi + mi,
p∗i = w
∗
i + m
∗
i , and p
c
i = w
c
i + m
c
i indicate the total price, optimal price,
and choke price (price at which demand is zero), respectively; and eco-
nomic impacts are measured through the total profits accruing to the in-
dustry Π = ∑i ΠOEM∗i +Π
S∗
i , where the superscripts OEM and S denote
the OEM and supplier respectively. These metrics are summed across i ≥ 1
firms, with i = 1 in the monopoly case. In the following proposition, we
compare the equilibrium outcomes and 3BL implications of the following
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two scenarios: no cost-sharing in the dyad (denoted by superscript N); and
strictly positive cost-sharing in the dyad. We stipulate the condition on δ,
ΩN = 8δ − α2 > 0 to ensure non-negativity and interior solutions in the
no-cost sharing scenario. We also perform a sensitivity analysis of the 3BL
implications in a cost-sharing monopolistic dyad with respect to the degree
of cost-sharing in the supply chain.
PROPOSITION 4.1. a) The level of investment in sustainability in a cost-
sharing dyad exceeds that in a dyad without cost-sharing, gCM > g
N
M iff θ ∈
[ωM, α4
√
2δ
].
b) CSCM > CS
N
M and E
C
M > E
N
M and Π
C
M < Π
N
M iff θ ∈ [ωM, α4√2δ ].
c) The degree of cost-sharing within the dyad has the following 3BL implications:
∂ECM
∂θ < 0,
∂CSCM
∂θ < 0, and
∂ΠCM
∂θ < 0 iff θ >
1
3 .
We learned from Lemma 4.1 that cost-sharing can lower the level of
sustainability related investments in a monopolistic dyad. However, from
Proposition 4.1(a), we see that if the degree of cost-sharing is below a
threshold ( α
4
√
2δ
), the level of investment in a cost-sharing dyad can ex-
ceed that in a dyad without cost-sharing. The level of investment in a
non-cost sharing configuration is constrained by the supplier’s individ-
ual rationality condition (ΠSM ≥ 0), while the OEM’s objective is convex
in the investment level. In a cost-sharing configuration, this constraint
is no longer binding when θ > ωM. However, when the degree of cost-
sharing increases sufficiently, the OEM lowers the level of investment be-
low the level in a non cost-sharing configuration as a result of internalizing
a greater fraction of the R&D costs. We note here that the degree of cost-
sharing is discontinuous at θ = 0, which coincides with the no cost-sharing
case. Further, Proposition 4.1(b) reveals that if the degree of cost-sharing is
sufficiently low, the social and environmental implications resulting from
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a cost-sharing dyad will be superior to those resulting from a non cost-
sharing configuration as a result of the higher investment level. Supply
chain profits however are higher in the cost-sharing configuration if and
only if the degree of cost-sharing exceeds the abovementioned threshold.
In comparing 3BL implications with a non cost-sharing configuration, we
therefore observe that either a superior social and environmental outcome
or a higher profit for the dyad may be realized depending on the degree of
cost-sharing between the OEM and supplier. A graphical illustration of the
comparison of the 3BL implications of cost-sharing is presented in Figure
9 below, where ∆X = XC − XN , where X ∈ {CS, E, Π} refers to the dif-
ference between the implications with and without vertical collaboration
through cost-sharing.
Figure 9. The 3BL impacts of cost-sharing as a function of
the fixed cost coefficient δ and the degree of cost-sharing θ.
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Note that the empty space in the southwest corner of Figure 9 corre-
sponds to the infeasible region in our analysis where θ > Max[ α
2
16δ , ωM]
and δ < α
2
8 . Further, Proposition 4.1(c) points out that consumer surplus
and environmental benefits fall as the degree of cost-sharing increases. This
results from a fall in the level of investment as the degree of cost-sharing
rises, as observed from Lemma 4.1. The profits of the dyad on the other
hand are non-monotone in the degree of cost-sharing; they increase upto
a threshold as supplier profits rise, and are maximized at θ = 13 . There-
after, they fall as a result of tapering demand due to underinvestment in
sustainability.
4.3.2. Duopoly. Having studied the value of vertical collaboration
within a monopolistic supply chain in the previous subsection, we now
turn our attention to horizontal collaboration across competing OEM-
supplier dyads A and B. Extending the demand models of quality compe-
tition in Banker et al. (1998) and Matsubayashi (2007) to the context of envi-
ronmental quality competition, we specify the demand for a dyad’s prod-
uct as qi = ki − wi − mi + φ(w−i + m−i) + α((gi + λg−i) − φ(g−i + λgi)),
where 0 ≤ ki ≤ 1 represents the initial market share of a dyad such that
kA = k and kB = 1− k, i.e., kA + kB = 1, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 is the degree of com-
petition between the two dyads (alternatively, the substitutability between
their products), and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 indicates the presence of R&D spillovers be-
tween two collaborating OEM’s, where i ∈ {A, B}. Collaboration between
OEM’s takes the form of informal and non-binding arrangements where
the two OEM’s agree to share the results and information from their re-
spective R&D efforts, implying an exogenous, positive degree of spillovers
λ > 0. Accordingly, we stipulate that λ = 0 when the two OEM’s do not
collaborate. To focus on the impact of supply chain size ki and degree of
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R&D spillovers λ, we stipulate that the cost structure is identical for both
firms and remains unchanged in the presence of competition and horizon-
tal R&D collaboration.
To isolate the impact of horizontal collaboration, we study a game be-
tween two competing dyads with horizontal collaboration between the
competing OEM’s and vertical collaboration between the OEM’s and their
suppliers. The sequence of actions in the game are as follows: 1) the two
OEM’s simultaneously choose R&D levels gi, 2) the two suppliers simul-
taneously set their wholesale prices wi, and 3) the OEM’s simultaneously
choose their margins mi. While we determine the optimal degree of vertical
collaboration within each dyad (the degree of cost-sharing that maximizes
a dyad’s profits), we do not include this decision in the game sequence,
i.e., we treat the degrees of vertical collaboration θi as exogenous parame-
ters in the game. The profit-maximization problems facing the OEM’s and
suppliers respectively are described below.
maximizemi , giΠ
OEM
i =qi(.)mi − θiδg2i
Subject to
ΠSi ≥ 0,
mi, gi ≥ 0.
maximizewiΠ
S
i =qi(.)wi − (1− θi)δg2i
Subject to
ΠOEMi ≥ 0,
wi ≥ 0.
This game is resolved by backward induction. In this section, we focus
only on the solutions for the special case of perfect competition (φ = 1)
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to generate tractable analytical insights. The assumption of perfect com-
petition makes this a market share model, where any market share gains
to dyad A must come from an equivalent loss in market share to dyad
B. In the following section, we thereafter relax this assumption and study
the role of competitive intensity φ on the collaborative equilibria and en-
suing 3BL implications. We stipulate the following two conditions on θi
and δ respectively, to ensure non-trivial and interior solutions to this game:
1) the degree of cost-sharing in either dyad must be sufficiently large,
θi >
α2(1−λ)2
36δ and 2) Ω2 =
√
δ (81δ− 16α2(λ− 1)2) + 9δ > 9δ. We also
define the term Ω1 = 81δθAθB − α2(λ− 1)2(θA + θB), where Ω1 > 0 if con-
dition 1 is satisfied. The solution of the game with horizontal and vertical
collaboration for the case of perfect competition is described in Lemma 4.2
below.
LEMMA 4.2. a) The investment levels in equilibrium are g∗A(θ) =
α(1−λ)(9δθB(k+4)−α2(1−λ)2)
Ω1
and g∗B(θ) =
α(1−λ)(9δθA(5−k)−α2(1−λ)2)
Ω1
.
b) The degree of cost-sharing that maximizes profits of dyads A and B is identi-
cal, θ∗A = θ
∗
B =
Ω2
72δ . At this degree of cost-sharing, the investment levels are
g∗A =
8α(λ−1)(8α2(λ−1)2−(k+4)Ω2)
Ω2(9Ω2−16α2(λ−1)2) and g
∗
B =
8α(λ−1)(8α2(λ−1)2+(k−5)Ω2)
Ω2(9Ω2−16α2(λ−1)2) .
We first note that the equilibrium outcomes described in Lemma 4.2 are
continuous in the degree of R&D spillovers λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note from Lemma
4.2(b) that the degree of cost-sharing that maximizes profits of dyads A
and B in equilibrium is identical in both dyads, and it is independent of the
initial market shares ki. It differs, however, from the degree of cost sharing
that maximizes a dyad’s profits in a monopoly (θ = 13 ) which is due to
the impact of competition. Moreover, it is complementary with horizontal
collaboration in the sense that it increases as the degree of R&D spillovers
λ increase. In contrast, we observe from Lemma 4.2(a) that the equilibrium
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investment levels do indeed depend on the initial market shares of the two
dyads. In the following proposition, we contrast the investment levels in
the two dyads and perform sensitivity analyses of the level of investment
with respect to the degree of spillovers between the two OEM’s λ and the
distribution of initial market shares ki. To focus on the role of horizontal
collaboration, we restrict our attention in the rest of the section to the case
of identical degrees of cost-sharing within the two dyads, i.e., θA = θB = θ.
PROPOSITION 4.2. a) The dyad with the larger initial market share invests
more in sustainability, i.e., g∗A > g
∗
B iff k >
1
2 .
b) The impact of R&D spillovers on investment levels is negative, i.e., ∂g
∗
A
∂λ < 0
and ∂g
∗
B
∂λ < 0. The impact of initial market share on investment levels is positive,
∂g∗A
∂k > 0, and
∂g∗B
∂k < 0.
Proposition 4.2(a) notes that dyads with a larger intrinsic market share
expend greater efforts toward sustainability-related R&D. This supports
observations from the field: WalMart has been more active with its sustain-
ability agenda than its smaller partner-competitors such as Target, as has
Nike, who shared their ’making’ application for environmentally focused
material selection with their smaller partner-competitors such as New Bal-
ance in the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (Schwartz, 2010; Rhodes, 2013).
We also observe from Proposition 4.2(b) that horizontal collaboration low-
ers the amount of investment by a dyad. This occurs as a result of the
dyads avoiding duplication and free-riding on their competitor’s R&D ef-
forts. Moreover, when the intensity of competition between the dyads is
maximum (φ = 1), neither dyad is inclined to invest very much in sus-
tainability as the concomitant benefits to demand are minimal. Indeed, we
observe in the following section that this may not be true at lower levels of
competitive intensity between the two dyads.
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Thus, at maximum competitive intensity, horizontal collaboration has
a detrimental effect on the total amount of investment in sustainability-
related R&D efforts. Why then do competing OEM’s seek such collabora-
tive alliances? We identify the economic motivation for horizontal collab-
oration in the following proposition, along with its effect on 3BL implica-
tions.
PROPOSITION 4.3. a) Both OEM’s profits are increasing in the degree of
spillovers, i.e., ∂Π
OEM
i
∂λ > 0. Moreover, the OEM’s profits are increasing in their
initial market shares, ∂Π
OEM
A
∂k > 0 and
∂ΠOEMB
∂k < 0, and OEM’s with smaller in-
trinsic market shares benefit more from horizontal collaboration, ∂
2ΠOEMA
∂λ∂k < 0 and
∂2ΠOEMB
∂λ∂k > 0.
b) Environmental benefits and consumer surplus decrease with collaboration,
∂EC
∂λ < 0 and
∂CSC
∂λ < 0. Environmental benefits and consumer surplus are mini-
mized at equal initial market shares k = 12 .
Proposition 4.3(a) notes that the two OEM’s profits are increasing in the
degree of R&D spillovers, and consequently, since the equilibria described
in Lemma 4.2 are continuous in the degree of spillovers λ, they prefer to
collaborate with their competitor. It is interesting to note that the major-
ity of collaborative alliances in the examples we alluded to in this chapter
are formed by and consist of large OEM’s. Proposition 4.3(a) also points
out that larger OEM’s make greater profits. However, the value of hori-
zontal collaboration (R&D spillovers) decreases as the inital market share
of an OEM rises, i.e., smaller OEM’s benefit most from horizontal collabo-
ration. Despite its economic motivation, horizontal collaboration between
OEM’s has a detrimental impact on both consumer surplus and environ-
mental benefits, both of which decrease with the degree of R&D spillovers
as noted in Proposition 4.3(b). The reason for this detrimental impact of
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collaboration is tied to the lowering of investment levels as a result of an
increase in the degree of R&D spillovers as described in Proposition 4.2(b).
This suggests that Porter and Van der Linde (1995)’s hypothesis that com-
petition is the most effective driver of sustainability may indeed be true.
However, we also find that another competitive factor, the initial distribu-
tion of market shares, has the opposite effect on environmental benefits and
consumer surplus. Both measures are minimized at equal distributions of
initial market shares. To further explore the role of competitive intensity
in conjunction with the degree of R&D spillovers and initial distribution of
market shares, we explore the impact of competitive intensity on horizon-
tal R&D collaboration and ensuing 3BL implications via a numerical study
in the following section.
4.4. Impact of Competitive Intensity
The results described in §4.3.2 were for the special case of perfect com-
petition (φ = 1). This stipulation restricted us to a market share model,
wherein any gains in market share to dyad A came from an equivalent loss
in market share to dyad B. In this section, we relax this assumption and al-
low for the competitive intensity of the firms to vary in the range φ ∈ [0, 1].
An analytical treatment of general levels of competitive intensity is cumber-
some and provides limited insights, hence, we adopt a numerical approach
in this section to verify if our insights from §4.3.2 continue to hold.
We obtain the equilibrium outcome for any given φ ∈ [0, 1] as in the
case of φ = 1 and describe the solution procedure in the proof of Lemma
4.2. We first determine the degree of cost-sharing that maximizes each
dyad’s profits for the two cases, namely for the case of λ = 0.5 and for
the case of λ = 0, and we then compare the equilibrium level of invest-
ment across the two cases. Accordingly, let ∆gi = g∗i |λ=0.5 − g∗i |λ=0 for
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i ∈ {A, B}. The results of this comparison as a function of ki and φ are
described in Figure 10 for α = 0.5 and δ = 1.
Figure 10. The effect of horizontal collaboration on invest-
ment levels in a duopoly for α = 0.5, δ = 1.
Figure 10 compares investment levels at the degrees of cost-sharing that
maximizes each dyad’s profits when there is (λ = 0.5) and when there is no
(λ = 0) horizontal collaboration. From Figure 10, we observe that for low
levels of competitive intensity between the two dyads, investment levels
can increase from collaboration. In particular, investment levels increase
from horizontal collaboration for a wider range of competitive intensities
when the dyad has a small initial market share. Overall, investment levels
of both dyads increase from horizontal collaboration at low competitive in-
tensities when the dyads are similarly sized (k = 12 ). This is explained by
noting that at a lower competitive intensity, both dyads get rewarded by
consumers for their investments in sustainability. In contrast, when com-
petitive intensity is high, neither firm receives sufficient demand benefits
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by investing in sustainability. Rather, at higher levels of competitive inten-
sity, the two dyads invest in sustainability to prevent a loss of market share
to their competitior.
This leads us to query the role of competitive intensity on the motiva-
tion for horizontal collaboration and its 3BL implications as a counterpart
to Proposition 4.3. To do so, we preform a numerical study by applying the
3BL metrics defined in §4.3 to compute the 3BL implications of the equilib-
rium outcomes for any given φ ∈ [0, 1]. We compare the 3BL implications
for each of the equilibria derived to produce Figure 10. Accordingly, to ex-
trapolate the results illustrated in Figure 10, let ∆E = E|λ=0.5 − E|λ=0 and
∆CS = CS|λ=0.5−CS|λ=0. We observe that ∆Πi = Πi|λ=0.5−Πi|λ=0, and in
particular, ∆ΠOEMi = Π
OEM
i |λ=0.5 −ΠOEMi |λ=0 are positive throughout the
range of parameters k ∈ [0, 1] and φ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., horizontal collaboration
results in higher OEM and dyad profits throughout the range of parame-
ters considered in this study. Therefore, we describe only the results from
the comparison of environmental benefits and consumer surplus in Figure
11.
Figure 11. The impact of horizontal collaboration on envi-
ronmental benefits and consumer surplus for α = 0.5, δ =
1.
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While we noted in Proposition 4.3 that horizontal collaboration impacts
environmental benefits and consumer surplus negatively, we observe from
Figure 11 that this is not necessarily true when the competitive intensity be-
tween the firms is lower. In particular, we see that environmental benefits
can increase from horizontal collaboration when competitive intensities are
low and the two dyads have similar initial market shares. Note the over-
lap between the region of positive environmental impacts from horizontal
collaboration in Figure 11 and the region where investment levels rise from
horizontal collaboration from Figure 10. Consumer surplus also increases
from horizontal collaboration for competitive intensities below φ = 1. We
also note that environmental benefits and consumer surplus are more likely
(over a wider range of competitive intensities) to increase from horizontal
collaboration when the two dyads are similar in size.
This suggests that horizontal collaboration can be particularly benefi-
cial from a societal and environmental perspective when competitive inten-
sity is low (φ < 1) and the distribution of initial market shares is roughly
equal (k→ 12 ) as seen in Figure 11. In contrast, horizontal collaboration has
negative societal and environmental consequences when the competitive
intensity is high (φ = 1), and moreover, these negative consequences are
exacerbated at an equal distribution of initial market shares (k = 12 ). Thus,
competitive intensity φ and the initial distribution of market shares k can
be viewed as substitutes in generating the best societal and environmental
consequences from horizontal collaboration.
4.5. Conclusion
The objective of this chapter is to understand the motivation for col-
laborative alliances within and across supply chains in the context of
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sustainability-related R&D, and to determine the consequences of collab-
oration from a 3BL perspective. An important hurdle to the effective de-
ployment of sustainable innovations has been the decentralization of deci-
sion making within supply chains; OEM’s and retailers demand green or
socially responsible products from their suppliers who must bear the costs
of implementation. Firms are beginning to realize that creating sustainable
products requires coordinating the implementation of research and devel-
opment efforts throughout their supply chains. To understand the motiva-
tion behind vertical collaboration within supply chains, we first develop a
model of a monopolistic OEM-supplier dyad that coordinates research and
implementation of sustainable innovations through cost-sharing. Our anal-
ysis reveals that cost-sharing within a monopolistic supply chain can result
in greater investment in sustainable innovation, and consequently, result
in better social and environmental outcomes. However, the motivation for
vertical collaboration within a supply chain is economic in nature. We find
that cost sharing can either improve social and environmental outcomes,
or the economic profit of the supply chain, but not both simultaneously.
The impact of cost-sharing depends on the degree to which the two par-
ties share research and development costs. At the degree of cost-sharing
that maximizes supply chain profits, social and environmental outcomes
are worse off than in the absence of such collaboration.
A recent development has been the formation of several industry-wide
alliances to share and co-develop sustainable innovations. Examples of
such collaborations include the Sustainable Apparel Coalition, The Sustain-
ability Consortium, the Climate Saver’s Computing Initiative etc. These
collaborative alliances bring together customer-facing organizations (such
as WalMart, Nike, Unilever, Dell etc.) that traditionally compete with their
partners in the alliance along the dimension of sustainability. Therefore,
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we address the question of why such organizations collaborate on the back-
end while they compete for customers on the front-end. Moreover, do these
alliances benefit the firms, consumers, and the environment? To address
these questions, we develop a model of competition between two OEM-
supplier dyads, where we stipulate perfect competition, meaning that the
products developed and sold by the two dyads are perfect substitutes to
each other. We find that horizontal collaboration between two competing
supply chains (OEM’s decide whether or not to collaborate) reduces the
amount of sustainability-related investment made by each supply chain as
they avoid duplicating each others’ efforts and pool their efforts. Conse-
quently, the social and environmental implications of horizontal collabora-
tion between competing supply chains is negative. However, we find that
regardless of an OEM’s characteristics, horizontal collaboration results in
improved profits, not just for each OEM, but also for each supply chain,
and thus, for the entire industry. This occurs due to a reduction in the cost
of effort (since investment levels fall) and the softening of environmental
quality competition between the two dyads. Moreover, we find that the
dyad with the larger market share will invest more in sustainability-related
R&D. This supports our observations from the aforementioned collabora-
tive ventures; Nike shares more R&D with its smaller partner-competitors
than the other way round, as does WalMart. Interestingly, despite the larger
supply chains making greater R&D investments in collaborative alliances,
we also find that smaller OEM’s benefit more from horizontal collabora-
tion. Therefore, the value of horizontal collaboration accrues to the partici-
pating firms at the detriment of society and the environment. We also find
that the initial distribution of market shares between the two dyads impacts
social and environmental implications; interestingly, these dimensions are
most negatively affected when the two dyads are similarly sized.
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We also perform a numerical analysis to better understand the impact
of competitive intensity between dyads on the motivation for and impli-
cations of horizontal collaboration. Unlike the case of maximum compet-
itive intensity (where the products sold by the two dyads are perfect sub-
stitutes for each other), we note that investment levels, and consequently,
the social and environmental implications, can actually improve with hor-
izontal collaboration when the intensity of compeititon between the two
dyads is low. In particular, horizontal collaboration has particularly bene-
ficial effects on the social and environmental impacts of horizontal collab-
oration when the two supply chains are similar in size. This is in contrast
to our findings from the case of perfect competition, where horizontal col-
laboration between similarly sized supply chains resulted in particularly
detrimental social and environmental implications. This suggests that com-
petitive intensity and the sizes of competing supply chains are substitutes
when it comes to spurring the best social and environmental implications
from horizontal collaboration. We also observe that regardless of competi-
tive intensity and the distribution of intrinsic market shares, OEM’s prefer
to collaborate with their competitiors. Horizontal collaboration benefits
not just the OEM’s but also their respective supply chains, and thus the
entire industry. Thus, we find that while OEM’s prefer to collaborate with
their competitors, the impacts of horizontal collaboration on society and
the environment depend on the competitive intensity and the initial dis-
tribution of market shares between the two dyads. The greatest benefits
from such collaborative alliances are realized when the competing supply
chains are similar in size and produce products that are more complements
than substitutes. It is noteworthy that several of the major roundtables and
sustainability-related collaborative alliances were founded by OEM’s that
provided complementary products and services. WalMart and Patagonia
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founded the Sustainable Apparel Coalition, and Intel and Google founded
the Climate Savers Computing Initiative. Our analysis reveals that such
alliances are more likely to have a positive impact from a 3BL perspective.
In closing, we acknowledge some limitations of our model and sug-
gest potential extensions to our study. The demand form stipulated in the
duopoly model is such that the overall size of the market is fixed, such
that any market share gains to one firm come from an equivalent loss in its
competitor’s market share. This stipulation further assumes that the two
firms produce otherwise identical and perfectly substitutable products. We
relax this stipulation in a numerical section to gain insight into the role of
competitive intensity on the motivations for and the implications of R&D
collaboration. An analytical treatment of the same in a more parsimonius
modeling framework could facilitate clearer insights. Secondly, we con-
sider only non-collusive R&D collaboration between competing OEM’s,
where collaboration occurs through a spillover of R&D efforts between
the two dyads. While we believe that joint non-competitive determina-
tion of R&D efforts by the two OEM’s is not appropriate given our context
of study, it could be a valuable extension to our model here. Similarly, it
would be valuable to allow horizontally collaborating firms to determine
their optimal levels of spillovers. One final extension we propose to pur-
sue is to explore the role of regulatory bodies in incentivizing (disincen-
tivizing) collaborative alliances through the use of subsidies (tariffs) so as
to achieve the socially and environmentally optimal level of investment in
sustainability-related R&D.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
For centuries, the finiteness of the earth’s natural resources did not ap-
pear to place a binding constraint on the needs and aspirations of a small
but growing human population. In the last few decades however, several
fish stocks have been depleted beyond commercial viability, droughts and
famines have rendered vast tracts of land unarable, global temperatures
and instances of extreme weather events have been on the rise, and the
availability and prices of minerals and other natural resources have become
increasingly uncertain. Each of these environmental problems stem from
four fundamental factors: 1) the earth and its resources that we depend
on are finite, renewable or otherwise; 2) human population is increasing;
3) per-capita incomes are increasing; and 4) we have exerted little effort to
mitigate this risk.
The combination of these four factors, as noted by Holdren and Ehrlich
(1974) and described in Figure 1, is pushing us rapidly towards collapse.
While factors 1-3 are virtually beyond our control, Holdren and Ehrlich
(1974) identify the appropriate use of technology and markets as the mani-
festation of factor 4 that will allow us to mitigate this risk of collapse. How-
ever, technology and markets are merely tools to serve the goals of society
as a whole. If society’s implicit goals are to exploit nature and ignore the
long term, then society will develop technologies and markets that destroy
the environment, widen the gap between rich and poor, and optimize for
short-term gain (Meadows et al., 2004).
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Nevertheless, there are several steps being taken in the right direction
by society today. Demand from a growing segment of conscious consumers
has led firms to innovate and produce socially and environmentally be-
nign products and adopt responsible business models, examples of which
include recycling and remanufacturing, developing ethical and environ-
mental criteria for supplier selection, a focus on cleaner and more efficient
water, energy, and transportation etc. These changes would not have been
possible if the traditional view of business as a tool to maximize profits,
return on investments, and shareholder value had persisted. Several firms
have now embraced a more holistic view, one that encompasses the needs
and considerations of multiple stakeholders - the people, the planet, as
well as profit. This framework, coined the 3BL (Elkington, 1998), has al-
lowed firms like Interface, Patagonia, Nike, and WalMart to maintain a sus-
tainable competitive advantage (Scott, 2012). This perspective is becoming
mainstream and does not necessarily conflict with, but rather, complements
the traditional economic interests of the firm (Kiron et al., 2012).
Firms’ operational decisions determine the choice of production and
distribution technologies, which in turn determine the efficiency of mate-
rial, water, and energy use and disposal. From a more strategic perspec-
tive, business models and product-line decisions of firms impact patterns
of consumption in society. Therefore, Operations Management can offer a
vital sustainability perspective (Drake and Spinler, 2013). The current lit-
erature in Operations Management and related areas tackles sustainability
in contexts ranging from reuse and remanufacturing (see Souza (2013) for a
review of the literature on closed-loop supply chains) to socially and envi-
ronmentally responsible products and business models (see, for example,
Chen (2001); Agrawal et al. (2012); Lim et al. (2014)). This thesis contributes
to this stream of literature by extending the application of a 3BL perspective
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to consider the role of technology, markets and regulation in the contexts
of natural resource management, environmental quality competition, and
pre-competitive collaboration for sustainability-related R&D.
The first essay considers the impact of markets on groundwater man-
agement from a societal, environmental, and economic perspective. Mar-
kets can have beneficial or detrimental impacts along these dimensions de-
pending on the hydro-economic parameters of the system. This essay also
explores the impact of privatizing the management of groundwater reser-
voirs and identifies conditions under which privatization can prove ben-
eficial from a 3BL perspective. The second essay contributes to the litera-
ture on environmental quality competition by considering the role of ex-
ternal certification agencies in providing credible environmental labeling
services for products with otherwise unobservable environmental charac-
teristics. The key contribution of this essay is to contrast private and non-
governmental ecolabeling schemes with respect to their impacts on pro-
ducers, society, and the environment when producers are not fully credi-
ble and are asymmetric in their credibilities. In the third essay, I identify
the motivation for pre-competitive collaboration for sustainability-related
R&D within and across competing supply chains, as well as its impacts
from a 3BL perspective.
There are several viable extensions to our work here. In the con-
text of groundwater management, one stipulation made in the model is
that the municipality’s aquifer is hydrologically disconnected from other
aquifers and water markets. If this stipulation were relaxed, a dynamic
non-cooperative extraction and reallocation game would ensue between
communities connected through a single groundwater source. Another po-
tential extension to this essay and to the literature on closed-loop supply
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chains is to consider a community’s problem of water recycling in conjunc-
tion with ground and surface water management, a new consideration in
arid parts of the world (Monks, 2014).
The single-period model of ecolabeling in Chapter 3 can be extended to
consider a multi-period game of credibility building by competing produc-
ers, wherein consumers update their information about a firm’s credibility
after observing a firm’s environmental quality choice in previous stages.
This model also assumes that producers only make truthful environmental
quality claims. Therefore, a potential extension to this model is to con-
sider information asymmetry where the producers signal their product’s
environmental qualities through prices or by acquiring costly external cer-
tification. This essay also focuses on the case of perfect competition be-
tween producers, i.e., when their products are perfect substitutes for each
other, restricting the model to a zero-sum market share game. Relaxing
this stipulation can provide insights into the role of competitive intensity
in determining the consequences of ecolabeling and environmental quality
competition.
The essay on pre-competitive R&D collaboration in Chapter 4 speci-
fies exogenous levels of knowledge spillover from collaboration. Endo-
genizing the extent of R&D spillovers from horizontal collaboration is a
natural extension to this model. The model of horizontal collaboration in
Chapter 4 assumes that environmental investment levels are chosen com-
petitively, with collaboration resulting from the creation of a pathway for
transmission and spillover of R&D from one OEM to the other. While this
modeling stipulation is appropriate to our context of study, the model can
be extended by considering non-competitive joint-setting of environmental
investment levels by collaborating OEM’s.
126
Bibliography
Agrawal, Anupam, Luk N Van Wassenhove, Arnoud De Meyer. 2013. The
sourcing hub and upstream supplier networks. Manufacturing & Service
Operations Management 16(2) 238–250.
Agrawal, Vishal V, Mark Ferguson, L Beril Toktay, Valerie M Thomas. 2012.
Is leasing greener than selling? Management Science 58(3) 523–533.
Albert, Angeline. 2010. Unilever sets sustainable sourc-
ing target. URL www.supplymanagement.com/news/2010/
unilever-sets-sustainable-sourcing-target.
Amacher, Gregory S, Erkki Koskela, Markku Ollikainen. 2004. Environ-
mental quality competition and eco-labeling. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 47(2) 284–306.
Amir, Rabah, Igor Evstigneev, John Wooders. 2003. Noncooperative versus
cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates. Games and Economic
Behavior 42(2) 183–207.
Anderson, R.C. 2009. Confessions of a Radical Industrialist: Profits, People,
Purpose - Doing Business by Respecting the Earth. McClelland & Stewart,
Toronto, Canada.
Ata, Baris, Deishin Lee, Mustafa H Tongarlak. 2012. Optimizing organic
waste to energy operations. Manufacturing & Service Operations Manage-
ment 14(2) 231–244.
Atallah, Gamal. 2002. Vertical R&D spillovers, cooperation, market struc-
ture, and innovation. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 11(3)
127
179–209.
Avci, Buket, Karan Girotra, Serguei Netessine. 2014. Electric vehicles with
a battery switching station: Adoption and environmental impact. Man-
agement Science 61(4) 772–794.
Bai, Chunguang, Joseph Sarkis. 2010. Integrating sustainability into sup-
plier selection with grey system and rough set methodologies. Interna-
tional Journal of Production Economics 124(1) 252–264.
Bakker, Karen. 2007. The commons versus the commodity: Alter-
globalization, anti-privatization and the human right to water in the
global south. Antipode 39 430–455.
Baksi, Soham, Pinaki Bose. 2007. Credence goods, efficient labelling poli-
cies, and regulatory enforcement. Environmental and Resource Economics
37(2) 411–430.
Balasubramanian, Karthik, David Drake. 2015. Mobile money: The effect
of service quality and competition on demand. Working paper, Harvard
Business School, Boston, MA.
Banker, Rajiv D, Inder Khosla, Kingshuk K Sinha. 1998. Quality and com-
petition. Management Science 44(9) 1179–1192.
Barlow, Maude, Tony Clarke. 2005. Blue Gold: The Fight to Stop the Corporate
Theft of the World’s Water. The New Press, New York, NY.
Ben Youssef, Adel, Chema Abderrazak. 2009. Multiplicity of eco-labels,
competition, and the environment. Journal of Agricultural & Food Indus-
trial Organization 7(2) 1–24.
Berns, Maurice, Zayna Khayat, Balu Balagopal, Martin Reeves. 2009. The
business of sustainability: what it means to managers now. Tech. rep.
Bernstein, Fernando, Fangruo Chen, Awi Federgruen. 2006. Coordinating
supply chains with simple pricing schemes: the role of vendor-managed
inventories. Management Science 52(10) 1483–1492.
128
Bernstein, Jeffrey I, M Ishaq Nadiri. 1988. Interindustry R&D spillovers,
rates of return, and production in high-tech industries. Tech. rep., Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research.
Bonini, Sheila. 2011. The business of sustainability. URL
www.mckinsey.com/insights/energy_resources_materials/the_
business_of_sustainability_mckinsey_global_survey_results.
Bottega, Lucie, Jenny De Freitas. 2009. Public, private and nonprofit reg-
ulation for environmental quality. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 18(1) 105–123.
Bottega, Lucie, Philippe Delacote, Lisette Ibanez. 2009. Labeling policies
and market behavior: Quality standard and voluntary label adoption.
Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization 7(2) 1–18.
Boyce, W.E., R.C. DiPrima. 2001. Elementary Differential Equations and
Boundary Value Problems. Wiley, New York, NY.
Brécard, Dorothée. 2014. Consumer confusion over the profusion of eco-
labels: Lessons from a double differentiation model. Resource and Energy
Economics 37 64–84.
Bruggink, T. H. 1992. Privatization versus groundwater central manage-
ment. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 51 205–222.
Brundtland, Gru, Mansour Khalid, Susanna Agnelli, Sali Al-Athel, Bernard
Chidzero, Lamina Fadika, Volker Hauff, Istvan Lang, Ma Shijun, Mar-
garita Morino de Botero, et al. 1987. Our common future. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, United Kingdom.
Burch, Stephen L. 2008. Development of an observation well network in
the Mahomet aquifer of East Central Illinois. Tech. rep.
Burnett, William C, Henry Bokuniewicz, Markus Huettel, Willard S Moore,
Makoto Taniguchi. 2003. Groundwater and pore water inputs to the
coastal zone. Biogeochemistry 66(1-2) 3–33.
129
Bustillo, Miguel. 2009. Wal-Mart to assign new ’green’ ratings. URL www.
wsj.com/articles/SB124766892562645475.
Cachon, Gérard P. 2003. Supply chain coordination with contracts. Hand-
books in operations research and management science 11 227–339.
Cachon, Gérard P, Martin A Lariviere. 2005. Supply chain coordination
with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations. Management
science 51(1) 30–44.
Calatrava, Javier, Alberto Garrido. 2005. Spot water markets and risk in
water supply. Agricultural Economics 33 131–143.
Carmona, M. 2011. Eco-labels as signals: the role of credibility and reputa-
tion. Innovative Marketing 7 116–124.
Castka, Pavel, Charles J Corbett. 2014. Governance of eco-labels: Expert
opinion and media coverage. Forthcoming in Journal of Business Ethics .
Chen, Chialin. 2001. Design for the environment: a quality-based model
for green product development. Management Science 47(2) 250–263.
Chiang, A.C. 1992. Elements of Dynamic Optimization. McGraw-Hill, New
York, NY.
Clark, Colin. 1990. Mathematical Bioeconomics. Wiley Interscience, New
York, NY.
Clay, Jason. 2011a. Roundtables help solve problems on a global
scale. URL www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
problem-solving-global-scale-roundtables-collaboration.
Clay, Jason. 2011b. Smart companies see the imporance of col-
laboration. URL www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
smart-companies-collaboration-productivity-efficiency.
Coleman, Pamela. 2012. Guide for organic crop producers. URL www.ams.
usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5101542.
130
Corbett, Charles J, Robert D Klassen. 2006. Extending the horizons: Envi-
ronmental excellence as key to improving operations. Manufacturing &
Service Operations Management 8 5–22.
Craig, Anthony J, Edgar E Blanco, Yossi Sheffi. 2011. Competing on envi-
ronmental quality: A model of product carbon labels. Working paper,
MIT, Cambridge, MA.
d’Aspremont, Claude, Alexis Jacquemin. 1988. Cooperative and noncoop-
erative R & D in duopoly with spillovers. The American Economic Review
80(3) 1133–1137.
Dawande, Milind, Srinagesh Gavirneni, Mili Mehrotra, Vijay Mookerjee.
2013. Efficient distribution of water between head-reach and tail-end
farms in developing countries. Manufacturing & Service Operations Man-
agement 15 221–238.
Delmas, Magali. 2001. Stakeholders and competitive advantage: The case
of ISO 14001. Production and Operations Management 10 343–358.
Desai, Preyas, Sunder Kekre, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Kannan Srinivasan.
2001. Product differentiation and commonality in design: Balancing rev-
enue and cost drivers. Management Science 47(1) 37–51.
Dinar, Ariel, J Letey. 1991. Agricultural water marketing, allocative effi-
ciency, and drainage reduction. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 20 210–223.
Donnan, Shawn. 2014. Jeans maker launches cheap financing
for more ethical factories. URL www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
a541bcb4-6417-11e4-8ade-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3clVX8flN.
Drake, David F, Stefan Spinler. 2013. Sustainable operations management:
An enduring stream or a passing fancy? Manufacturing & Service Opera-
tions Management 15(4) 689–700.
131
D’Souza, Clare, Mehdi Taghian, Peter Lamb. 2006. An empirical study on
the influence of environmental labels on consumers. Corporate Communi-
cations: An International Journal 11(2) 162–173.
Elkington, John. 1998. Partnerships from cannibals with forks: The triple
bottom line of 21st-century business. Environmental Quality Management
8 37–51.
Espey, Molly, James Espey, W Douglass Shaw. 1997. Price elasticity of res-
idential demand for water: A meta-analysis. Water Resources Research 33
1369–1374.
Feinerman, Eli, Keith C Knapp. 1983. Benefits from groundwater man-
agement: Magnitude, sensitivity, and distribution. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics. 65 703–710.
Fischer, Carolyn, Thomas P Lyon. 2014. Competing environmental labels.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 23(3) 692–716.
Fractor, David T. 1988. Privatizing the groundwater resource. Journal of the
American Water Resources Association 24 405–412.
FTC. 2012. Guides for the use of environmental marketing claims ("green
guides"). URL www.ftc.gov/policy/federal-register-notices/
guides-use-environmental-marketing-claims-green-guides.
Fuller, JD, RG Vickson. 1987. The optimal timing of new plants for oil from
the Alberta tar sands. Operations Research 35 704–715.
Galarraga Gallastegui, Ibon. 2002. The use of eco-labels: A review of the
literature. European Environment 12(6) 316–331.
Galbreth, Michael R, Tamer Boyacı, Vedat Verter. 2013. Product reuse in
innovative industries. Production and Operations Management 22(4) 1011–
1033.
Ghosh, Debabrata, Janat Shah. 2012. A comparative analysis of greening
policies across supply chain structures. International Journal of Production
132
Economics 135(2) 568–583.
Ghosh, Debabrata, Janat Shah. 2015. Supply chain analysis under green
sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract. International Jour-
nal of Production Economics 164 319–329.
Gisser, Micha, David A Sanchez. 1980. Competition versus optimal control
in groundwater pumping. Water Resources Research 16 638–642.
Gleick, Peter H. 2000. A look at twenty-first century water resources devel-
opment. Water International 25 127–138.
Gleick, Peter H, Heather Cooley. 2006. The World’s Water, 2006-2007. Island
Press, Washington, D.C.
Grabosky, Peter N. 1994. Green markets: Environmental regulation by the
private sector. Law & Policy 16(4) 419–448.
Grafton, R Quentin, Clay Landry, Gary D Libecap, Sam McGlennon, Robert
O’Brien. 2010. An integrated assessment of water markets: Australia,
chile, china, south africa and the usa. Tech. rep., National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Gunther, M. 2012. Behind the scenes at the sustainable ap-
parel coalition. URL www.greenbiz.com/blog/2012/07/26/
behind-scenes-sustainable-apparel-coalition.
Gunther, M. 2013a. Millercoors: A trickle-down theory
of corporate sustainability. URL www.marcgunther.com/
millercoors-a-trickle-down-theory-of-corporate-sustainability/.
Gunther, Marc. 2013b. Walmart’s index: This is big. really big. URL www.
marcgunther.com/walmarts-index-this-is-big-really-big/.
Guo, Ruixie, H. L. Lee, Robert Swinney. 2015. Responsible sourcing in sup-
ply chains. Forthcoming in Management Science .
133
Gurnani, Haresh, Murat Erkoc. 2008. Supply contracts in manufacturer-
retailer interactions with manufacturer-quality and retailer effort-
induced demand. Naval Research Logistics 55(3) 200–217.
Hanak, Ellen, Caitlin Dyckman. 2002. Counties wresting control: Local
responses to California’s statewide water market. University of Denver
Water Law Review 6 490–520.
Handfield, Robert, Steven V Walton, Robert Sroufe, Steven A Melnyk. 2002.
Applying environmental criteria to supplier assessment: A study in the
application of the analytical hierarchy process. European Journal of Oper-
ational Research 141(1) 70–87.
Hanemann, W Michael. 1998. Determinants of Urban Water Use. Urban
Water Demand Management and Planning. McGraw-Hill, New York, 31–
75.
Hansen, Kristiana, Richard Howitt, Jeffrey Williams. 2008. Short-term
leases or long-term transfers? An econometric test of water market struc-
ture in the Western United States. Working Paper, University of Califor-
nia, Davis.
Harbaugh, Rick, John W Maxwell, Beatrice Roussillon. 2011. Label con-
fusion: The groucho effect of uncertain standards. Management Science
57(9) 1512–1527.
Harou, Julien J, Manuel Pulido-Velazquez, David E Rosenberg, Josué
Medellín-Azuara, Jay R Lund, Richard E Howitt. 2009. Hydro-economic
models: Concepts, design, applications, and future prospects. Journal of
Hydrology 375 627–643.
Hart, Kelley J. 2008. The Mojave Desert as grounds for change: Clarify-
ing property rights in California’s groundwater to make extraction sus-
tainable statewide. West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law Policy 14
1213–1703.
134
Hauter, W. 2012. Are we better off privatizing water? URL online.wsj.
com/article/SB10000872396390443816804578002280926253750.html.
Holdren, John P, Paul R Ehrlich. 1974. Human population and the global
environment: Population growth, rising per capita material consump-
tion, and disruptive technologies have made civilization a global ecolog-
ical force. American Scientist 62(3) 282–292.
Holland, Stephen P. 2003. Set-up costs and the existence of competitive
equilibrium when extraction capacity is limited. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 46 539–556.
Holland, Stephen P. 2006. Privatization of water-resource development.
Environmental and Resource Economics 34 291–315.
Horne, Ralph E. 2009. Limits to labels: The role of eco-labels in the assess-
ment of product sustainability and routes to sustainable consumption.
International Journal of Consumer Studies 33(2) 175–182.
Hotelling, Harold. 1931. The economics of exhaustible resources. Journal of
Political Economy 39 137–175.
Howe, Charles W, Christopher Goemans. 2003. Water transfers and their
impacts: Lessons from three Colorado water markets. Journal of the Amer-
ican Water Resources Association 39 1055–1065.
Howe, Charles W, Dennis R Schurmeier, W Douglas Shaw. 1986. Innovative
approaches to water allocation: The potential for water markets. Water
Resources Research 22 439–445.
Ibanez, Lisette, Gilles Grolleau. 2008. Can ecolabeling schemes preserve
the environment? Environmental and Resource Economics 40(2) 233–249.
Islegen, Özge, Stefan Reichelstein. 2011. Carbon capture by fossil fuel
power plants: An economic analysis. Management Science 57(1) 21–39.
Israel, Morris, Jay R Lund. 1995. Recent California water transfers: Impli-
cations for water management. Natural Resources Journal 35 1–32.
135
Kaiser, Ronald A. 2005. Solving the Texas Water Puzzle: Market-Based Alloca-
tion of Water. Texas Public Policy Foundation, Austin, TX.
Kamien, M.I., N.L. Schwartz. 1991. Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of
Variations and Optimal Control in Economics and Management. Advanced
Textbooks in Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Kamien, Morton I, Eitan Muller, Israel Zang. 1992. Research joint ventures
and R&D cartels. The American Economic Review 1293–1306.
Kenny, Joan F, Nancy L Barber, Susan S Hutson, Kristin S Linsey, John K
Lovelace, Molly A Maupin. 2009. Estimated use of water in the United States
in 2005. US Geological Survey Reston, VA.
Khanna, Madhu. 2001. Non-mandatory approaches to environmental pro-
tection. Journal of economic surveys 15(3) 291–324.
Kim, Kilsun, Dilip Chhajed. 2002. Product design with multiple quality-
type attributes. Management Science 48(11) 1502–1511.
Kiron, David, Nina Kruschwitz, Knut Haanaes, Ingrid von Streng Velken.
2012. Sustainability nears a tipping point. MIT Sloan Management Review
53(2) 69–74.
Klassen, Robert D, Curtis P McLaughlin. 1996. The impact of environmen-
tal management on firm performance. Management Science 42 1199–1214.
Klassen, Robert D, Stephan Vachon. 2003. Collaboration and evaluation in
the supply chain: The impact on plant-level environmental investment.
Production and Operations Management 12(3) 336–352.
Kleindorfer, Paul R, Kalyan Singhal, Luk N Wassenhove. 2005. Sustainable
operations management. Production and Operations Management 14 482–
492.
Knapp, Keith C, Marca Weinberg, Richard Howitt, Judith F Posnikoff. 2003.
Water transfers, agriculture, and groundwater management: A dynamic
economic analysis. Journal of Environmental Management 67 291–301.
136
Kolk, Ans. 2008. Sustainability, accountability and corporate governance:
exploring multinationals’ reporting practices. Business Strategy and the
Environment 17(1) 1–15.
Konikow, Leonard F, Eloise Kendy. 2005. Groundwater depletion: A global
problem. Hydrogeology Journal 13(1) 317–320.
Kraft, Tim, Feryal Erhun, Robert C Carlson, Dariush Rafinejad. 2013a. Re-
placement decisions for potentially hazardous substances. Production and
Operations Management 22(4) 958–975.
Kraft, Tim, Gal Raz. 2014. Competing on toxicity: The impact of supplier
prices and regulation on manufacturers’ substance replacement strate-
gies. Working Paper, Darden Business School, Charlottesville, VA.
Kraft, Tim, Yanchong Zheng, Feryal Erhun. 2013b. The ngo’s dilemma: how
to influence firms to replace a potentially hazardous substance. Manufac-
turing & Service Operations Management 15(4) 649–669.
Krulce, Darrell, James A. Roumasset, Tom Wilson. 1997. Optimal man-
agement of a renewable and replaceable resource: The case of coastal
groundwater. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79 1218–1228.
Leire, Charlotte, Åke Thidell. 2005. Product-related environmental infor-
mation to guide consumer purchases–a review and analysis of research
on perceptions, understanding and use among nordic consumers. Journal
of Cleaner Production 13(10) 1061–1070.
Li, George, Sampath Rajagopalan. 1998. Process improvement, quality, and
learning effects. Management Science 44(11) 1517–1532.
Lim, Michael K, Ho-Yin Mak, Ying Rong. 2014. Toward mass adoption of
electric vehicles: Impact of the range and resale anxieties. Manufacturing
& Service Operations Management 17(1) 101–119.
Majumder, Pranab, Ashok Srinivasan. 2008. Leadership and competition
in network supply chains. Management Science 54(6) 1189–1204.
137
Mangasarian, O. 1966. Sufficient conditions for the optimal control of non-
linear systems. SIAM Journal on Control 4 139–152.
Mason, Charles F. 2006. An economic model of ecolabeling. Environmental
Modeling & Assessment 11(2) 131–143.
Matsubayashi, Nobuo. 2007. Price and quality competition: The effect of
differentiation and vertical integration. European Journal of Operational
Research 180(2) 907–921.
Mazzoni, Mary. 2014. The higg 2.0 index and the journey to an industry-
wide sustainable apparel standard. URL http://www.triplepundit.
com/special/sustainable-fashion-2014/higg-2-0-index.
Meadows, D.H., J. Randers, D.L. Meadows. 2004. The Limits to Growth: The
30-Year Update. Chelsea Green Publishers, Burlington, VT.
Meinzen-Dick, Ruth S. 1998. Groundwater markets in Pakistan: In-
stitutional development and productivity impacts. Markets for Water.
Springer, 207–222.
Melnyk, Steven A, Robert P Sroufe, Roger Calantone. 2003. Assessing the
impact of environmental management systems on corporate and envi-
ronmental performance. Journal of Operations Management 21 329–351.
Monks, Kieron. 2014. From toilet to tap: Getting a taste for
drinking recycled water. URL www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/world/
from-toilet-to-tap-water/.
Moon, Wanki, Wojciech J Florkowski, Bernhard Brückner, Ilona Schonhof.
2002. Willingness to pay for environmental practices: implications for
eco-labeling. Land Economics 78(1) 88–102.
Moorthy, K Sridhar, Ivan PL Png. 1992. Market segmentation, cannibaliza-
tion, and the timing of product introductions. Management Science 38(3)
345–359.
138
Mussa, Michael, Sherwin Rosen. 1978. Monopoly and product quality. Jour-
nal of Economic theory 18(2) 301–317.
Natural Resources Defense Council. 2010. Climate change, water, and
risk. URL www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/watersustainability/files/
WaterRisk.pdf.
NCEE. 2004. International experiences with economic incentives for pro-
tecting the environment. Tech. rep., US EPA.
O’Connor, Dennis. 1998. Governance of the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California: Options for Change. California Research Bureau, Cali-
fornia State Library.
Pagell, Mark, Zhaohui Wu, Michael E Wasserman. 2010. Thinking differ-
ently about purchasing portfolios: an assessment of sustainable sourcing.
Journal of Supply Chain Management 46(1) 57–73.
Plambeck, Erica L, L Denend. 2008. Wal-mart. Stanford Social Innovation
Review 6(2) 53–59.
Pongkijvorasin, Sittidaj, James Roumasset, Thomas Kaeo Duarte, Kimberly
Burnett. 2010. Renewable resource management with stock externalities:
Coastal aquifers and submarine groundwater discharge. Resource and
Energy Economics 32 277–291.
Porter, Michael E, Claas Van der Linde. 1995. Green and competitive: end-
ing the stalemate. Harvard business review 73(5) 120–134.
Rhodes, Margaret. 2013. Nike launches a new app to help designers choose
green materials. URL www.fastcodesign.com/1672949/.
Roumasset, James A, Christopher A Wada. 2012. Ordering the extraction of
renewable resources: The case of multiple aquifers. Resource and Energy
Economics 34(1) 112–128.
Saleh, Yahya, Ülkü Gürler, Emre Berk. 2011. Centralized and decentralized
management of groundwater with multiple users. European Journal of
139
Operational Research 215 244–256.
Saleth, R Maria. 1998. Water markets in India: Economic and institutional
aspects. Markets for Water. Springer, 187–205.
Saliba, Bonnie Colby, David B Bush, William E Martin, Thomas C Brown.
1987. Do water market prices appropriately measure water values. Jour-
nal of Natural Resources 27 617–651.
Savaskan, R Canan, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Luk N Van Wassenhove. 2004.
Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing. Man-
agement science 50(2) 239–252.
Savaskan, R Canan, Luk N Van Wassenhove. 2006. Reverse channel design:
the case of competing retailers. Management Science 52(1) 1–14.
Schwartz, Ariel. 2010. Sustanability faceoff: Wal-
mart vs. target. URL www.fastcompany.com/1634995/
sustainability-faceoff-walmart-vs-target.
Scott, Ryan. 2012. The bottom line of corporate good.
URL www.forbes.com/sites/causeintegration/2012/09/14/
the-bottom-line-of-corporate-good/.
Sethi, Suresh, Gerhard Sorger. 1990. An exercise in modelling of consump-
tion, import and export of an exhaustible resource. Optimal Control Ap-
plications and Methods 11 191–196.
Shimomura, K. 1983. On the optimal order of exploitation of deposits of a
renewable resource. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 139
319–322.
Sinha, Deepak K, Michael A Cusumano. 1991. Complementary resources
and cooperative research: a model of research joint ventures among com-
petitors. Management Science 37(9) 1091–1106.
Sinn, Hans-Werner. 2008. Public policies against global warming: A supply
side approach. International Tax and Public Finance 15 360–394.
140
Slade, Raymond M, Michael E Dorsey, Sheree L Stewart. 1986. Hydrology
and water quality of the Edwards Aquifer associated with Barton Springs in the
Austin area, Texas. US Department of the Interior, Geological Survey.
Sodhi, ManMohan S, Christopher S Tang. 2011. Social enterprises as
supply-chain enablers for the poor. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 45(4)
146–153.
Souza, Gilvan C. 2013. Closed-loop supply chains: A critical review, and
future research*. Decision Sciences 44(1) 7–38.
Stevenson, Seth. 2012. Patagonia’s founder is america’s
most unlikely business guru. URL www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303513404577352221465986612.
Swami, Sanjeev, Janat Shah. 2012. Channel coordination in green supply
chain management. Journal of the Operational Research Society 64(3) 336–
351.
Tang, Christopher S., Sean Zhou. 2012. Research advances in environmen-
tally and socially sustainable operations. European Journal of Operational
Research 223 585 – 594.
Teisl, Mario F. 2003. What we may have is a failure to communicate: La-
beling environmentally certified forest products. Forest Science 49(5) 668–
680.
Tsay, Andy A, Narendra Agrawal. 2000. Channel dynamics under price
and service competition. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
2(4) 372–391.
Tsur, Yacov, Theodore Graham-Tomasi. 1991. The buffer value of ground-
water with stochastic surface water supplies. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 21 201–224.
Tully, Shawn. 2000. Water, water everywhere. URL money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2000/05/15/279789/.
141
Tully, Stephanie M, Russell S Winer. 2014. The role of the beneficiary in will-
ingness to pay for socially responsible products: a meta-analysis. Journal
of Retailing 90(2) 255–274.
UTL. 2011. Opposing the signing of the Utah-Nevada agreement
on the Snake Valley groundwater management system. URL www.
goshutewater.org/index.php/june-utl-resolution.html.
Vachon, Stephan, Robert D Klassen. 2008. Environmental management
and manufacturing performance: the role of collaboration in the supply
chain. International journal of production economics 111(2) 299–315.
Vaux, Henry J, Richard E Howitt. 1984. Managing water scarcity: An eval-
uation of interregional transfers. Water Resources Research 20 785–792.
Wang, X., M. K. Lim, Y. Ouyang. 2015. Food, energy, and environment
trilemma: Sustainable farmland use and biofuel industry development.
Working paper, University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign, Champaign,
IL.
Weber, Gregory S. 1994. Twenty years of local groundwater export legis-
lation in california: Lessons from a patchwork quilt. Natural Resources
Journal 34 657–750.
Weinberg, Marca, Catherine L Kling, James E Wilen. 1993. Water markets
and water quality. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 278–291.
Xu, Ying, Soo-Haeng Cho, Sridhar R Tayur. 2015. Combating child labor:
Incentives and information transparency in global supply chains. Work-
ing Paper, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pitts-
burgh, PA.
Yoskowitz, David W. 1999. Spot market for water along the Texas Rio
Grande: Opportunities for water management. Natural Resources Jour-
nal 39 345–355.
142
Youssef, Adel Ben, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed. 2008. Eco-labelling, competition
and environment: Endogenization of labelling criteria. Environmental and
Resource Economics 41(2) 133–154.
Zektser, S, HA Loaiciga, JT Wolf. 2005. Environmental impacts of ground-
water overdraft: Selected case studies in the Southwestern United States.
Environmental Geology 47 396–404.
143
Appendix A (Chapter 2)
A1: The Centralized Management and Investment Problems
The centralized planner’s problem
A centralized planner determines how much water to sell in each of
the municipalities, lcpj and l
cp
k , and how much to extract from the aquifer
in either municipality, qcpj and q
cp
k . The objective of the central planner is
to maximize total welfare across both municipalities. We drop the time
subscript for convenience. The formulation is as follows:
maximize
lcpj , l
cp
k , q
cp
j , q
cp
k
ˆ
∞
0
e−δt
[ˆ lcpj
0
(a− bu)du +
ˆ lcpk
0
(a− bu)du(5.0.1)
− cj(xj)qcpj − ck(xk)qcpk
]
dt,
Subject to
dxj
dt
= Gj(xj)− qcpj ,
dxk
dt
= Gk(xk)− qcpk ,
lcpj , l
cp
k , q
cp
j , q
cp
k , xj, xk ≥ 0,
lcpj + l
cp
k = q
cp
j + q
cp
k .
The constraint lcpj + l
cp
k = q
cp
j + q
cp
k stipulates that all water extracted
must be sold in the two municipalities. We apply the maximum princi-
ple to solve (5.0.1). The Hamiltonian is Hc.v = alcpj − b2 lcp2j + alcpk − b2 lcp2k −
cj(xj)q
cp
j − ck(xk)qcpk +λcpj (Gj(xj)− qcpj )+λcpk (Gk(xk)− qcpk )+ µ(qcpj + qcpk −
144
lcpj − lcpk ), where µ is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the aforemen-
tioned constraint. The unique solution is described by the following opti-
mality conditions:
∂Hc.v
∂lcpj
= a− blcpj − µ ≤ 0 and lcpj (a− blcpj − µ) = 0,(5.0.2)
∂Hc.v
∂lcpk
= a− blcpk − µ ≤ 0 and lcpk (a− blcpk − µ) = 0,(5.0.3)
∂Hc.v
∂qcpj
= µ− cj(xj)− λcpj ≤ 0 and qcpj (µ− cj(xj)− λcpj ) = 0,(5.0.4)
∂Hc.v
∂qcpk
= µ− ck(xk)− λcpk ≤ 0 and qcpk (µ− ck(xk)− λcpk ) = 0,(5.0.5)
dλcpj
dt
− δλcpj = −
∂Hc.v
∂xj
= c′(xj)q
cp
j − G′(xj)λcpj ,(5.0.6)
dλcpk
dt
− δλcpk = −
∂Hc.v
∂xk
= c′(xk)q
cp
k − G′(xk)λcpk ,(5.0.7)
dxj
dt
= Gj(xj)− qcpj ,(5.0.8)
dxk
dt
= Gk(xk)− qcpk ,(5.0.9)
lcpj + l
cp
k = q
cp
j + q
cp
k ,(5.0.10)
lcpj , l
cp
k , q
cp
j , q
cp
k , xj, xk, λ
cp
j , λ
cp
k ≥ 0.(5.0.11)
The investment problem
We consider the investment problem in (2.4.2) for a privatized munici-
pality. The non-privatized variant of this problem follows by analogy and is
hence omitted. The current-value Hamiltonian and optimality conditions
follow as in the other problem formulations. For analytical convenience,
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we substitute q¯t for l¯t throughout. We state three new optimality condi-
tions associated with the three decision variables unique to this problem:
∂Hc.v
∂w¯t
= a− 2b(q¯t + w¯t + i¯t − e¯t)− cw − σ¯t ≤ 0 and(5.0.12)
w¯t(a− 2b(q¯t + w¯t + i¯t − e¯t)− cw − σ¯t) = 0,
∂Hc.v
∂W¯
= 0⇒ F′(W¯) =
ˆ ∞
0
e−δtσ¯t+τ¯dt,(5.0.13)
where σ¯t is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the capacity constraint.
To compute the optimal time of investment, we note that while the price
path and hence the path of the total quantity of water sold within the mu-
nicipality is continuous, the extraction path may not be continuous when
the capacity investment is made and water production begins (Holland,
2006). Therefore, we define q¯τ¯− and q¯τ¯+ as the limits of the extraction path
just before and after water production begins. The optimality condition for
investment timing can now be stated as:
a(q¯τ¯− + w¯t + i¯t − e¯t)− b(q¯τ¯− + w¯t + i¯t − e¯t)2 + s(e¯t − i¯t)(5.0.14)
− (c(x¯t) + λ¯t)q¯τ¯− + δF(W¯) = a(q¯τ¯+ + w¯t + i¯t − e¯t)
− b(q¯τ¯+ + w¯t + i¯t − e¯t)2 + s(e¯t − i¯t)− (c(x¯t) + λ¯t)q¯τ¯+ − cww¯t.
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A2: Proofs
PROOF. Lemma 2.1: For part (a), from (2.3.3) and (2.3.8), lot > 0 ⇒
λot = a− blot − c(xt) ≥ 0. For part (b), substituting for λot in (2.3.6), we get
dlot
dt =
(G′(xt)−δ)
b [a− blot − c(xt)− c
′(xt)G(xt)
G′(xt)−δ ], where κ(x) := c(x) +
c′(x)G(x)
G′(x)−δ .
From (2.3.7), dxtdt = G(xt) − lot − eot where eot = 0 for all t by definition
in the benchmark solution. The system of differential equations dl
o
t
dt and
dxt
dt along with the initial condition x0 have a unique solution (Boyce and
DiPrima, 2001). For part (c), applying steady-state conditions to this sys-
tem, dl
o
t
dt =
dxt
dt = 0, we have l
o
ss =
(a−κ(xoss))
b and x
o
ss = G−1(
(a−κ(xoss))
b ).
To show that ds
o(x)
dx < 0, we first claim that
dlo(x)
dx > 0. We see that
dlo(x)
dx =
(G′(xt)−δ)
b [a−blot−κ(xt)]
G(xt)−lot , where a − bl
o
t − κ(xt) and G(xt) − lot must
move in opposite directions to approach steady-state (this system has a
saddle-point steady-state which can be approached only along one separa-
trix (Boyce and DiPrima, 2001)). Therefore, ds
o(x)
dx = −b dl
o(x)
dx < 0.

PROOF. Proposition 2.1: For part (a), first note from assumption (iii)
and (2.3.3) that a − bl∗t (xt) = c(xt) + λ∗t (xt). By substituting zt = et − it
in (2.3.1), note that conditions (2.3.4) and (2.3.5) can be replaced by s −
c(xt) − λt = 0 and zt(s − c(xt) − λt) = 0. For optimality, a − bl∗t (xt) =
c(xt) + λ∗t (xt) = s, i.e., l∗t (xt) =
a−s
b . Additionally, substituting for
λ∗t (xt) = s − c(xt) in (2.3.6), we get x∗t = κ−1(s). Therefore, the unique
z∗t that solves the optimality conditions (2.3.3)-(2.3.8) must satisfy the hy-
drodynamic constraint at time t, z∗t (xt) = x∗t − xt − G(xt) − l∗t (xt), i.e.,
z∗t (xt) = κ−1(s) − xt − G(xt) − a−sb . From the constraint etit = 0, we
thus have e∗t (xt) = Max[z∗t , 0] = xt − κ−1(s) + G(xt) − a−sb ≥ 0 when
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xt ≥ κ−1(s) and i∗t (xt) = |Min[z∗t , 0]| = κ−1(s) − xt − G(xt) + a−sb > 0
when xt < κ−1(s).
For part (b), note that setting (2.3.7) to zero for steady-state gives z∗ss =
G(x∗ss)− l∗ss = G(κ−1(s))− a−sb , where e∗ss = Max[z∗ss, 0] = G(κ−1(s))− a−sb
when xoss ≥ x∗ss = κ−1(s), i.e., so(xoss) ≤ s, and i∗ss = |Min[z∗ss, 0]| =
a−s
b − G(κ−1(s)) when xoss < x∗ss = κ−1(s), i.e., so(xoss) > s.

PROOF. Proposition 2.2: (a) Without loss of generality, assume that j is
the exporter. The Nash equilibrium is obtained by equating the supply and
demand curves qjss(s) = a−sb − Gj(κ−1j (s)) to qkss(s) = Gk(κ−1k (s))− a−sb ⇒
a = s + b2
[
Gj(κ−1j (s)) + Gk(κ
−1
k (s))
]
. This admits a unique solution
s˜ ∈ (soj (xojss) ∧ sok(xokss), soj (xojss) ∨ sok(xokss)). To prove that this is indeed the
Nash equilibrium, we show that it is not optimal for either the importer
or exporter to deviate unilaterally from this price. Dividing the range of
prices into s < s˜ and s > s˜, we first show that it is never optimal for
the exporter to deviate. For all prices s, the traded quantity is given by
min[qjss(s), qkss(s)]. When s < s˜, from Proposition 2.1(b), the traded quan-
tity is qjss(s) = Gj(κ−1j (s))− a−sb < qkss(s) since
dqjss(s)
ds > 0 and
dqkss(s)
ds < 0.
Therefore, the equilibrium welfare of the exporter is Πjss = ( a−sb )(s +
b
2 (
a−s
b )) + s(Gj(κ
−1
j (s)) − a−sb ) − c(κ−1j (s))Gj(κ−1j (s)). Taking the deriva-
tive, we get ∂Πjss∂s =
∂κ−1j (s)
∂s (s − cj(κ−1j (s)) −
c′j(κ
−1
j (s))Gj(κ
−1
j (s))
G′j(κ
−1
j (s))
)G′j(κ
−1
j (s)) +
Gj(κ−1j (s))− a−sb > 0, where the sign of the derivative can be verified from
Proposition 2.1. When s > s˜, from Proposition 2.1(b), the traded quantity
is qkss(s) = a−sb − Gk(κ−1k (s)) < qjss(s). It can be shown that the steady-
state condition x˜jss for the constrained export problem solves κj(x) =
a − b(Gk(κ−1k (s)) + Gj(x)) − s, such that
∂x˜jss
∂s > 0. The equilibrium wel-
fare of the exporter is given by Πjss = (
a−κj(x˜jss)
b )(κj(x˜jss) +
b
2 (
a−κj(x˜jss)
b )) +
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s( a−sb − Gk(κ−1k (s))) − cj(x˜jss)Gj(x˜jss). The derivative with respect to
s is ∂Πjss∂s =
a−2s−κj(x˜jss)κ′j(x˜jss)
∂x˜jss
∂s
b − Gk(κ−1k (s)) −
∂x˜jss
∂s (c
′
j(x˜jss)Gj(x˜jss) +
cj(x˜jss)G′j(x˜jss))− s ∂Gk(κ
−1
k (s))
∂s < 0. Therefore, since
∂Πjss
∂s > 0 when s < s˜ and
∂Πjss
∂s < 0 when s > s˜, it is never optimal for the exporter to deviate from s˜.
Repeating a similar analysis for the importer reveals that it is not optimal
for the importer to deviate from s˜. For part (b), observe that ∂s˜∂a = −
∂Ψ
∂a
∂Ψ
∂s
=
2/b
(2/b)+G′j x
′
j(s)+G
′
kx
′
k(s)
> 0 where Ψ = a − s − b2
[
Gj(κ−1j (s)) + Gk(κ
−1
k (s))
]
.
Similarly, ∂s˜∂b = −
∂Ψ
∂b
∂Ψ
∂s
= −2(a−s)/b
2
(2/b)+G′j x
′
j(s)+G
′
kx
′
k(s)
< 0. Part (c) follows from the
proof of part (b) and Proposition 2.1(b).

PROOF. Proposition 2.3: We now characterize the solution described
by (5.0.2)-(5.0.11). We extend assumption (iii) to the central planner’s prob-
lem by imposing the condition lcpj , l
cp
k > 0 for all t. From (5.0.2) and
(5.0.3), this implies that lcpj = l
cp
k for all t. Moreover, from our modeling
assumptions that c(K) = G(K) = 0 for both aquifers, lcpj + l
cp
k > 0 ⇒
qcpj , q
cp
k > 0 for all t by (5.0.10). From (5.0.4) and (5.0.5), this implies
that cj(xj) + λ
cp
j = ck(xk) + λ
cp
k for all t. Substituting for λ
cp
j and λ
cp
k into
(5.0.6) and (5.0.7) respectively gives us differential equations that describe
the evolution of lcpj and l
cp
k . Setting
dlcpj
dt =
dlcpk
dt = 0 gives us the steady-
state quantities lcpjss = l
cp
kss = l
cp
ss =
a−κj(xcpjss)
b =
a−κk(xcpkss)
b , where we define
scp = κj(x
cp
jss) = κk(x
cp
kss). Setting (5.0.8) and (5.0.9) equal to zero at steady-
state and adding them, along with (5.0.10), gives us the following equation
that is uniquely solved by scp: Gj(xj(s)) + Gk(xk(s)) =
2(a−s)
b . Note that
this equation is identical to the equation whose unique solution s˜ solves
the fixed quantity trading equilibrium in Proposition 2.2(a). This equation
has a unique solution, therefore, scp = s˜. From the monotonicity of κj(x),
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κk(x), Gj(x) and Gk(x), it follows that x
cp
jss = x˜jss, x
cp
kss = x˜kss, l
cp
jss = l˜jss and
lcpkss = l˜kss.

PROOF. Proposition 2.4: For the profit-maximizing exporter, Hc.v =
al¯t − bl¯2t + s(e¯t − i¯t)− c(x¯t)(l¯t + e¯t − i¯t) + λ¯t(G(x¯t)− (l¯t + e¯t − i¯t)). The rest
of the proof follows by analogy with the proof of Proposition 2.1, with 2b
replacing b in the solution.
For part (a), we begin by showing that s¯o(x¯oss) < so(xoss). It can be shown
that if lo(x¯oss) < 2l¯oss; then it is also true for all t (Boyce and DiPrima, 2001).
From the optimal paths lo(xt) and l¯o(xt) from Lemma 2.1 and its coun-
terpart for the privatized municipality, note that at x¯oss, lo(x¯oss) < 2l¯oss =
a−κ(x¯oss)
2b , which implies that l
o(xt) < 2l¯o(xt) must be true for all t. There-
fore, s¯o(xt) = a − 2bl¯o(xt) < a − blo(xt) = so(xt) for all t, and hence
s¯o(x¯oss) < so(xoss) for t ≥ T. For part (b), from Proposition 2.1 and its ana-
log for the privatized municipality, we have l¯∗t =
a−s
2b <
a−s
b = l
∗
t for all
t and any price s in the water market. For the rest of part (b) and part (c),
note that from part (a), Proposition 2.1 and its analog for the privatized mu-
nicipality, it follows that e¯∗t (xt) ≥ e∗t (xt) and i¯∗t (xt) ≤ i∗t (xt). In addition,
x¯∗ss = x∗ss = κ−1(s), and q¯∗(x¯∗ss) = q∗(x∗ss).

PROOF. Proposition 2.5: Part (a) follows by analogy with the proof of
Proposition 2.2(a) after noting that when a privatized municipality trades
with a non-privatized municipality, the corresponding equation uniquely
solved by s˜wp is a = s+ 2b3
[
Gj(κ−1j (s)) + Gk(κ
−1
k (s))
]
, and when two priva-
tized municipalities trade, s˜pp solves a = s + b
[
Gj(κ−1j (s)) + Gk(κ
−1
k (s))
]
.
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We define the expression θ(ω, s, a, b) :
= s + ωb
[
Gj(κ−1j (s)) + Gk(κ
−1
k (s))
]
− a, whose root s˜ is decreasing in ω
from our assumptions on Gj(x) and Gk(x), therefore, s˜ww > s˜wp > s˜pp. The
effects on l˜ and x˜ follow from Proposition 2.1(b) and its counterpart for the
privatized municipality. The proof of 5(b) follows directly from the proof
of 2(b).

PROOF. Proposition 2.6: To see the impact of export bans on Proposi-
tion 2.1, let et = 0 for all t in (2.3.1). There are two cases to consider for
a given xt ≥ κ−1(s). If s ≥ so(xt), assume that i∗t (xt) = 0 solves (2.3.1).
Plugging i∗t (xt) = 0 in the optimality conditions returns the benchmark
solution from Lemma 2.1 which admits a unique solution q∗t (xt) = qo(xt).
Therefore, insomuch as c(xt) + λ∗t (xt) = c(xt) + λo(xt) = so(xt) ≤ s sat-
isfies the inequality in (2.3.5) when s ≥ so(xt), q∗t (xt) = qo(xt), i∗t (xt) = 0
solve the problem when et = 0 for all t. Alternatively, if s < so(xt), we
have a − bl∗t (xt) = c(xt) + λ∗t (xt) from (2.3.3) since l∗t (xt) > 0 from as-
sumption (iii). Now assume that c(xt) + λ∗t (xt) < s, which implies from
(2.3.5) that i∗t (xt) = 0. However, these two conditions together (from
the s ≥ so(xt) condition and the uniqueness of its solution) imply that
q∗t (xt) = qo(xt), which along with (2.3.3) (c(xt) + λ∗t (xt) = a − bl∗t (xt) =
a− blo(xt) = so(xt) < s) violates s < so(xt), therefore c(xt) + λ∗t (xt) < s
is infeasible if s < so(xt), and hence c(xt) + λ∗t (xt) = s. Therefore,
c(xt) + λ∗t (xt) ≥ s for all t, which, taken together with (2.3.3) and i∗t (xt) = 0
if xt ≥ κ−1(s) from Proposition 2.1(a), imply that q∗t (xt) ≥ a−sb . More
specifically, q∗t (xt) = qo(xt) if s ≥ so(xt) and q∗t (xt) = a−sb if s < so(xt),
i.e., q∗t (xt) = Max[
a−s
b , q
o(xt)]. Analogously, for the privatized munici-
pality, q¯∗t (xt) = q¯o(xt) if s ≥ s¯o(xt) and q¯∗t (xt) = a−s2b if s < s¯o(xt), i.e.,
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q¯∗t (xt) = Max[
a−s
2b , q¯
o(xt)].
Given the solutions to (2.3.1) and (2.4.1) when et = e¯t = 0 for all t, we
see that 0 ≤ ∆q¯∗t (xt) = q¯∗t (xt) − q¯o(xt) = Max[ a−s2b , q¯o(xt)] − q¯o(xt) ≤
Max[ a−sb , q
o(xt)] − qo(xt) = ∆q∗t (xt) = q∗t (xt) − qo(xt) since we have
shown that qo(xt) < 2q¯o(xt) must be true for all t in the proof of Propo-
sition 2.4.

PROOF. Proposition 2.7: (a) We first characterize the solution for a pri-
vatized municipality with no access to a water market, i.e., e¯t = i¯t = 0 for
all t. First, notice from (5.0.12) that w¯ot > 0 ⇒ σ¯ot (xt) = a − 2b(q¯ot (xt) +
w¯ot )− cw = a− 2bl¯o(xt)− cw, and correspondingly, for the non-privatized
analog, wot > 0 ⇒ σot (xt) = a − b(qot (xt) + wot ) − cw = a − blo(xt) − cw,
where l¯o(xt) and lo(xt) are the quantities of water sold in the investment
problem when there is no access to a water market. The result from Propo-
sition 2.4(b) still applies due to the continuity of the price paths (Holland,
2006) before and after water production begins, such that σot (xt) > σ¯
o
t (xt)
for all xt. Therefore, from (5.0.13), W¯o < Wo. Moreover, notice that σ¯ot (xt) >
0 for t ≥ τ¯ since a− 2b(q¯ot (xt) + w¯ot ) is increasing from Lemma 2.1’s coun-
terpart for the non-privatized municipality, hence σot (xt) > 0. Therefore,
from the corresponding complementary slackness condition (and similarly
for the non-privatized analog), this implies that σot (xt) > σ¯
o
t (xt) > 0 ⇒
w∗t = W∗, w¯∗t = W¯∗. Further, note that q¯o(xτ¯−) − w¯τ+ = q¯o(xτ¯+) for
the continuity of the price paths. Substituting for q¯o(xτ¯−) and q¯o(xτ¯+) in
(5.0.14) gives the investment threshold criterion c(xτ¯)+ λ¯(xτ¯) = cw +
δF(W¯)
W¯
and the analogous condition for the non-privatized municipality. From
the convexity of F(W), note that this threshold is higher for the non-
privatized municipality. For part (b), note from Proposition 2.4(b) that
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a − bl∗t (xt) = a − 2bl¯∗t (xt) = s when there is access to a water market.
Therefore, from (5.0.12), σ∗t (xt) = σ¯∗t (xt) = s − cw, which implies from
(5.0.13) that W¯∗ = W∗. Moreover, c(xt) + λ¯∗(xt) = c(xt) + λ∗(xt) = s for
all t, implying from the investment threshold criterion that both municipal-
ities invest simultaneously (immediately or never). 
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Appendix B (Chapter 3)
B1: Tables and Figures
Figure 12 was obtained by plotting ∆E = E|(gGAc , τGAc ) − E|(gGBc , τGBc ) and
∆ΠPri = ΠPri|(gPAc , τPAc ) − ΠPri|(gPBc , τPBc ) as defined in the proof of Propo-
sition 3.4. We observe from the figure that for the chosen parameters
(β = 0.75, ν = 0.5), ∆E and ∆ΠPri are decreasing in µH and are nega-
tive when µH rises above a threshold value that is different for the NGO
and private ecolabeling scheme. Varying β ∈ (0, 1] and ν ∈ [0, 1) in incre-
ments of 0.2 does not affect the monotonicities of ∆E and ∆ΠPri. Thus, from
Proposition 3.4(a), we infer that for sufficiently high (low) µH, the NGO and
private ecolabeling schemes are optimally stipulated such that the ensuing
equilibrium between the two firms is SC (CC).
Figure 12. The effect of credibility on the equilibrium
choices of NGO and private ecolabeling schemes for β =
0.75 and ν = 0.5
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Figure 13. The effect of credibility on 3BL measures when
SC equilibria ensue for β = 0.75, µH = 0.75, and ν = 0.9
Figure 13 illustrates the second-stage equilibria between competing
producers in the presence of a single external ecolabeling scheme for a gen-
eral level of substitutability between the two firms’ products, which is cap-
tured by φ ∈ [0, 1] in the demand functions qi = 12 − (pi− φp−i)+ β(µigi−
φµ−ig−i), where i ∈ {H, L}. The analysis in §3.4 assumes φ = 1, i.e., the
two firms’ products are perfectly substitutable. Note that the equilibrium
structure in Figure 13 preserves the structure in Figure 6 for φ = 1. Figure
13 was obtained for β = 0.75, µH = 0.75, and ν = 0.9, by comparing each
firm’s profits for each of the equilibria described in Table 2 with its profits
from unilateral deviation as in the proof of Lemma 3.3.
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Figure 14. Region where τ1(gCc ) > τ2(gCc ) for β = 0.9
To show that τ1(gCc ) ≤ τ2(gCc ), we solve τ2(gCc )− τ1(gCc ) = 0 for gCc and
obtain the two roots gCc =
162β3µ4H(ν2+1)−9β5µ6H(ν2+1)
2−729βµ2H∓
√
A
6(β2µ2H−18)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 , where
A = µ2H
(
β2µ2H − 9
)2 (
β2µ2H
(
ν2 + 1
)− 9)2 (4β6µ6Hν2 + 9β4µ4H (3ν4 − 6ν2 − 1)
−81β2µ2H
(
2ν4 + ν2 − 4) + 1458 (ν2 − 1)) such that ∂2(τ2(gCc )−τ1(gCc ))
∂(gCc )2
=
2β2(18−β2µ2H)
(β2µ2H−9)
2 > 0, implying that τ2(gCc ) − τ1(gCc ) < 0 between the two
roots. This region is feasible only when the expression ψ(β, µH , ν) =(
4β6µ6Hν
2 + 9β4µ4H
(
3ν4 − 6ν2 − 1)− 81β2µ2H (2ν4 + ν2 − 4)+ 1458 (ν2 − 1)) >
0. We plot this region as a function of µH and ν in Figure 14 for β = 0.9,
and observe that it exists only for ν, µH → 1, i.e., for µL → 1. Varying β in
increments of 0.05 within the range β ∈ [0.05, 0.95] does not qualitatively
change the result illustrated in Figure 14, however, we note that the size of
the region where τ1(gCc ) > τ2(gCc ) shrinks as β decreases.
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Table 4. Equilibrium outcomes and 3BL implications with
NGO preemption when ν = 0.5
The entries in Tables 4 and 5 are obtained by fixing ν = 0.5 and varying
µH in increments of 0.2 in the range µH ∈ [0.2, 0.8] for β = 0.5 and for β =
0.75. Repeating this procedure by varying ν in the range ν ∈ [0.2, 0.8]
in increments of 0.2 does not impact the equilibria between the compet-
ing firms or the 3BL implications. The equilibrium outcomes are obtained
by backward induction as in the monopoly case described in the proof of
Proposition 3.5.
Table 5. Equilibrium environmental qualities (g∗H, g
∗
L)
when β = ν = 0.5
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B2: Proofs
PROOF. Lemma 3.1: The monopolist’s objective is maximizepm,gmΠm =
pmqm − g2m. First solving for price in the second stage by setting ∂Πm∂pm = 0
( ∂
2Πm
∂p2m
= −2, i.e., objective is concave in pm) with τ = 0 for a self-labeling
monopolist gives pm(gm) = 12 (βµgm + 1). Substituting for pm(gm) in Πm
and solving for gm in the second stage by setting
∂Πm(gm)
∂gm = 0 (
∂2Πm(gm)
∂g2m
=
β2µ2
2 − 2 < 0, i.e., objective is concave in gm), we get gSm = βµ4−β2µ2 . Substitut-
ing for gSm in pm(gm) and Πm(gm), we obtain pSm =
2
4−β2µ2 and Π
S
m =
1
4−β2µ2 .
It is readily verified that ∂g
S
m
∂µ > 0,
∂pSm
∂µ > 0, and
∂ΠSm
∂µ > 0.

PROOF. Proposition 3.1: The NGO ecolabelers problem is
maximizegm,τm(1− pm(gm) + βgm)gm, subject to the monopolist’s individ-
ual rationality criterion: ΠGm ≥ ΠSm = 14−β2µ2 , where pm(gm) = 12 (βκgm + 1)
where κ = 1 if C, else κ = µ, from the proof of Lemma 3.1. Similarly,
the private ecolabeler solves maximizegm,τmτm subject to the monopolist’s
individual rationality criterion ΠPm ≥ ΠSm = 14−β2µ2 . The monopolist’s
individual rationality constraint must hold with equality at the optimum,
thus, substituting for gm from the equation ΠCm =
1
4−β2µ2 into the re-
spective objective functions for the two external ecolabelers and solving
simultaneously for gm and τm, we obtain gGm =
4β−β3µ2+2
√
β2(1−µ2)(4−β2µ2)
(4−β2)(4−β2µ2) ,
τGm = 0, gPm =
β
4−β2 , and τ
P
m =
β2(1−µ2)
(4−β2)(4−β2µ2) . It is readily verified from the
definitions of β ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1] that gGm > gPm > gSm.

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PROOF. Proposition 3.2: (a): CSSm =
´ 44−β2µ2
2
4−β2µ2
( 44−β2µ2 − p)dp = 2(β2µ2−4)2 ,
CSPm =
´ 44−β2
2
4−β2
( 44−β2 − p)dp = 2(β2−4)2 , and
CSGm =
´ −4β2µ2+2β
√
β2(µ2−1)(β2µ2−4)+16
(β2−4)(β2µ2−4)
−2β2µ2+β
√
β2(µ2−1)(β2µ2−4)+8
(β2−4)(β2µ2−4)
(
−4β2µ2+2β
√
β2(µ2−1)(β2µ2−4)+16
(β2−4)(β2µ2−4) − p)dp
=
β4(µ2−1)+4β2µ2−4β
√
β2(µ2−1)(β2µ2−4)−16
2(β2−4)2(β2µ2−4) . The ordering CS
G
m > CSPm > CSSm
can be determined by noting that CSSm, CSPm, CSGm are monotonic in µ such
that ∂(CS
G
m−CSPm)
∂µ < 0 and (CS
G
m − CSPm)|µ=1 = 0; ∂(CS
P
m−CSSm)
∂µ < 0, and
(CSPm−CSSm)|µ=1 = 0. Similarly, environmental benefits are ESm = 2βµ(β2µ2−4)2 ,
EPm =
2β
(β2−4)2 , and
EGm =
(
β3(−µ2)+2
√
β2(µ2−1)(β2µ2−4)+4β
)(
−2β2µ2+β
√
β2(µ2−1)(β2µ2−4)+8
)
(β2−4)2(β2µ2−4)2 , which
are ordered as EGm > EPm > ESm by similarly noting that EGm, EPm, ESm are
monotonic in µ such that ∂(E
G
m−EPm)
∂µ < 0 and (E
G
m − EPm)|µ=1 = 0; and
∂(EPm−ESm)
∂µ < 0 and (E
P
m − ESm)|µ=1 = 0. Producer surplus under the three
ecolabeling regimes are equal as follows from the proof of Proposition 3.1
as the monopolist’s individual rationality constraint must hold with equal-
ity at the optimal choices of both external ecolabeling schemes.
b) The sensitivity of the measures from part a) follows directly by taking
their first derivative w.r.t µ. 
PROOF. Lemma 3.2: The optimal environmental qualities are chosen by
simultaneously solving ∂Π
S
H(p
S
H(g
S
H))
∂gSH
=
∂ΠSL(p
S
L(g
S
L))
∂gSL
= 0. Optimal prices are
obtained by substituting for gSH and g
S
L in the price functions p
S
H(g
S
H) and
pSL(g
S
L) which in turn are obtained by solving
∂ΠSH(p
S
H ,g
S
H)
∂pSH
=
∂ΠSL(p
S
L,g
S
L)
∂pSL
= 0.
Concavity of the objective functions in pSi and g
S
i is readily verified. Finally,
substituting for gSH, g
S
L, p
S
H, and p
S
L, we obtain Π
S
H and Π
S
L . The ordering of
the two firms optimal decisions and profits follow directly. 
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PROOF. Proposition 3.3: a) CSS =
´ 2β2µ2Hν2−9β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9
2β2µ2Hν
2−9
2(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
(
2β2µ2Hν
2−pSH(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)−9
β2µ2H(ν
2+1)−9 )dp
S
H
+
´ 2β2µ2H−9β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9
2β2µ2H−9
2(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
(
2β2µ2H−pSL(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)−9
β2µ2H(ν
2+1)−9 )dp
S
L =
2β4µ4H(ν4+1)−18β2µ2H(ν2+1)+81
4(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 , ES =
βµH
(
4β4µ4Hν
4−36β2µ2Hν2+ν(9−2β2µ2H)
2
+81
)
12(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 ,
and ΠS = ΠSH +Π
S
L
=
1458−4β6µ6Hν2(ν2+1)+36β4µ4H(ν2+1)
2−405β2µ2H(ν2+1)
36(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 .
b) Sensitivities of the three measures w.r.t. credibility µH and credibility
ratio ν follow directly by taking their first derivatives and from the
definitions of β, µH, and ν. 
PROOF. Lemma 3.3: Given gCc and τCc , we compute firm H and firm
L’s profits for each strategy pair SS, SC, CS, and CC. We then solve for
τCc such that neither firm prefers to deviate from an action given its
competitors action. For example, CC is an equilibrium iff ΠCCH ≥ ΠSCH
and ΠCCL ≥ ΠCSL , where the first and second letters in the superscripts
denote firm H and firm L’s actions, respectively. Solving ΠCCH −ΠSCH ≥ 0
and ΠCCL − ΠCSL ≥ 0 for τCc , we obtain the condition τCc ≤ τ1(gCc ) =
Min[
β2µ2H+4(g
C
c )
2(9−β2(µ2H−1))−12βgCc
4(β2µ2H−9)
, 14
(
−4(gCc )2 + (3−2βg
C
c )
2
β2µ2Hν
2−9 + 1
)
] =
β2µ2H+4(g
C
c )
2(9−β2(µ2H−1))−12βgCc
4(β2µ2H−9)
. Similarly, solving ΠSCH −
ΠCCH ≥ 0 and ΠSCL − ΠSSL ≥ 0 for τCc , we obtain
β2µ2H+4(g
C
c )
2(9−β2(µ2H−1))−12βgCc
4(β2µ2H−9)
= τ1(gCc ) ≤ τCc ≤ τ2(gCc ) =
β2µ2Hν
2(9−2β2µ2H)
2
(β4µ4H+9β2µ2Hν2−81)
(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 −36(gCc )2(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)+108βgCc (9−2β2µ2H)
36(β2µ2H−9)
2 .
Solving ΠSSH −ΠCSH ≥ 0 and ΠSSL −ΠSCL ≥ 0 for τCc , we get τCc ≥ τ2(gCc ) =
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Max[
β2µ2H(β4µ4Hν4+9β2µ2H−81)(9−2β2µ2Hν2)
2−108βgCc (2β2µ2Hν2−9)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
36(β2µ2Hν2−9)
2
(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
−36(gCc )2(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
(β4µ4Hν4−9β2(2µ2Hν2+1)+81)
36(β2µ2Hν2−9)
2
(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 ,
β2µ2Hν
2(9−2β2µ2H)
2
(β4µ4H+9β2µ2Hν2−81)
(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 −36(gCc )2(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)+108βgCc (9−2β2µ2H)
36(β2µ2H−9)
2 ]
=
β2µ2Hν
2(9−2β2µ2H)
2
(β4µ4H+9β2µ2Hν2−81)
(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 −36(gCc )2(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)+108βgCc (9−2β2µ2H)
36(β2µ2H−9)
2 .
Solving ΠCSH −ΠSSH ≥ 0 and ΠCSL −ΠCCL ≥ 0 for τCc , we obtain
1
4
(
−4(gCc )2 + (3−2βg
C
c )
2
β2µ2Hν
2−9 + 1
)
= τ3(gCc ) ≤ τCc ≤ τ4(gCc ) =
β2µ2H(β4µ4Hν4+9β2µ2H−81)(9−2β2µ2Hν2)
2−36(gCc )2(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
36(β2µ2Hν2−9)
2
(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
(β4µ4Hν4−9β2(2µ2Hν2+1)+81)−108βgCc (2β2µ2Hν2−9)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
36(β2µ2Hν2−9)
2
(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 . Note that
τ3(gCc ) ≤ τ4(gCc ) iff gCc ≥ gˆ = 9β
5µ6H(ν3+ν)
2−162β3µ4Hν2(ν2+1)+729βµ2Hν2+
√
B
6(18−β2µ2Hν2)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
where B = µ2H
(
β4µ4Hν
2 (ν2 + 1)− 9β2µ2H (2ν2 + 1)+ 81)2
(4β6µ6Hν
6 − 9β4µ4H
(
ν4 + 6ν2 − 3) ν2 + 81β2µ2H (4ν4 − ν2 − 2)
+1458
(
1− ν2)). 
PROOF. Proposition 3.4: a) For the NGO’s problem;
maximizegGc ,τGc qH gH + qLgL subject to the firms’ individual rationality
and incentive compatibility constraints, we first rewrite the thresholds in
Lemma 3.3 in terms of gi(τGc ). We note that all thresholds are such that
∂gi(τGc )
∂τGc
< 0. Further, within each region, the NGO’s objective is increasing
in gGc , implying that τGc = 0 is optimal and the optimal environmental
standard must be at an equilibrium region’s upper threshold. Thus,
rewriting g1(0), we obtain gGAc =
√
β2(µ2H−1)(β2µ2H−9)+3β
−2β2µ2H+2β2+18
as the environ-
mental benefit maximizing environmental standard for region GG, and
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gGBc =
−18β7µ6H(ν2+1)
2
+81β5µ4H(ν4+6ν2+5)−1458β3µ2H(ν2+2)+6561β
6(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
+
√
β2(2β4µ4H−27β2µ2H+81)
2
(β4µ6Hν2+9β2µ4Hν4−9(β2+9)µ2Hν2+81)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
6(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2
as the environmental benefit maximizing environmental standard
for region SG. We claim that GS can never occur in equilib-
rium. Environmental benefits from a GS equilibrium will ex-
ceed environmental benefits from an SG equilibrium iff gGc >
3(81+18β2µ2Hν−β4µ4Hν(ν2+ν+1))
2β(β4µ5Hν2(ν+1)−β4µ4Hν(ν2+ν+1)−9β2µ3H(ν3+ν2+ν+1)+18β2µ2Hν+81µH(ν+1)+81)
> Max[(gGc )−1(τ2(0))], where the second inequality can be verified by
noting that the minimum value of the central term exceeds the maxi-
mum value of (gGc )−1(τ2(0)) by evaluating them at the boundary of the
parametric regions of β, µH, ν ∈ [0, 1] due to their monotonicities in
each of these parameters: the central term is decreasing in β, µH, ν, and
Max[(gGc )−1(τ2(0))] is decreasing in ν but increasing in β and µH). How-
ever, an SS equilibrium would ensue for gGc > (gGc )−1(τ2(0)). SS can never
be an equilibrium outcome since it does not maximize environmental bene-
fits; E|(gGAc , τGc ) > ESS. Therefore the NGO chooses environmental standard
gGAc iff environmental benefits from the ensuing GG equilibrium exceed
those from an SG equilibrium, i.e., iff ∆E = E|(gGAc , τGc ) − E|(gGBc , τGc ) ≥ 0,
else he chooses standard gGBc .
For the private ecolabeler’s problem, maximizegPc ,τPc τ
P
c (I[Eqm = P∗] +
I[Eqm = ∗P]) subject to the firms’ individual rationality and incentive com-
patibility constraints, where I[..] = 1 if true, else 0. If PP, then τPc is max-
imized at gPAc =
3β
2(9+β2(1−µ2H))
(by solving ∂τ1(g
P
c )
∂gPc
= 0, where ∂
2τ1(gPc )
∂(gPc )2
< 0)
and τPAc = τ1(gPAc ) =
β2(µ2H−1)
4(β2(µ2H−1)−9)
, the threshold for PP, giving total la-
beling profits ΠPri|(gPAc , τPAc ) =
2β2(µ2H−1)
4(β2(µ2H−1)−9)
. If SP, then τPc is maximized at
gPBc =
27β−6β3µ2H
2(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)
(by solving ∂τ2(g
P
c )
∂gPc
= 0, where ∂
2τ2(gPc )
∂(gPc )2
< 0) and
162
τPBc = τ2(gPBc ) =
β2(9−2β2µ2H)
2
(β4µ6Hν2+9β2µ4Hν4−9(β2+9)µ2Hν2+81)
36(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 , giving total
labeling profits ΠPri|(gPBc , τPBc ) =
β2(9−2β2µ2H)
2
(β4µ6Hν2+9β2µ4Hν4−9(β2+9)µ2Hν2+81)
36(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 .
The equilibrium choice is determined by whichever obtains higher
labeling profits, i.e., the private ecolabeler stipulates gPAc and
τPAc iff ∆ΠPri = ΠPri|(gPAc , τPAc ) − ΠPri|(gPBc , τPBc ) =
2β2(µ2H−1)
4(β2(µ2H−1)−9)
−
β2(9−2β2µ2H)
2
(β4µ6Hν2+9β2µ4Hν4−9(β2+9)µ2Hν2+81)
36(β4µ4H−9β2(2µ2H+1)+81)(β2µ2H(ν2+1)−9)
2 ≥ 0, else he stipulates gPBc
and τPBc . Note that since τ3(gPc ), τ4(gPc ) ≤ τ2(gPc ), PS can never earn
maximum labeling profits, and hence, never occur in equilibrium.
b) From the proof of Proposition 3.4(a), note that ensuing equilibria
are always CC or SC, i.e., firm L always adopts the external ecolabel
in equilibrium. It remains to show that when firm H chooses S, that
its self-labeling environmental quality is lower than the environmental
standard adopted by firm L. Note that firm H’s best response to firm L
when firm L adopts an external standard gCc (obtained by solving for gSH
in ∂Π
S
H(gL=g
C
c )
∂gSH
= 0) is gSH(gL = g
C
c ) =
βµH(2βgCc −3)
2(β2µ2H−9)
. This self-labeling envi-
ronmental quality exceeds the external environmental standard adopted
by L iff gCc <
3βµH
2(9−β2(µH−1)µH) . But from Proposition 3.4(a), Lemma 3.3,
and the definitions of β, µH, and ν,
3βµH
2(9−β2(µH−1)µH) < g
PA
c < gPBc and
3βµH
2(9−β2(µH−1)µH) < g
GA
c < gGBc , thus, g∗L = g
C
c ≥ g∗H.
c) Within each of the possible equilibrium regions CC and SC, the NGO
chooses gGc = gGAc = g1(τGAc = 0) and gGc = gGBc = g2(τGBc = 0).
From Proposition 3.4(a), within these equilibrium regions, the pri-
vate labeler chooses τPAc , τPBc > 0. Noting that
∂gi(τGc )
∂τGc
< 0,
this implies gGAc = g1(τGAc = 0) > gc1(τ
PA
c > 0) = gPAc , and
gGBc = g2(τGBc = 0) > g2(τPBc > 0) = gPBc . 
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PROOF. Proposition 3.5: a) From Lemma 3.1, we have the mo-
nopolist’s reservation profits as 14−β2µ2 . We start first by solving
the private ecolabeler’s problem in the second stage. The pri-
vate ecolabeler maximizes his revenues τP2m , leaving a profit of
1
4
((
β2 − 4) (gP2m )2 + 2βgP2m − 4τP2m + 1) to the monopolist, subject to
two constraints: 1) monopolist’s profits from adopting the private label
exceed the monopolist’s reservation profits 14−β2µ2 , and 2) monopolist’s
profits from adopting the private label exceed the monopolist’s profits
from adopting the NGO’s ecolabel 14
((
β2 − 4) (gG2m )2 + 2βgG2m − 4τG2m + 1).
The maximum labeling fee the private label can charge (when the
monopolist’s profits meet these two constraints with equality) is thus
τP2m = Min[
1
4
(
4
β2µ2−4 +
(
β2 − 4) (gP2m )2 + 2βgP2m + 1)
, 14
(− (β2 − 4) (gG2m )2 − 2βgG2m + 4τG2m + gP2m (2β+ (β2 − 4) gP2m ))] ≤
1
4
(
4
β2µ2−4 +
(
β2 − 4) (gP2m )2 + 2βgP2m + 1) = τPm. Note that both expressions
1
4
(
4
β2µ2−4 +
(
β2 − 4) (gP2m )2 + 2βgP2m + 1) ,
and 14
(− (β2 − 4) (gG2m )2 − 2βgG2m + 4τG2m + gP2m (2β+ (β2 − 4) gP2m ))
are maximized at gP2m =
β
4−β2 . b) The environmental benefits
EC2m =
1
2 g
C2
m (βgC2m κ + 1) and consumer surplus CSC2m =
1
8 (βg
C2
m κ + 1)2
depend only on gC2m and are independent of τC2m . Therefore, since
gP2m = gPm, E2m = EPm and CS2m = CSPm. Monopolists profits
Π2m =
1
4
(
β2
4−β2 − 4τm + 1
)
are decreasing in labeling fees τm and since
τP2m ≤ τPm and gP2m = gPm = β4−β2 , Π2m = ΠP2m ≥ ΠPm. 
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Appendix C (Chapter 4)
C1: Proofs
PROOF. Lemma 4.1: Resolving by backward induction, in the third
stage, OEM chooses m∗(w, g) = 1−w+αg2 by solving
∂ΠOEMM (m,w,g)
∂m = 0
( ∂
2ΠOEMM (m,w,g)
∂m2 < 0). Anticipating this choice in the second stage, the sup-
plier chooses w∗(g) = 1+αg2 by solving
∂ΠSM(w,g)
∂w = 0 (
∂2ΠSM(w,g)
∂w2 < 0). In
the first stage, the OEM chooses g∗M =
α
16δθ−α2 by solving
∂ΠOEMM (g)
∂g = 0
( ∂
2ΠOEMM (g)
∂g2 < 0 iff 16δθ − α2 = ΩM > 0). Substituting for g∗M = αΩM
in the price functions, we get m∗M =
4δθ
ΩM
and w∗M =
8δθ
ΩM
. Note that
∂m∗M
∂θ ,
∂w∗M
∂θ ,
∂g∗M
∂θ < 0. For this solution to meet the supplier’s individual
rationality constraint, ΠSM =
δ(α2(θ−1)+32δθ2)
(α2−16δθ)2 ≥ 0, i.e., θ >
√
α4+128α2δ−α2
64δ =
ωM must hold. 
PROOF. Proposition 4.1: a) In a cost-sharing dyad, EM = q∗Mg
∗
M = (1−
w∗M − m∗M + αg∗M)g∗M = 4αδθΩ2M , CSM =
´ 16δθ
Ω
12δθ
Ω
(1 − p + αg∗M)dp = 8δ
2θ2
Ω2M
, and
ΠM = Π
OEM∗
M +Π
S∗
M =
δ(48δθ2−α2)
Ω2M
. For a dyad without cost-sharing, the
solution proceeds as in the proof of Lemma 4.1 except in the final stage of
backward induction where the OEM’s objective ΠOEMM (g) =
1
16 (αg + 1)
2
is convex in g. Invoking the supplier’s individual rationality constraint
restricts gNM ≤ α+2
√
2δ
ΩN
. Note that the conditionΩN = 8δ− α2 > 0 must hold
for a non-negative solution. These solutions along with 3BL implications
are compiled in the following table.
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Eqm characteristics No cost-sharing dyad Cost-sharing dyad
g∗M
α+2
√
2δ
ΩN
α
ΩM
EM
(α+2
√
2δ)(α
√
2δ+4δ)
2Ω2N
4αδθ
Ω2M
CSM
δ(α2+4α
√
2δ+8δ)
4Ω2N
8δ2θ2
Ω2M
ΠM
δ(α2+4α
√
2δ+8δ)
2Ω2N
δ(48δθ2−α2)
Ω2M
Table 6. Comparison of equilibria and 3BL outcomes in a
monopoly with and without cost-sharing
The results in Proposition 4.1(a) and (b) follow from Table 6.
c) It is readily verified that ∂E
C
M
∂θ ,
∂CSCM
∂θ < 0, and
∂ΠCM
∂θ =
32α2δ2(1−3θ)
Ω3M
, such
that ΠCM is unimodal achieving its maximum at θ =
1
3 (
∂ΠCM
∂θ < (>)0 for
θ > (<) 13 ). 
PROOF. Lemma 4.2: Setting φ = 1, we simultaneously solve
∂ΠOEMA (w,m,g,θ)
∂mA
=
∂ΠOEMB (w,m,g,θ)
∂mB
= 0 to obtain mA(w, g, θ) and mB(w, g, θ) in
the fourth stage. Substituting the OEM margin functions in the supplier’s
objectives, we next simultaneously solve ∂Π
S
A(w,g,θ)
∂wA
=
∂ΠSB(w,g,θ)
∂wB
= 0
to obtain wA(g, θ) and wB(g, θ) in the third stage. Concavity of
the objective functions is readily verified. In the second stage, si-
multaneously solving ∂Π
OEM
A (g,θ)
∂gA
=
∂ΠOEMB (g,θ)
∂gB
= 0 gives g∗A(θ) =
α(λ−1)(α2(λ−1)2−9δθB(k+4))
9δΩ1
and g∗B(θ) =
α(λ−1)(α2(λ−1)2+9δθA(k−5))
9δΩ1
, where
Ω1 = 81δθAθB− α2(λ− 1)2(θA + θB)with δ > Max[ α
2(1−λ)2
81θA
, α
2(1−λ)2
81θB
] as the
concavity condition which is satisfied given conditions 1 and 2. To obtain
the degrees of cost-sharing that maximize supply chain profits, simultane-
ously solving ∂(Π
OEM
A (θ)+Π
S
A(θ))
∂θA
=
∂(ΠOEMB (θ)+Π
S
B(θ))
∂θB
= 0 gives θ∗A = θ
∗
B =
Ω2
72δ
( ∂
2(ΠOEMi (θ)+Π
S
i (θ))
∂θ2i
< 0), where Ω2 =
√
δ (81δ− 16α2(λ− 1)2) + 9δ. Sub-
stituting θ∗i in gi(θ) returns the investment levels at the optimum level of
cost-sharing.
Equilibrium outcomes for general φ are obtained similarly with the condi-
tion δ > Max[
α2(φ2−2)2(λ(φ2−2)φ+2φ4−9φ2+8)2
θB(−4φ6+33φ4−84φ2+64)2
,
α2(φ2−2)2(λ(φ2−2)φ+2φ4−9φ2+8)2
θA(−4φ6+33φ4−84φ2+64)2
]
ensuring concavity of the objectives in gi and non-trivialty of so-
lutions. Supply-chain optimal degrees of cost-sharing are obtained
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by solving ∂(Π
OEM
A (θ,φ)+Π
S
A(θ,φ))
∂θA
=
∂(ΠOEMB (θ,φ)+Π
S
B(θ,φ))
∂θB
= 0 to obtain
θ∗A = θ
∗
B =
2α2(λ2−1)(4φ10−49φ8+228φ6−499φ4+508φ2−192)(φ2−2)2−16δφ14
4δ(3−φ2)(−4φ6+33φ4−84φ2+64)2
+296δφ12−2289δφ10+9578δφ8−23392δφ6+33312δφ4−25600δφ2+8192δ+√A
4δ(3−φ2)(−4φ6+33φ4−84φ2+64)2 , where
A2 =
(
4φ8 − 41φ6 + 150φ4 − 232φ2 + 128)2 (4α4 (λ2 − 1)2 (φ6 − 6φ4 + 11φ2 − 6)2
+δ2
(−4φ6 + 33φ4 − 84φ2 + 64)2 − 4α2δ (φ4 − 5φ2 + 6)
(λ2
(
4φ8 − 35φ6 + 109φ4 − 140φ2 + 64)+ 4λ (2φ6 − 13φ4 + 26φ2 − 16) φ
+4φ8 − 35φ6 + 109φ4 − 140φ2 + 64)).

PROOF. Proposition 4.2: a) From Lemma 4.2, and given the assump-
tion θA = θB = θ, g∗A(θ) =
α(λ−1)(α2(λ−1)2−9δθ(k+4))
9δΩ1
and g∗B(θ) =
α(λ−1)(α2(λ−1)2+9δθ(k−5))
9δΩ1
. Given condition 1 which ensures Ω1 > 0, the dif-
ference ∆g(θ) = g∗A(θ)− g∗B(θ) = α(2k−1)(1−λ)Ω1 > 0 iff k > 12 .
b) Taking the derivative of the investment levels w.r.t λ gives
∂g∗A(θ)
∂λ =
−α(2α4(λ−1)4+9α2δθ(2k−19)(λ−1)2+729δ2θ2(k+4))
9δθΩ21
< 0 from condition
2 (Ω2 > 9δ). Taking the derivative of g∗B(θ) w.r.t λ gives
∂g∗B(θ)
∂λ =
−2α5(λ−1)4+9α3δθ(2k+17)(λ−1)2+729αδ2θ2(k−5)
9δθΩ21
< 0 from condition 2 (Ω2 > 9δ).
Taking the derivatives of g∗A(θ) and g
∗
B(θ) w.r.t k gives
∂g∗A(θ)
∂k =
α(1−λ)
Ω1
> 0
and ∂g
∗
B(θ)
∂k =
α(λ−1)
Ω1
< 0 from condition 1 which ensures Ω1 > 0. 
PROOF. Proposition 4.3: a) OEM A’s profits evaluated at the
equilibrium described in Lemma 4.2 (along with the assumption
θA = θB = θ) are ΠOEMA =
(81δθ−α2(λ−1)2)(α2(λ−1)2−9δθ(k+4))2
81δθΩ21
. The
derivative of OEM A’s profits w.r.t λ is evaluated as ∂Π
OEM
A
∂λ =
2α2(λ−1)(α2(λ−1)2−9δθ(k+4))(2α4(λ−1)4+9α2δθ(2k−19)(λ−1)2−2187δ2θ2(k−2))
81δθΩ31
.
Solving ∂Π
OEM
A
∂λ = 0 for k gives kA1 =
α2(λ−1)2−36δθ
9δθ < 0
and kA2 =
2α4(λ−1)4−171α2δθ(λ−1)2+4374δ2θ2
9δθ(243δθ−2α2(λ−1)2) > 1, and
∂2
∂ΠOEMA
∂λ
∂k2 =
4α2δθ(λ−1)(2α2(λ−1)2−243δθ)
−Ω31
< 0, where the inequalities follow from
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condition 1. This implies that ∂Π
OEM
A
∂λ > 0 ∀ k ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly,
OEM B’s profits are evaluated as (
81δθ−α2(λ−1)2)(α2(λ−1)2+9δθ(k−5))2
81δθΩ21
, and
∂ΠOEMB
∂λ =
2α2(λ−1)(α2(λ−1)2+9δθ(k−5))(2α4(λ−1)4−9α2δθ(2k+17)(λ−1)2+2187δ2θ2(k+1))
81δθΩ31
.
Solving ∂Π
OEM
B
∂λ = 0 for k gives kB1 =
−2α4(λ−1)4+153α2δθ(λ−1)2−2187δ2θ2
9δθ(243δθ−2α2(λ−1)2) < 0
and kB2 =
45δθ−α2(λ−1)2
9δθ > 1, and
∂2
∂ΠOEMB
∂λ
∂k2 =
4α2δθ(λ−1)(2α2(λ−1)2−243δθ)
−Ω31
< 0,
where the inequalities follow from condition 1. This implies that
∂ΠOEMB
∂λ > 0 ∀ k ∈ [0, 1]. Taking the derivative of OEM A’s profits w.r.t
k, ∂Π
OEM
A
∂k =
2(α2(λ−1)2−81δθ)(α2(λ−1)2−9δθ(k+4))
9(81δθ−2α2(λ−1)2)2 > 0 from condition 1 and
similarly, for OEM B, ∂Π
OEM
B
∂k =
2(81δθ−α2(λ−1)2)(α2(λ−1)2+9δθ(k−5))
9(81δθ−2α2(λ−1)2)2 < 0
from condition 1. Taking the derivative of ∂Π
OEM
A
∂λ and
∂ΠOEMB
∂λ
w.r.t k, ∂
2ΠOEMA
∂λ∂k =
4α2δθ(λ−1)(2α2(k+4)(λ−1)2−243δθ(k+1))
(2α2(λ−1)2−81δθ)3 < 0 and
∂2ΠOEMB
∂λ∂k =
4α2δθ(λ−1)(2α2(k−5)(λ−1)2−243δθ(k−2))
(2α2(λ−1)2−81δθ)3 > 0 from condition 1.
b) Environmental benefits at equilibrium (along with
the assumption θA = θB = θ) are evaluated
as EC =
α(1−λ)(2α4(λ−1)4−162α2δθ(λ−1)2+81δ2θ2(2k2−2k+41))
9δθΩ21
.
Taking the derivative w.r.t λ and solving ∂EC∂λ =
α(4α6(λ−1)6−486α4δθ(λ−1)4−972α2δ2θ2(k2−k−20)(λ−1)2−6561δ3θ3(2k2−2k+41))
9δθΩ31
= 0
which gives complex roots kE1 = kE + ιrE and kE2 = kE − ιrE, and
∂2(
∂EC
∂λ )
∂k2 =
108αδθ(2α2(λ−1)2+27δθ)
−Ω31
< 0, implying that ∂EC∂λ < 0 ∀ k ∈ [0, 1].
Taking the derivative w.r.t k, ∂EC∂k =
9αδθ(4k−2)(1−λ)
Ω21
which goes to zero at
k = 12 , and
∂2EC
∂k2 =
36αδθ(1−λ)
Ω21
> 0, implying EC is minimized at k = 12 .
Consumer surplus at equilibrium (along with the assumption θA = θB = θ)
is evaluated as CSC =
2α4(λ−1)4−162α2δθ(λ−1)2+81δ2θ2(2k2−2k+41)
2Ω21
. The deriv-
ative w.r.t λ is evaluated as ∂CSC∂λ =
162α2δ2θ2(1−2k)2(1−λ)
−Ω31
< 0. Taking the
derivative w.r.t k, ∂CSC∂k =
81δ2θ2(2k−1)
Ω21
which goes to zero at k = 12 , and
∂2CSC
∂k2 =
162δ2θ2
Ω21
> 0, implying CSC is minimized at k = 12 . 
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